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Thesis summary 
University of Sussex 
Andrea Carboni 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography 
 
Essays on Political Elites and Violence in Changing Political Orders of Middle East 
and Africa 
This research project addresses the question of how political elites’ behaviour varies when 
competition among them is heightened. Focusing on changing political orders across 
Africa and the Middle East, it seeks to understand how political elites facing internal and 
external challenges manipulate local power structures for political survival purposes, 
resulting in distinct political trajectories. The thesis argues that local political and conflict 
environments are conditional on the nature of competition among elites. Volatile political 
transitions, intense popular unrest, and militarised environments all create distinct 
incentives and constraints which shape political orders, and determine the inclusion or 
exclusion of select elites in the resulting political settlement. 
Using a mixed-method research design which combines quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, the thesis consists of five essays exploring select topics and three in-depth 
case studies. The essays address two cross-cutting themes. First, they show how elites 
reconfigure institutional structures to cement alliances and survive internal or external 
challenges when power is being contested after a change in the leadership, or when facing 
popular mobilisation. Bargaining occurs through ministerial appointments or purges 
which aim to consolidate political settlements and secure power holders from rivals. 
Examples from Tunisia and recent episodes of leadership changes from across Africa are 
presented together with original datasets of ministerial appointments. Second, the essays 
illustrate how patterns of violence within states are indicative of the fragmented nature of 
the political environment of the political competition therein taking place. Findings from 
Libya and Yemen are presented to demonstrate that localised fragmentation produce 
subnational geographies of conflict which reflect the strategies and the mobilisation 
capacity of armed groups and elite actors. 
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1. Introduction 
Across societies, elites occupying positions of authority are critical actors for the stability 
of political orders. By either promoting or stalling change, elites can steer the political 
trajectory of a state, and shape the nature of the political or conflict environments where 
they operate. Yet this relationship is not unidirectional: political orders within states 
create incentives and set constraints for distinct forms of contentious politics at the 
national and subnational levels. Indeed, political elites – even those sitting in the highest 
positions of authority – are often faced with external constraints. They operate in highly 
competitive environments, populated by formal political institutions and rival elites 
struggling for survival and access to power. As a result of this interaction, elite behaviour 
both shapes and is conditional upon the political orders in which these actors operate, 
producing distinct political and conflict trajectories. 
This research project is concerned with how the behaviour of political elites varies when 
competition between them is heightened, and includes either the use or the threat of 
violence. It aims to understand how emerging political orders and elite structures could 
shape different trajectories of conflict, explaining why certain actors resort to different 
forms of violence, and how conflict clusters along specific subnational geographies. It 
also explores how processes of bargaining among elites produce inclusive or exclusive 
political orders, and at which institutional or extra-institutional levels this competition 
unfolds. Two dominant themes are discussed. First, how elites in Africa and the Middle 
East behave when power is being contested and they face internal or external challenges, 
namely after a change in the leadership or amidst increased political unrest. Second, how 
geographies and patterns of violence within a state reflect the cohesive or fragmented 
nature of the political environment and of the political competition taking place therein. 
This chapter provides an introduction to the research project, outlining the main themes 
and the context, setting out the structure, and summarising the key arguments and 
findings. 
1.1. Understanding political elites and violence 
1.1.1. Context 
Over the past twenty years, several African and Middle Eastern states have experienced 
major socio-political transformations. These include: the revival of authoritarian practices 
in states expected to be democratising; the end of long-standing rulers followed by the 
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rise of competitive authoritarian regimes and controlled democracies; the outbreak of 
protest movements which sparked volatile political transitions; major demographic 
changes which upset established governance practices within and across states; and the 
rise of regional powers aspiring to extend their arc of influence through a mix of hard and 
soft power (Levitsky and Way 2010; Cheeseman 2011, 2015; Achcar 2013; Way 2016; 
Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). 
Among these is also a surge in armed conflict, a reflection of violent political 
competitions taking place within states. Despite a lower risk of civil war onset, different 
forms of violence dominate the political landscape of several countries in Africa and the 
Middle East (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Across the region, violent conflict is often an 
endemic component of political struggle, resulting in protracted local insurgencies, 
sustained rates of civilian violence, and highly fragmented conflict environments 
characterised by a variety of armed groups struggling for access to power and financial 
resources along with a widespread use of violence by state agents (Raleigh 2012a, 2016; 
Stacher 2015; Raleigh and Kishi 2018). Shifts in perpetrators and modes of civilian 
targeting particularly reveal the increasing volatility of these conflict environments, 
pointing to the worrying victimisation of civilians in modern conflict (Raleigh 2012). 
Additionally, state breakdown, as experienced by Libya and Yemen among many other 
countries in the region, demonstrates the risk of prolonged states of unrest escalating into 
domestic conflicts with wider regional implications (Polese and Santini 2018). 
Amidst widespread unrest and endemic violence, domestic political elites continue to 
steer the political trajectory of states in the region. Intense popular mobilisations, the rise 
of domestic and transnational armed groups, the emergence of multiple threats to the 
established authority: these trends all aim to challenge the legitimacy of incumbents to 
hold power over their citizens, forcing elites to design survival strategies through which 
they seek to safeguard their power and influence. These new challenges have produced a 
reconfiguration of power structures within states signalling attempts by incumbents to 
secure the support of elite groups deemed to be vital for their continued grip on power.  
Despite common perceptions about the persistence of uncontested ‘big man’-style 
governance practices (Haber 2006), most political orders are sustained by volatile 
alliances between political elites who agree to cooperate for their mutual benefit (Raleigh 
and Dowd 2018). As a result, the majority of the most monolithic authoritarian regimes 
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have institutional arrangements which, at least on paper, are supposed to regulate and 
restrain the supremacy of the ruler and their authoritarian drifts (Svolik and Boix 2007). 
An important consequence is that formal and informal practices of power co-exist in most 
political orders. Patronage and clientelist networks are often co-opted within state 
structures, which in turn reflect the variegated alliances that sustain the regime. Access to 
state institutions is often seen to regulate competition among elites by minimising the 
risks related to succession and elections while providing a stable access to rents (De Waal 
2015). Across the region, examples of this institutionalised elite competition are rife: 
recent managed leadership removals in Algeria and Sudan were followed by struggles 
over the control of interim governing bodies; questionable or ostensibly rigged elections 
in Algeria, Egypt and Ethiopia were instrumental in providing a façade of democratic 
legitimacy to entrenched authoritarian regimes; the proliferation of state institutions in 
Libya and Yemen sought to accommodate highly hostile elites through the allocation of 
state positions; while the proposed extension of presidential term limits sparked new 
struggles in Algeria, Burundi and Uganda. 
Taken together, these multiple forms of political competition and contestation require an 
explanation of how elites operate in such circumstances. Struggles over who dominates a 
political order have the potential to spark armed violence and shape specific geographies 
and patterns of conflict while determining the relative inclusiveness of its governance 
institutions. 
1.1.2. Debates 
Much of the academic scholarship on African and Middle Eastern political elites has been 
dominated by debates centred on the notions of rentierism, neo-patrimonialism, 
kleptocracy, big-man rule, and other concepts that fail to adequately account for the 
changing nature of political competition across the region (Bratton and Van de Walle 
1994). At the same time, an oversimplified conceptualisation of the state as a unitary actor 
advancing a coherent political agenda falls short of explaining divergent state-building 
trajectories. Within this framework, formal institutions, consisting of the state and its 
articulations, typically operate in parallel with, or in opposition to, informal governance, 
which displays an independent and alternative logic (North 1990; Bratton 2007; Razo 
2014). States permeated by informal institutions or captured by non-state actors are 
therefore assigned labels of ‘fragile’, ‘weak’ or ‘failed’, underscoring wider implications 
for regional security and stability (Raleigh and Dowd 2013). By accepting these state-
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centred perspectives focused on ‘failure’, the persistence of informal governance is 
viewed as a ‘temporary situation’, which is set to disappear as the state retakes its fully-
fledged ‘Weberian’ statehood. 
Importantly, studying the behaviour of ruling elites is crucial to our understanding of the 
evolution of conflict dynamics, domestically and regionally. Essentialist explanations of 
conflict have obscured the role of elites in using violence for political purposes. These 
would typically highlight the power of ideology, sectarianism and culture to drive 
conflict, and construct binary divisions between supposedly opposing immutable blocs 
(Cohen 2013). However, existing research has demonstrated the inadequacy of these 
wholesale arguments in explaining the onset of violence, revealing how violent activity 
instead responds to dynamics rooted in local political environments (Dowd 2016; Durac 
2019). 
Additionally, starting from the 1990s, and again in the aftermath of the uprisings that have 
swept across the Arab world since 2011, the ‘democratic transition’ and ‘authoritarian 
retrenchment’ paradigms have often catalysed academic and policy-making debates, 
overlooking the mechanisms through which elites may use different means, including 
violence, to influence the political process and shape emerging political orders 
(Huntington 2009; Linz and Stepan 2013). Underlying these analytical frameworks was 
the assumption that transitions from authoritarian rule are intrinsically moments of 
uncertainty, intense competition and heightened conflict, which will either generate 
(semi-)functioning democracies or revert to authoritarian regimes (Carothers 2002). 
Nevertheless, these paradigms are unable to explain the divergent patterns of violence 
witnessed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as well as elsewhere in Africa (Valbjørn 
2012; Stacher 2015). Over the past decade, academic research has nevertheless paid 
increasing attention to the study of elites for understanding the logic of conflict. The 
introduction of new frameworks in elite studies, and the greater availability of large 
datasets, have provided original insights into previously ill-defined notions of patronage 
(Arriola 2009), political order (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009), cohesion (Levitsky 
and Way 2012), and regime instability (Kroeger 2018). 
Building on these debates, there are several reasons why a study dedicated to 
understanding how elite competition works is relevant.  
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First, elite competition should not be viewed through a merely dichotomous perspective 
that pits formal and informal institutions against each other, but rather as something that 
unfolds across these levels producing innovative institutional arrangements incorporating 
both logics. In these political systems, power arises from the combination of multiple 
sources of influence and the distinction between formal structures and informal 
governance is more nuanced, warranting explanations that consider the heterogenous and 
non-hierarchical nature of the state. Drawing from perspectives that highlight the 
networked (Brass and Krackhardt 2012) and transactional (De Waal 2015) nature of 
power relationships, this research project aims to contribute to the study of contemporary 
‘political marketplaces’ understood as political orders regulated by transactions between 
elites. 
Second, elite competition regulates the logic of inclusion and exclusion in political 
settlements. Although it is a common perception that ‘big-man’ rule is the rule in most 
authoritarian regimes, all leaders are surrounded by a network of influential actors whose 
support is vital to ensure regime survival (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). Hence 
political survival is managed through the strategic inclusion (or exclusion) of key political 
elites in governance structures, which provides these actors with regular access to power 
and rents (Arriola 2011). Recent research has further confirmed that contemporary 
political orders display overall high levels of socio-political inclusion, albeit 
disproportionately among groups and within the hierarchy of the state (Raleigh and 
Wigmore-Shepherd 2020). The research project aims to address this key debate, 
presenting new empirical evidence as to how elite inclusion and exclusion are used 
strategically in changing political orders. 
Third, within a context of persisting political fluidity across Africa and the Middle East, 
elite competition continues to be a main driver of intrastate violence (Gledhill 2012). 
Envisioning this political turmoil as an open-ended process of political transformation, I 
identify its roots in a context of regime re-making, in which the weakening or the 
fragmentation of regimes creates incentives for militarised inter-elite bargaining and 
multiple forms of political violence. In some contexts, situations of protracted conflict 
produce distinct ‘wartime political orders’, in which armed groups negotiate their access 
to political power and authority through the use or threat of violence (Staniland 2012). 
This interpretation further builds on Charles Tilly’s seminal work on state-building and 
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violence (1985), which described the strategic role of violence in the making of new 
regimes and states. 
A fourth key debate concerns the implications of fragmented political environments, and 
whether these are conducive to more unstable political settlements and conflict escalation. 
Existing studies have examined the consequences of fragmentation in relation to civil war 
spaces (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012; 
Brenner 2015) as well as states and their agents (Raleigh and Dowd 2018; Raleigh and 
Kishi 2018). I seek to contribute to this scholarship by exploring the link between 
subnational geographies of violence and local political orders, and how fragmentation 
impacts on the capacity to effectively carry out collective action. 
1.1.3. Research questions 
The overarching research question guiding this project is: how do the survival strategies 
of political elites shape conflict environments amidst periods of rapid change? The 
question is explored with reference to political orders in the contemporary Middle East 
and Africa regions, in which several countries have recently experienced dramatic 
transformations resulting in different conflict patterns and divergent political trajectories. 
Where does inter-elite bargaining occur? How is political violence linked to elite 
struggles for domination over the political settlement? Which geographies of violence 
and power are set to emerge amid heightened political mobilisation?  
This thesis seeks to analyse how distinct processes of elite bargaining can create 
incentives for specific forms and patterns of political violence at local, regional and 
national levels and ultimately shape the resulting political and institutional outcomes. It 
responds to calls for a better integration of theoretical frameworks about political elites 
and violence (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Choi and Raleigh 2015; De Waal 2015), while also 
addressing the geographic and spatial contexts in which they are situated (Raleigh and 
Dowd 2018). This includes a discussion on the interaction between the state and its 
constituent elite actors as well as on the specific governance structures arising from this 
networked relationship. 
In drawing from multiple case studies from Africa and the Middle East (with Yemen 
representing the only case outside of the African continent), the research project is less 
interested in deriving regionally-situated conclusions than it is in understanding elite 
survival strategies in states under stress. The selection of the cases serve to illustrate how 
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processes of bargaining among elites are not restricted to a region (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North Africa, or else) but occur widely within and beyond the African continent, 
illustrating its common political underpinnings (George and Bennett 2005). Additionally, 
all cases included in the thesis share common institutional arrangements (i.e. a republican 
form of state) and have a recent history of political violence or protest, or a combination 
of both that produces unique challenges for incumbents. The inclusion of Yemen among 
cases lying largely within Africa follows the examples of recent studies that compare its 
practices of power with those observed in Africa, and particularly in the Horn (De Waal 
2015; Lewis 2015; Phillips 2019). 
Two main sub-questions are discussed. Each considers a dimension of the relationship 
between political elites and the respective conflict and political environments in which 
they are situated. First, this research interrogates how elites in Africa and the Middle East 
behave when power is being contested and face internal or external challenges, namely 
after a change in leadership or amidst heightened political unrest. Through this question, 
I seek to understand how incumbents attempt to consolidate a political settlement that has 
come under contestation by rallying the support of prospective allies and neutralising 
potential rivals. To do so, I analyse the political and geographic architecture of the regime 
as a reflection of an elite environment responding to internal and external challenges. The 
three articles included under this theme will explore the role of non-party ministers for 
consensual politics in Tunisia’s contemporary history, the appointment of ‘crisis cabinets’ 
in response to unrest across Africa, and the reconfiguration of elite environments in the 
aftermath of leader removals in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
Second, the following sub-question asks how geographies and patterns of violence within 
a state reflect different topographies of power at the local level. More specifically, it 
analyses how the structure of local conflict spaces, which is revealing of the cohesive or 
fragmented nature of the political environment and of the political competition taking 
place therein, shapes trajectories of conflict at the local level, determining violence 
intensity and outcomes. To this end, I focus on the concepts of fragmentation and 
cohesion in relation to armed groups and political elites in civil war contexts. The two 
articles presented under this theme will explore subnational patterns of armed group 
fragmentation in the Libyan civil war (2014-2017) as a reflection of distinct wartime 
political orders, and how elite fragmentation frustrated collective action amidst an 
attempted uprising during Yemen’s civil war. 
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1.2. Scope of the research 
This research project assumes that political elites are rational actors whose behaviour is 
predominantly driven by concerns of political survival (De Waal 2015). Consequently, I 
argue that the use of violence is rooted in the specific conditions of local conflict 
environments which can incentivise or inhibit armed conflict, and less so in cultural, 
ideological, tribal, or ‘irrational’ factors. To avoid conceptual vagueness (Sartori 1970), 
in this section I define the scope and the contours of the analytical categories applied 
throughout the research project, as a prelude to a wider discussion in the following 
chapters.  
1.2.1. Defining political elites 
This research is concerned specifically with domestic political elites, a concept that 
broadly refers to a restricted group of individuals holding positions of political authority 
within a country. While there is no agreement in the existing scholarship about what 
political elites are or what this category includes (Zartman 1974; Putnam 1976; Higley 
and Burton 2006), I adopt Volker Perthes’ definition, which identifies ‘politically relevant 
elites’ as “those individuals, groups, and networks […] in a given country who wield 
political influence and power in that they make strategic decisions or participate in 
decision making on a national level, contribute to defining political norms and values 
(including the definition of ‘national interests’), and directly influence political discourse 
on strategic issues” (2004: 5).  
This definition allows extending a country’s politically relevant elites beyond government 
and military officials to also include top party officers, professional associations, trade 
unions, media, interest groups, socio-political movements and other powerful 
organisations. A full discussion of elites who do not hold positions of authority in the 
political sphere is beyond the scope of this study. Importantly, non-politically relevant 
elites have featured prominently in academic debates on the role of elites within and 
across states, attesting to the interplay between political, economic, humanitarian, 
bureaucratic, and media elites in all political system (Best and Higley 2018). 
A second dimension of the analytical approach adopted in this thesis concerns the role of 
the elites as opposed to the ‘mobilised publics’ (Asseburg and Wimmer 2016) and 
external actors. Specifically, the research project speaks to the large body of scholarship 
that identifies elites as the key actors driving political transformations. Public masses 
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have indeed the potential of sparking change and forcing elites into making significant 
concessions, as the recent popular uprisings across Africa and the Middle East testify. 
Likewise, the involvement of external actors such as foreign armies, transnational 
political and economic elites and international financial institutions can ultimately change 
the balance of power in domestic politics, often feeding narratives about hidden agendas 
and conspiracy theories. However, I contend that neither popular masses nor international 
actors are able to determine durable political outcomes without taking into account the 
priorities and the behaviour of domestic political elites. In fact, a country’s political 
trajectory is determined by its domestic political elites, which may co-opt protest 
movements, accept foreign support or antagonise them in pursuit of their own political 
agendas or survival strategies. Nevertheless, the analyses presented in this thesis consider 
the transformative role of mobilised publics and external actors, especially in their 
relation to their impact on elite choices. 
1.2.2. Defining violence 
Additionally, the research focuses specifically on political violence, which is understood 
as “the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” (Raleigh et al. 
2010). Physical manifestations of political violence are only one form of a broader 
phenomenon, which also has significant symbolic, structural and systemic ramifications 
(Galtung 1969; Arendt 1972; Habermas 1986; Bourdieu 1990; Fanon 2004). While not 
directly addressed in this study, these dimensions of violence are considered in relation 
to governance practices and the wider dimensions of power. 
Violence is considered in relation to its political dimensions and its larger impact on 
domestic and transnational political stability (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Raleigh et al. 
2010). This includes a variety of manifestations of violence perpetrated by states, rebel 
groups, and armed militias operating independently or at the behest of state and local 
elites, which target other violent agents and civilians. Incidents of violence that are 
predominantly interpersonal, criminal and social (for example, gender-based violence) in 
nature are not the focus of this research project. In several contexts, however, the 
boundaries between these different forms of violence are blurred, as examples of state 
agents and armed groups tolerating or sustaining organised criminal networks illustrate 
(Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008; Reno 2009; Herbert 2018; Gallien 
2019). 
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1.3. Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing scholarship on political violence and elites, 
outlining the theoretical framework of the research. The chapter highlights the political 
significance of violence, drawing attention to how inter-elite relations dictate the 
functioning of the political orders. The main approaches, existing gaps, and unresolved 
issues are discussed. Chapter 3 delineates the research design. 
The empirical chapters 4 to 8 address the substantive issues of the research, touching upon 
two main themes. Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted to the analysis of elite behaviour in 
changing political orders, including the use of consensus-based politics in Tunisia 
between 2011 and 2018 (Chapter 4); the appointment of ‘crisis cabinets’ following 
heightened unrest across Africa (Chapter 5); and elite positioning in the wake of 
leadership changes in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe between 2017 and 2019 (Chapter 
6). Chapter 7 and 8 instead look at the structural component of the elite dimension to 
understand how the fragmented or cohesive nature of conflict spaces can influence 
violence trajectories in civil war contexts. The proposed case studies include an in-depth 
investigation of political elites in the Sana’a-based government in Yemen (Chapter 7) and 
an analysis of armed group fragmentation in 2014-2017 Libya (Chapter 8). A summary 
of the articles is presented below. 
1.3.1. Non-party ministers and consensual politics in Tunisia 
Authors: Andrea Carboni 
Publication status and target journal: Submitted to The Journal of North African Studies 
 
Non-party ministers have constituted a defining feature of contemporary Tunisia. Often 
boasting a technocratic profile, these ministers have served in an increasing number of 
ministerial positions under Ben Ali and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The article 
aims to explain why Tunisia’s incumbents have routinely selected non-party ministers 
over the past thirty years, and how these choices reflect diverging strategies of 
government. It contends that non-party ministers are critical components of Tunisia’s 
changing political orders, whose role changed dramatically before and after 2011 despite 
an ever more prominent presence in the executive. While under Ben Ali the participation 
of non-party ministers reflected the president’s attempt to neutralise opponents 
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depoliticising the executive, after 2011 their increasing involvement in government 
contributed to consolidate a consensus-based pact between different political forces. 
Using an original dataset of ministerial appointments between 1987 and 2018, the 
analysis intends to provide a more nuanced understanding of Tunisia’s current order and 
political settlements more broadly. 
1.3.2. Crisis Cabinets and the influence of protests on elite volatility in 
Africa 
Authors: Andrea Carboni and Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd 
Publication status and target journal: Submitted to Research & Politics 
 
Appointments in senior government are one of the many tools leaders can use to ensure 
their political survival. Leaders regularly reshuffle their cabinets outside of election 
periods in an effort to prevent, or manage, challenges to their leadership. However, how 
different types of threat lead to different types of change within the senior government 
remains largely unexplored. Using an original dataset of African cabinets, we examine 
whether public protests can influence leaders to make changes to their government to 
mollify public discontent, and whether these changes take a particular form. The findings 
demonstrate that protest movements alone are rarely conducive to the appointment of 
‘crisis cabinets’ unless elites capitalise on the unrest to mount a challenge against the 
leader. We also highlight that cabinet reshuffles instituted in response to intense protest 
tend to address protest demands through a ‘changing of the guard’ and the dismissal of 
long-standing elites heavily associated with the regime. Through this analysis, the article 
seeks to provide a more granular understanding of regime reactions to protests, and to 
contribute to a growing focus on African executives. 
1.3.3. Rebooting the System. Regime Cycles, Elites, and Succession in 
African States 
Authors: Andrea Carboni and Clionadh Raleigh 
Publication status and target journal: Submitted to Journal of Modern African Studies 
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Theories of regime change in Africa often rely on various ‘single moment’ approaches. 
The ‘coup’ literature posits internal revolutions come from removing the leader; the 
‘uprising’ literature suggests change comes from public protest external to the regime; 
and the ‘transitology’ literature explains how trajectories towards or away from 
democracy often arise as a consequence of elections. A common assumption across these 
explanations is that regimes do significantly change after a coup, public uprising or 
significant election. Yet, across multiple African regimes that recently experienced a 
significant regime rupture, we see continuity in the people, systems, policies, and political 
relationships that populate and structure new governments. What can explain the subtle 
yet significant shifts that occur between senior elites and authorities after a regime crisis? 
We posit that regime crisis is best understood as one of several elite dynamics that 
commonly occur within an authoritarian regime cycle. We argue that the cycle evident 
across African authoritarian regimes is driven by a process of elite contestation and 
consolidation, and dynamic are defined by expectations as to when leaders may leave 
office. These dynamics therefore indicate the leader-elite relationships are at given time, 
and suggest when regimes may expand, contract, purge, and fracture as political interests 
within alter a leader’s claim on power. We focus here on four dynamics of crisis, 
accommodation, consolidation, and factionalisation, and apply our cycle explanation to 
recent regime changes in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
 
1.3.4. Taming the snakes. The Houthis, Saleh and the struggle for power in 
Yemen 
Authors: Andrea Carboni 
Publication status and target journal: Preparing for submission to Middle East Studies 
 
This article analyses the events surrounding the collapse of the alliance between Ansar 
Allah and the faction of the General People’s Congress aligned with former Yemeni 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017. Comparing the structure of their 
respective elite networks, the articles argues that different levels of cohesion among elites 
were key in determining the outcome of the failed Saleh-inspired uprising. Reflecting a 
patronage-based support base, higher fragmentation within Saleh’s camp hampered its 
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capacity to mobilise and coordinate elites in a critical juncture, and left it subsequently 
exposed to repression and co-option. The article further highlights how power relations 
were not dictated by institutional power-sharing arrangements, but are rather a function 
of how elites are situated within the network and the strength of the ties they share. 
1.3.5. Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict 
Systems in the Libyan Civil War 
Authors: Andrea Carboni and James Moody 
Publication status and target journal: Published in Small Wars and Insurgencies 
 
After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned 
space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious, and 
ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational 
governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political 
orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in 
Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local 
interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups 
during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in 
eastern, western, and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of 
armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to 
authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance 
relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability 
and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant 
actor, their strategies, and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this 
analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics 
that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally. 
1.4. Main findings 
The findings that emerge from this research project relate to three main areas. First, I 
present evidence of the heterogenous nature of conflict spaces and corporate groups 
among several examples from Africa and the Middle East, to demonstrate how their 
relative fragmentation (or cohesion) affects violence onset and intensity. I further show 
that the elite-conflict nexus is multidirectional, and plays out at the national, regional and 
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local levels. Second, elite inclusion should not be viewed as a mere issue of institutional 
representation which concerns the distribution of political offices among key socio-
political constituencies. Rather, it involves the degree to which these groups are able to 
maintain access to power in different political arrangements. Third, political survival 
animates the behaviour of elites in changing political orders, requiring a combination of 
accommodation and repression according to the circumstances. 
1.4.1. The elite-violence nexus 
I show that conflict patterns in civil war contexts are indicative of the fragmented nature 
of the political environment and of the political competition taking place therein. These 
conflict spaces are populated by highly heterogenous groups competing with each other 
for political influence and power, and with political elites whose support is deemed 
essential to secure survival. Drawing from the examples of Libya and Yemen, I argue that 
the vanishing of state institutions did not produce ‘ungoverned spaces’, but rather wartime 
political orders characterised by subnational state-making practices, volatile alliances and 
distinct geographies of violence. 
Using different methodologies, I show that the fragmentation of these wartime political 
orders can influence conflict intensity and onset in various ways. First, conflict 
geographies are embedded in the nature and modes of domestic political competition. In 
Libya, subnational variations in violence levels are a product of the interaction between 
national and local political considerations, which inhibited or incentivised fragmentation 
and violence intensity. The emergence of wartime political orders – each characterised 
by distinct levels of fragmentation and violence – therefore reflects locally-situated 
governance relations between armed groups and the dominant power holder. Second, 
fragmented groups find significant constraints to mobilise and secure support from local 
elites. The ability to conduct successful collective action – ranging from coup attempts to 
uprisings – rests on the ability of the leadership to mobilise its loyal supporters. During a 
regime’s existential crisis, the absence of a cohesive support base risks leaving elites more 
exposed to repression, co-option and defection; a fate that many incumbents and power 
holders from Sudan and Zimbabwe to Yemen came to realise. 
Theories positing a link between elite or armed group fragmentation and violence argue 
that when fragmentation is higher, the risk of violence and instability are also greater 
(Cunningham 2012; Levitsky and Way 2012). However, the examples from Libya and 
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Yemen reveal that fragmentation alone is not a predictor of violence patterns. Despite 
arguments highlighting the purely sectarian, regional, or state-centred motivations of 
conflict, the research project emphasises the importance of local political conditions and 
power relations in providing domestic elite groups with incentives to escalate violence 
and seek access to power. 
1.4.2. Elite inclusion 
A second set of findings concerns the notion of elite inclusion in political orders. Existing 
literature on this subject typically assumes that political power reflects the institutional 
representation assigned to key constituencies. As a result, in states regulated by 
patronage-based mechanisms, the distribution of political offices according to socio-
political criteria – such as region, ethnicity, or tribe – signals the leadership’s willingness 
to cement coalitions with the groups represented in the state’s apical political institutions. 
In fact, the notion of inclusion is multidimensional, and political power cannot be 
measured solely as a matter of representation (Rocha Menocal 2017). 
I show instead that this relation is more complex. In some contexts, elites may decide to 
deliberately renounce to government positions in order to maximise political power or 
rule by consensus, explaining the rise of non-party ministers that would otherwise be 
impossible to explain through patronage-based arguments (Chapter 4). The 
reconfiguration of existing political alliances is otherwise shown to occur following 
existential challenges faced by a regime, requiring a reshuffle in the composition of its 
governing elites (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 7 further highlights that institutional 
representation is a poor indicator of a group’s relative power. Indeed, power-sharing 
agreements may result in unbalanced political settlements when some key political 
brokers, by virtue of their position within wider elite networks, are able to exercise 
disproportionate power either individually or as part of a corporate group. Signalling a 
desire for greater inclusion in the distribution of rents, armed groups acting at the behest 
of local elites may resort to different forms of political violence, often without requiring 
escalation (Chapter 8). In such cases, power is conditional on their ability to use violence 
to extract rents, including political representation in the state’s governance institutions.  
Additionally, I emphasise the importance of understanding the conditions in which 
political power is exercised. One-size-fits-all solutions prescribing the application of 
institutional arrangements in different political contexts are unlikely to produce the same 
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political outcomes but can instead exacerbate existing power imbalances. Notably, the 
popular branding of Tunisia’s technocratic governance as a model for governance in 
conflict-ridden states such as Yemen (Al-Akhali, Al-Rawhani and Biswell 2019) rests on 
the assumption that non-party governments are inherently apolitical, leaving government 
affairs to highly competent technocrats while sidelining the real power holders. Instead, 
the Tunisia example analysed in Chapter 4 shows how governments consisting of non-
affiliated ministers are also the outcome of highly political processes and ostensibly 
inclusive and accepted elite settlements. 
1.4.3. Political survival in changing political orders 
A third key finding arising from this research project is the importance of understanding 
elites’ political survival strategies in changing political orders. I show that elites employ 
a variety of strategies to ensure their continued access to power, ranging from making 
political concessions for opponents to using repression and violence against rivals. This 
political bargaining, aimed at securing survival, in power often occurs through cabinet 
appointments, requiring the reconfiguration of ruling coalitions to weather volatile 
political transitions or popular mobilisation. These are moments of intense political 
fluidity (Banegas 1993), mutating shared expectations over the regime’s or the leader’s 
survival and exacerbating defections or alliance switches. In response to these changing 
circumstances, changes in the regime’s hierarchy can either be cosmetic, when intended 
to placate unrest through co-option or facilitating demobilisation, or can significantly alter 
the composition of the ruling coalition in an effort to broaden the regime’s support base 
or purge the most restive among the allies. 
I show that similar mechanisms occurred in the aftermath of three leadership changes in 
Africa when the elites orchestrating the leader’s removal faced the challenge of anchoring 
the regime in society and among the elites (Chapter 6). This required a broad 
reconfiguration of existing alliances and power structures which, however, left the seizing 
group’s leading role uncontested. In Chapter 5, I also find that events of popular unrest 
across Africa rarely trigger a drastic overhaul of the cabinet, epitomising a widely shared 
attitude when resisting change. Instead, when such accommodation occurs, this reflects 
the survival-oriented political calculations and strategies of elites. 
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2. Literature review 
In recent years, a growing body of scholarly literature has investigated the drivers, forms 
and consequences of violent conflict across the globe. Studies have increasingly 
addressed the political dimension of conflict in an effort to understand the political 
processes underpinning violence onset, diffusion and continuation. The role of elites has 
been the subject of renewed scrutiny, particularly in response to stalled democratic 
transitions and authoritarian retrenchment in Africa and the Middle East. The project 
addresses these debates, seeking to understand how inter-elite competition shapes 
political orders and trajectories of conflict. 
Each of the analytical chapters in this thesis includes a brief discussion of the relevant 
literature which serves as theoretical framework to a specific research question and 
findings. This chapter instead aims to bring together the different literatures that apply to 
the project as a whole to provide a succinct overview of the larger academic debates and 
establish a coherent intellectual foundation. I address four main – and largely 
interconnected – themes. First, I discuss the determinants of political violence, and in 
particular its strategic dimension in political processes. The second section addresses the 
notion of political elites, tracing its evolution in scholarly debates and discussing the main 
empirical challenges. The third section discusses the notion of ‘political marketplaces’, 
situating elites within contemporary systems of governance in Africa and the Middle East. 
The fourth part concludes with a wider discussion on elite fragmentation, cohesion and 
exclusion in these political orders, examining their impact on conflict trajectories.  
2.1. Understanding political violence 
Explanations of political violence typically refer to two main schools, one that ascribes 
violence to state capacity (or the lack thereof) and one that describes violence as 
functional to political strategies.  
Theoretical approaches focusing on state capacity connect the onset of violence to the 
breakdown of state structures. In establishing a link between institutional characteristics 
and the onset of collective contentious action, these arguments suggest that weak or 
transitional regimes offer incentives to non-state actors for organising and using violence, 
while the government is unable to contain behavioural challenges effectively. Recent 
research has studied the relationship between regime characteristics and civil war onset 
to conclude that weak governments and mixed regimes, or anocracies, are more 
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vulnerable to violent collective action and insurgencies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003;).  
Violence is therefore the product of chaos, exacerbated by pervasive state failure and 
weakness in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War (Kaldor 1999). Across much of 
Africa and the Middle East, instability is primarily driven by the proliferation of failed 
states, territorial entities characterised by an inadequate exercise of sovereign authority 
and the predominance of non-state actors over institutional structures (Rotberg 2002). 
Tackling domestic and regional insecurity therefore requires that a government can 
establish its monopoly over the use of physical force, restoring the necessary condition 
of statehood. 
Hence the ‘failed state’ argument, which was popularised in academic debates and in the 
practice of states and international organisations (Thürer 1999; International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001), reduces the onset of violence within a 
territory to the mere capacity of a state of exercising sovereign authority. This arises from 
the predication that functioning states possess fully-fledged Weberian statehood, whereby 
the state is able to enforce its authority across the territory. However, the reality of many 
African and Middle Eastern states is different, because political institutions are 
characterised by uneven ‘topographies of power’ (Boone 2003) and the spatial and 
temporal persistence of ‘areas of limited statehood’ structured along unconventional 
governance hierarchies (Risse 2017; Polese and Santini 2018). While uneven state 
outreach may provide incentives for the emergence of armed non-state actors, the notion 
of ‘ungoverned spaces’ bears little resemblance to reality and ignores the “local and 
national contexts and mechanisms that promote violence within a state” (Raleigh and 
Dowd 2013: 11).  
Additionally, by treating states as unitary entities, these approaches have limited the 
analysis of violence onset to specific national and structural characteristics, failing to 
address how subnational geographies of power can produce different institutional 
outcomes or conflict patterns across countries. They also do not account for how political 
elites may activate or de-activate violence domestically and for how conflict may cluster 
in specific subnational geographies. The absence of the state – and not intra-elite 
dynamics – are key to determining the manifestation of instability. 
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A second school interprets violence as a strategic tool serving political goals. Within this 
framework, authors either ascribe violence to the ideological agendas of specific political 
groups (see Dowd 2016: 42; Durac 2019) or explain the role within wider political 
processes. According to the ‘political opportunity’ argument developed in the work of 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, the form and the timing of contentious politics are 
conditional on the political opportunities arising from the institutional and power 
structures of a given political system (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2007; Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007). These political opportunities relate to the characteristics of a regime, 
and include the presence of multiple centres of power, the coercion capacity, the degree 
of opening, the cohesion of the ruling coalition and of the opposition, and the level of 
repression. The authors therefore link the emergence of specific forms of contention to 
institutional frameworks that can prescribe, tolerate or prohibit such collective action and 
enforce their authoritative in a more or less effective way (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 72-
74).1 Changes in the political opportunities structure of a specific regime can thus explain 
variations in the emergence and modes of collective action across time and space focusing 
on the interaction between state and non-state actors. 
Despite the limitations of the ‘political opportunity’ framework, including its reliance on 
measures of democracy to explain the likelihood of regime accommodation and 
repression (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010), it importantly highlights how violence is 
situated within a wider quest for power involving multiple political groups. Violence is a 
tool of political bargaining that actors use for several political goals, including to signal 
resources and interests, eliminate political opponents or frustrate collective action and 
mobilisation (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund 2020). Its onset is facilitated when ruling 
elites are fragmented and unable to act collectively, or when the stakes of political 
competition are high: this strategic perspective is used to explain, among other things, 
electoral violence, where violence becomes one of the tools that candidates and groups 
use to achieve electoral ends (Hafner-Burton 2014). 
 
1 High-capacity non-democratic regimes typically repress any form of active dissent, outlawing a wide 
range of repertoires of contention and making it more likely that political conflict will occur clandestinely, 
outside institutional borders (what the authors term ‘transgressive contentious politics’). At the other side 
of the spectrum stand low-capacity non-democratic regimes, where the government is typically unable to 
repress non-state contentious action and lethal conflicts are therefore a likely outcome. Suffering from 
chronic instability and institutional weakness, low-capacity democratic regimes are prone to military coups, 
ethnic, political or religious uprisings, and other violent forms of contentious action. Finally, high-capacity 
democratic regimes create the conditions for social movements to emerge and organise their claims (Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007). 
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The conceptualisation of violence as a tool for political bargaining implies that a 
multitude of actors have access to it. In many contexts, governments, political militias, 
rebel groups, party chiefs and local authorities have access to violent means, and do not 
hesitate to use force, or threaten to use it, to achieve political goals. Before explaining 
how this negotiation occurs, and how violence upholds armed political settlements, I now 
turn to discuss the notion of political elites, the key notion underpinning this research 
project. 
2.2. Understanding political elites 
Political thought has long grappled with the notion of elites, in an effort to explain the 
emergence of a ruling class in society (Pakulski, in Best and Higley 2018: 9). However, 
systematic studies on elite behaviour appeared only in the early twentieth century, largely 
thanks to the pioneering work of European liberal authors confronting the increasing 
bureaucratisation and segmentation of society (see, among others, Mosca 1939; 
Schumpeter 1942; Michels 1959; Pareto 1966; Weber 1978). These early elite theorists 
pointed out the existence of a homogenous, autonomous and self-perpetuating ruling class 
wielding power over the masses. In complex societies characterised by growing division 
of labour and social stratification, effective governance requires the existence of a 
segmented and skilled ruling class, according to an ‘iron law’ that perpetuates the power 
of the elites. 
A new generation of scholars started to question the premises of classical theory after 
WWII, criticising the internal homogeneity and the limited size of elites postulated by 
classical elitism. Theorists as diverse as Charles Wright Mills (1956) and Robert Dahl 
(1961) shed new light on elite behaviour, highlighting that inter-elite interactions are far 
more complex, and that power is broadly distributed across society. In their studies of 
elites in the United States, Wright Mills and Dahl showed that power was a resource not 
held by a single, homogenous power elite, but by a composite set of competing elites who 
ally and wield varying influence over decision-making processes. In other words, elites 
do usually control only certain resources, and can be found at any level of society. These 
“functional elites” are therefore far more pervasive than the “hegemonies” controlling all 
resources, which constitute instead a rare occurrence in modern political systems. 
A question that has long puzzled elite theorists concerns the definition of what actually 
makes up an elite. Despite a long tradition in social sciences, there is little consensus on 
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which groups constitute elites and how they exercise their power in wider society. Early 
attempts to provide an empirical determination of elites focused upon their ability to 
influence the decision-making process and the allocation of resources across society 
thanks to their disproportionate power (Quandt 1969; Waterbury 1970; Dekmejian 1971; 
Zonis 1971). These definitions, however, were often more concerned with issues of 
definition than issues of fact (Putnam 1976: 5), fighting “boundary wars” and seeking 
“ultimate concepts” (Zartman 1974: 470). Nevertheless, these efforts at defining elites as 
a powerful class reveal that elite studies are a complex and contentious matter (Higley 
and Burton 2001: 182): elite boundaries are unclear and change according to the definition 
and the lens we adopt; their behaviour is elastic and its influence often hard to determine 
empirically; inter-elite relations are similarly complex, as are relations with the rest of 
society. This makes the task of determining the real impact of elites on society 
academically challenging, as elites are never the only factor that explains change but are 
always combined with other social processes (Lasch 1995). 
In general terms, elites are defined by the relative power they exercise, or are accorded, 
in society (Salverda and Abbink 2013: 1). They include all influential individuals who 
occupy a position of authority in a community and seek to preserve this privileged status. 
In other words, a definition of political elites that embraces the complexity of domestic 
power structures should not only include the persons in highest offices, but a wider range 
of “governors, provincial chairmen, and mayors, as well as village chiefs, headmen, and 
leaders of party cells” (Paige 1977). In his seminal study on political elites in the Middle 
East, Volker Perthes (2004: 5) reaches a similar conclusion by introducing the concept of 
‘politically relevant elites’ to identify  
“those people in a given country who wield political influence and power 
in that they make strategic decisions or participate in decision-making on 
a national level, contribute to defining political norms and values 
(including the definition of ‘national interests’), and directly influence 
political discourse on strategic issues”.  
This definition has important theoretical implications, and is also used as the theoretical 
formulation underpinning the concept of elites for this research project. First, it implies 
that power is not restricted to those who occupy nominal positions of power, but also 
includes those individuals or groups who exercise power outside formal institutional 
arrangements. Elite status is indeed the result of the accumulation of multiple sources of 
power, and the ability of converting and projecting that power in a political environment 
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(Malejacq 2019). Second, it understands power as a resource distributed across several 
circles, wielding varying degree of influence on the political process. Around the 
immediate core are a number of operatives who contribute to the survival of the regime, 
such as rank-and-file party members, government officers, business and bureaucratic 
elites. They share the ability of influencing political discourse and defining political 
norms, enabling the implementation of regime policies. A third important implication 
concerns the dynamic nature of the concept. Rather than an ascribed, immutable attribute, 
elite status – and the resulting distribution of power – is subject to changes in the external 
environment. Internal unrest, economic downturns, international realignments: they all 
contribute to change the strategic considerations of individuals and groups as well as their 
bargaining power vis à vis other domestic actors (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016). 
In the last few decades, the study of elites has developed to incorporate more empirical 
approaches. Empirical studies have largely focused on the social composition of elites, 
patterns of intra-elite conflict, how leaders distinguish themselves from the rest of the 
elite, how elites are recruited and vary over time (Blondel and Muller-Rommel, in 
Klingemann and Dalton 2007: 818-832). These new perspectives on elites have paid more 
attention to identifying the individuals occupying top positions in decision-making 
institutions, thus making inferences on the social characteristics (such as age, education, 
gender, or social background) of elite circles. Additionally, they have benefitted 
enormously by the compilation of publicly available datasets and elite surveys, which 
allowed systematic comparative analyses of different political systems (Hoffmann-
Lange, in Klingemann and Dalton 2007: 910-927).  
As the interest in more empirically grounded elite studies grew, so did the demand for 
addressing the boundary problem: in other words, where should we look to study elites? 
The boundary problem carries important theoretical and practical consequences, since 
studying either 30 or 300 elites assumes different understandings and research methods 
(Laumann, Marsden and Prensky 1989). In the absence of a uniformly applicable 
definition for elites, elite studies must be spatially and temporally situated, and assign 
public and reproducible criteria to the category of “political elites” (Zartman 1974: 469).  
Another important dimension of elite studies is their geographical focus. Despite 
continuing interest in elite groups in social sciences, empirical research has focused 
largely on Western societies, where the abundance of data has allowed the compilation 
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of large-n datasets. By contrast, there has been much less research on non-Western elites 
(Salverda and Abbink 2013: 2). This is partly explained by the fact that power in much 
of the developing world is often understood to reside outside the established formal 
institutions, which makes it difficult to identify influential power holders by merely 
looking at top government positions. This is especially true in Africa and the Middle East, 
where official public institutions have been traditionally kept weak in favour of more 
informal, private-like systems of governance (Bayart 1993; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; 
Owen 2012). Nonetheless, the early processes of democratisation along with the growing 
institutionalisation of political practices in many African and Middle Eastern states 
starting from the 1990s has attracted growing academic attention in terms of elite 
behaviour and its wider impact on political stability (Goldsmith 2001). 
The role of elites as agents and factors of change to explain domestic instability was 
further explored in several studies on political (Posner and Young 2007; Arriola 2009; 
Barkan 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Osei 2015) and military (Barany 2011, 
2013; Albrecht 2015;) institutions in Africa and the Middle East. This research has shed 
new light on the internal mechanisms of formal institutional structures in the developing 
world. In line with Asseburg and Wimmen (2016), I seek to make sense of elite behaviour 
in states under stress, where inter-elite struggles over power and competition for influence 
can sometimes constitute an existential threat to the status of incumbents. 
Indeed, by restricting access to the central decision-making institutions and presiding over 
the allocation of scarce resources, domestic elites are instrumental in shaping the political 
trajectory of a state. Elite groups always compete with one another, and with other groups 
outside the elite network, to control power and resources. However, whereas some elites 
agree on the rules of the game to ‘tame’ political competition (Sartori 1995), others resort 
to violent means in order to settle their divergences and preserve their position within 
networks of power. In this latter case, intra-elite conflict is likely to shape the political 
environment, and conflict patterns thus reflect the degree of integration or disintegration 
of ruling elites. 
2.3. The ‘political marketplace’ framework. Political elites as business managers 
in Africa and the Middle East 
Political elites do not operate in a vacuum, but are situated in a wider political framework 
that regulates the interactions between them through norms and institutions with varying 
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degrees of formalisation. In Africa and in the Middle East, the practice of politics is 
typically understood through the language of neo-patrimonialism and rentierism. 
According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 458), the concept of neo-patrimonialism 
describes political systems where the exercise of political power mostly serves the private 
interests of the ruling elite. Despite the presence of formal institutions, bureaucratic 
offices and binding norms, public officials exercise power using personal patronage to 
award personal favours and bolster popular support among certain societal groups. In a 
similar fashion, Hazem Beblawi (1990) identifies the heavy dependence on external rents 
as the single most important characteristic of rentier states. This reliance on rents (which 
usually derive from natural resources or other strategic assets, such as military aid) exerts 
a negative effect on the country’s economic and political development, as it does not 
provide incentives for creating an efficient bureaucracy, stimulating the domestic 
productive sector and increasing institutional accountability. As a consequence, efforts at 
democratisation are undermined in both systems of governance. 
Dominating much of the academic and policy discourse in recent decades, these 
frameworks arguably described (and still do in many cases) several political realities 
across Africa and the Middle East. However, new trends emerging across the region seem 
to have changed the political landscape of many states (De Waal 2014: 1-2). First, despite 
major international efforts and sustained socio-economic growth, states have become 
more fragmented than in the past. Second, the decrease in the number of civil war and 
large-scale killings has not been matched by greater stability and peace. Third, 
international interventions, far from stabilising countries, are generating more insecurity, 
both domestically and regionally. Finally, identity markers maintain their importance 
despite the decreasing influence of tribal, ethnic and subnational authorities. 
Acknowledging this changing reality, Célestin Monga (1996) wrote two decades ago that 
the neo-patrimonial framework was no longer relevant when describing the contemporary 
systems of governance in the developing world.  
Indeed, political systems have undergone profound transformations. Driven by the 
emergence of transnational financial networks, the introduction of new 
telecommunications technologies, and the multiplication of sources of rents following 
new systems of international intervention across the world (aid, counter-terrorism, 
cooperation against international organised crime are just a few examples), the forms of 
political power have come to reflect a new reality in which the control over the means of 
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coercion is increasingly dispersed and political bargaining is conducted through violence, 
or the threat thereof. To describe the changing realities of politics in Africa and the Middle 
East, Alex De Waal applies the notion of the ‘political marketplace’ in relation to: 
 “a contemporary system of governance, characterized by pervasive 
monetized patronage, in the form of exchange of political loyalty or 
cooperation for payment. The countries where this occurs share three 
principal features, namely (a) the dominance of inter-personal political 
bargaining over formal rules and procedures, (b) pervasive rent-seeking 
by members of the political and business elite, and (c) integration into a 
global patronage order. The political marketplace is not a transitional or 
outdated system that is about to be replaced by Weberian states, but a 
flexible and dynamic governance order.” (De Waal 2014: 1). 
Describing state formation in the Arabian Peninsula, Uzi Rabi (2006: 3) similarly 
observes that “[T]he state should not be seen as an independent political actor but rather 
as a ‘political field,’ i.e., an arena in which diverse actors compete for influence and 
resources. States in this context should not be seen in a fully-fledged ‘Weberian’ manner, 
dominated by a rational bureaucratic model.” The political marketplace framework 
conceives political elites as akin to business managers acting in a political market, where 
political bargaining is conducted primarily through the exchange of cooperation for 
reward and the price of loyalty is set by the intersection between demand and supply (De 
Waal 2014: 1). In this context, political entrepreneurs use money, coercion (or the threat 
thereof) and all other resources at their disposal to ensure that their competitors comply 
with the rules of the system. Politics is therefore mostly driven by material, personal 
interests, with very little room for elements such as ideologies, law and formal rules.  
The political marketplace thus creates opportunities for alternative forms of political 
bargaining and imposes constraints on the behaviour of the political elites. Within this 
framework, politics varies along four main dimensions: political finance, degree of 
centralisation of the tools of coercion, the nature of the political bargaining, and the 
integration with transnational markets (De Waal 2015). These variables influence the 
mechanisms of political bargaining by creating incentives for existing elites to stage rent-
seeking rebellions, by opening up spaces for new actors to join the marketplace or by 
increasing or limiting the amount of resources available to the political entrepreneurs. 
Since such mechanisms are reproduced at all levels, persistent instability and turbulence 
shape the dynamics of the political marketplace. Failure to meet the expectations of 
intermediate or local elites may result in struggles between elites seeking to extract their 
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share of resources or in the collapse of the existing marketplace and the subsequent 
replacement of the incumbent. 
The fragmentation that characterises the dynamics of these regimes multiplies the 
challenges faced by political leaders. According to Joel Migdal, whether a narrow core 
elite is indeed in control or is forced to negotiate with peripheral centres of power is 
unclear in most authoritarian regimes (Migdal 2001: 36). A typical outcome of such 
situations is the militarisation of the political marketplace. Alex De Waal observes that 
this is a common situation in the Horn of Africa, where control over the means of coercion 
is decentralised and a wide range of political actors or groups use violence to extort rents 
and negotiate loyalty to the ruler. (ibid.: 16). This was also the case of Yemen, where 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled for over three decades in a highly fragmented country, 
where local, tribal armed militias vying for power and patronage periodically used or 
threatened violence to claim their share of rents.  
However, political marketplaces do not display the same degree of pervasive 
militarisation. Alternating violence and accommodation, political entrepreneurs may 
resort to alternative strategies to placate rent-seeking elites, with violence only used as a 
last resort. Typical expressions of tamed, neo-patrimonial political bargaining include 
patronage and coup-proofing, whereby rulers seek to reward intermediate elites to buy 
their loyalty and deflect any challenge to the leadership. Patronage refers to the practice 
of granting material benefits to specific groups of people to enhance regime stability 
(Arriola 2009: 1340). It includes the allocation of funds or the creation of public sector 
jobs in strategic constituencies, the systematic co-opting of targeted groups into the 
bureaucracy or the distribution of government posts among certain regional or ethnic 
communities. As such, patronage has constituted a central component of African and 
Middle Eastern governance for decades (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; Erdle, in Perthes 
2004; Alley 2010; Liddell 2010; Owen 2012: 49-53). Coup-proofing describes instead 
the variety of strategies that rulers use to prevent existential challenges from arising 
within their own regime (Svolik 2009). Ruling elites across Africa and the Middle East 
have long tried to mitigate risks to their leadership by establishing ethnic or communal 
ties between officers and incumbents, creating parallel security institutions (otherwise 
known as counterbalancing), rotating military and bureaucratic officials frequently, 
distributing material incentives and exploiting communal ties (Heydemann 2007; Pilster 
and Bohmelt 2011; Makara 2013; Albrecht 2015; De Bruin 2018). 
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However, there is still some ambiguity about the relationship between these phenomena 
and political stability. Arriola (2009) points out that the concept of patronage has been 
used to explain both the endemic political instability and the enduring survival of African 
regimes. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 462-463) argue that elites in neo-patrimonial 
regimes fracture over access to limited resources, exploiting ethnic, regional or other 
identity markers. Pervasive patronage undermines democratic procedures – where in 
place – as leaders may capitalise on divisive identities to secure popular support, while 
generating grievances among underprivileged elite groups. These may be tempted to use 
violence in order to be included in patronage networks or negotiate a better position. The 
events of the Arab uprisings seem to suggest that coup-proofing does not always ensure 
regime survival, nor stability (Barany 2011). At the same time, Huntington (1968: 70), 
Bayart (1993) and Van de Walle (2007) point to the stabilising effects of patronage, which 
allows the maintenance of cross-cutting elite clientelist relations and the creation of a 
cohesive ruling coalition. Both patronage and coup-proofing seek to tie the fate of certain 
groups to the survival of the regime to ensure their loyalty and prevent regime overthrow 
(Makara 2013: 230). Indeed, the proliferation of ministerial positions and security bodies 
is intended to reward key constituencies and like-minded elites, while keeping possible 
competitors weak and disorganised. 
2.4. Linking elites, political orders and patterns of violence 
The political marketplace framework attempts to provide a model of political governance 
dominated by militarised inter-elite bargaining to explain trajectories of conflict and state-
building. It is concerned with a variegated class of politic elites motivated by self-
enrichment, in which access to domestic and transnational rents increases the political 
budget, the price of loyalty, and regime dependence from intermediate elites. Whilst 
intended to tame and regulate conflict, the patronage-based network exposed in De 
Waal’s argument results in the emergence of a violence-ridden state hostile to 
development. 
De Waal’s model, however, is dominated by a transactional logic of political bargaining 
that has not found universal application, even in states supposedly described as emblems 
of a militarised political marketplace like South Sudan (Watson 2016: 189). In its essence, 
the political marketplace argument is a revisited version of the ‘greed-not-grievance’ 
approach popularised by Collier (2000), which explains violence as a mere consequence 
of elite predation. Militarised political marketplaces are therefore the outcome of a 
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corrupted form of state-building: this resonates with similar arguments that identify a 
sequential pattern in the development of political orders, which are set to improve their 
developmental credentials as they transition from limited to open access orders (North et 
al. 2013). 
Despite these limitations, and a largely hazy vocabulary, the ‘political marketplaces’, 
‘political orders’,2 ‘political environments’,3 ‘political (un-)settlement’4 literatures 
constitute a valid attempt to move beyond hierarchical and state-centred accounts of 
power and statehood, and ‘good governance’ agendas popular in policy circles (Pospisil 
and Rocha Menocal 2017; Polese and Santini 2018). These approaches refute both the 
binary distinction between formal and informal institutions suggested by the institutional 
and state-building literature, and the ‘hybrid order’ tradition that situates elites within an 
elusive, all-encompassing concept of informality (Phillips 2019). They are instead 
concerned with unpacking the ‘rules of the game’ that govern political orders to 
understand the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, the balkanisation of power and 
governance, and the subnational patterns of violence. 
Existing scholarship has argued that political orders predicated on elite exclusion are 
more prone to civil war onset and often associated with widely shared authoritarian 
practices (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Contemporary regimes display high 
rates of inclusion, and tend to include most socio-political groups in the highest ranks of 
office (Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020). At the heart of these arguments is the idea 
that inclusive political settlements are key to preventing the onset of conflict and 
promoting long-term socio-political development (Lindemann 2008; Acemoglu et al. 
 
2 According to North et al. (2013), developing societies manage violence through the manipulation of 
economic interests by the political system and the creation of rents which discourage influential groups and 
individuals – the ‘elites’ – from using violence. These mechanisms define ‘limited access orders’, social 
arrangements that, in societies where violence is latent and a viable option for political groups, 
disincentivise the use of violence by elites. Paul Staniland formulates an alternative definition of political 
orders in civil war contexts, which “refers to the structure and distribution of authority between armed 
organizations: who rules, where, and through what understandings” (Staniland 2012: 247). 
3 Political environments describe the state and dynamics of political power as it is expressed and 
experienced over locations across a country. In states under stress, environments are shaped by relationships 
between national and subnational elites. See Raleigh and Dowd (2018). 
4 Political settlements are characterised by a balance of power underpinning political institutions, which is 
successful in managing violence and delivering some economic and political development (Khan 2010; 
Rocha Menocal 2017). Akin to De Waal’s political marketplace, political unsettlement is characterised by 
violent political bargaining taking place in parallel with a political order that continues to exist within 
formal and informal institutions (Bell and Pospisil 2017: 581). 
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2012; North et al. 2013). As a result, the recurrence of violence in seemingly inclusive 
political orders presents an apparent paradox.  
The problem lies in the way that inclusion is defined. Inclusion is a multidimensional 
concept, which addresses both processes and outcomes. Measuring inclusion only in 
terms of processes – the degree of representation of decision-making institutions – 
obscures how developmental outcomes are shared across societal groups (Rocha Menocal 
2017: 562). Policy efforts aimed at promoting stability often assume that designing 
broadly representative institutions, consensus or technocratic governments and elections 
may automatically deliver distributional outcomes or limit violence. In fact, these 
approaches ignore the fact that power is not a mere function of a group’s institutional 
presence (for instance, the number of ministries a group controls), and that institutional 
changes may not be sufficient to alter the actual practices of power. Recent examples 
from Libya and Yemen – partially discussed in the following chapters – show how 
ostensibly inclusive power-sharing agreements failed to avoid the recurrence of violence 
and transform existing power relations, resulting in further exacerbating hostilities and 
reproducing exclusionary political settlements. 
In addition, the civil war literature has provided further insights into how the organisation 
and structure of domestic political orders dictates patterns of intrastate violence. Some 
arguments highlight the importance of state-insurgent relations. In civil war contexts, 
variations in territorial control and cooperation between states and armed groups shape 
the contours of the ‘wartime political orders’ in which violence is used (Staniland 2012). 
In other words, violence is a function of the form of political competition and bargaining 
which occurs at the local level. Rather than conflict spaces characterised by all-out 
violence, civil wars see a range of bargains, deals and negotiations among political elites 
that shape patterns of violence and governance. 
Notions of fragmentation and cohesion have also been applied to explain conflict duration 
and escalation, as well as regime breakdown. In particular, the proliferation of armed 
groups and elites is shown to increase the risks of conflict escalation through the 
multiplication of spoiler groups attempting to maximise their access to power and rents 
and the increasing difficulty of committing actors to stop violence (Driscoll 2012; 
Cunningham 2013). Conversely, other authors highlight the stabilising effects of factional 
cohesion, which enhances cooperation and trust among elites. I apply these concepts to 
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explain both the emergence of subnational geographies of violence and the outcomes of 
elite struggles in highly volatile political orders.  
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3. Research design and methodology 
3.1. Methods 
This chapter outlines the overarching research design used in this research project, 
illustrating the methodologies applied, data sources and collection process, and the 
relevant ethical considerations. Each of the substantive analytical chapters below provide 
further detail on the specific methodology used to answer particular research questions. 
The research project uses a mixed-method design which combines quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies to the study of elites across Africa and the Middle East. Elite 
studies have long lacked a systematic methodology, suffering from “argument and 
confusion over key terms, a relative dearth of testable hypotheses, a failure clearly to 
separate normative from empirical theory and, not least, the lack of a firm data base in 
which the latter could be solidly grounded.” (Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987: 1). New data 
collection techniques, along with methodological and conceptual developments, 
contributed to broaden the scope and depth of elite research. 
Elite studies employ a variety of research methods, which follow a tripartite classification 
according to the object of the research (Semenova, in Best and Higley 2018). A first group 
is concerned with how institutions affect the behaviour of elites, involving the application 
of a wide range of quantitative methods (i.e. social network analysis, cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analysis, fuzzy sets, etc.) to the study of elite survival and careers in different 
institutional settings. A second group of research methods adopts an inductive approach 
to draw inferences about political outcomes from elite behaviours. Experiments, elite 
surveys and archival research are among the methods most widely used in studies that 
fall into this group. The third group focuses on interaction of elite groups, and is common 
in anthropological and ethnographic studies concerned with the interpretation of elite 
behaviour through observation techniques and in-depth interviews. 
The three categories outlined above are not mutually exclusive, and this research project 
uses a combination of them to answer a variety of questions. Indeed, the substantive 
analytical chapters are interested in understanding the impact of institutions on elite 
behaviour, how elite behaviour produce different political outcomes, and the interaction 
between elite groups themselves. Quantitative methods are therefore used along with 
qualitative techniques in an effort to explain the causal mechanisms underlying empirical 
observations and generate causal inferences (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). 
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The research project adopts a nested approach to comparative analysis, which combines 
large-n quantitative data with small-n process-tracing to corroborate causal inferences 
(Lieberman 2005). Quantitative analysis serves as the starting point for the study, 
contributing to guide case selection through the identification of patterns or statistical 
relations. Data collection will be calibrated as to maximise the number of observations 
and the validity of measurements, ensuring the reliability of data-collection techniques 
and the replicability of the data collected. Large-n quantitative analysis also requires that 
contested or elusive concepts, such as political violence, political elites or patronage, can 
be measured empirically, and their methodological boundaries made explicit. 
The use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques in this study deserves further 
considerations. All social interactions are ‘socially situated’ in wider networks of 
interpersonal relations and individual motives alone are insufficient to explain the 
behaviour of social agents. The notion of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985, 1992) 
assumes that behaviour of individual and collective actors is constrained by spatial-
temporal networks of social relations. Importantly, SNA has contributed to power 
analysis through an empirical understanding of how social actors develop strategies to 
consolidate or increase power within the network, and how these relational structures 
provide in turn constraints and opportunities for elite agents (Brass and Krachardt 2012). 
Through the notion of networks, the focus is on how individual elites are connected 
between each other and on how the organisation of such connections influence the power 
and politics. While operational definitions of networks may vary according to the 
methodology used (Keller, in Best and Higley 2018), power is interpreted as a resource 
gained and lost through relations, whereby elites engage in transactions through their 
positions within wider networks of influential actors. This systemic perspective suggests 
that governance institutions and corporate groups – the state, the parties, the tribes, the 
economic corporations, the militias – are populated and defined by the networks of 
relations that their constituent actors have with other political elites. In other words, power 
is a function of the network of relationships individual elites entertain with others, rather 
than a mere reflection of their individual attributes or institutional hierarchies. 
As a result, the SNA approach has enormously enhanced empirical research on elite 
structures, as it allows researchers to analyse relations among elite agents and their 
interaction with the wider political environment and provide empirical mapping of power 
distribution (Knoke 1993; Hoffmann-Lange, in Klingemann and Dalton 2007: 910-927; 
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Marks and Stys 2019). In recent years, SNA techniques have been applied to study the 
dynamics of a variety of collective actor networks, including criminal gangs in the United 
States (Radil, Flint and Tita 2010; Papachristos, Hureau and Braga 2013), informal trade 
in developing countries (Walther 2015), transnational networks of armed Islamist groups 
(Walther and Christopoulos 2015; Walther and Leuprecht 2015) and cross-sectional or 
longitudinal elite networks (Moore 1979; Gil-Mendieta and Schmidt 1996; Kostiuchenko 
2012; Osei 2015; Keller 2016; Woldense 2018).  
The selection of the quantitative method is conditional on the specific research question. 
In Chapter 5 and 8, large-n statistical analysis is used to observe correlations between 
political violence and elite behaviour or armed group fragmentation. In Chapter 4, a large-
n dataset is used to study the profile of ministerial elites in a single country, and analyse 
its changes over time. In Chapter 7, SNA is the starting point for understanding how the 
relative density and fragmentation of elite sub-networks impacts institutional and conflict 
outcomes. 
Supplementing large-n and quantitative analysis, process tracing is used in this research 
project to analyse and explain causal mechanisms. Social sciences typically resort to 
multiple methods to develop research hypotheses, distinguishing between inductive 
(theory-building) and deductive (theory-testing) techniques (George and Bennett 2005). 
Among them, process tracing aims at making robust inferences about causal explanations 
from historical cases. Process tracing provides the foundation to make inferences, which 
refers to the process by which we use the facts we know to learn about facts we do not 
know distinguishing between the systematic and the non-systematic components of the 
phenomena under analysis (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 46).  
While descriptive inference provides an accurate historical summary of the events, 
selecting the information and the data at our disposal and discerning between the 
systematic and the non-systematic components, causal inference refers to the process 
through which researchers explain the causal mechanisms that generate a specific 
outcome. This research requires a solid combination of both descriptive and causal 
inferences. In fact, structured, focused comparison is complementary to good description 
rather than competitive with it (ibid: 45). As such, each of the substantive chapters below 
includes a description of the relevant elite environment along with a summary of the 
crucial events that are relevant to understand the dynamics under examination. Research 
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hypotheses are further tested on in-depth country-based case studies focusing on Tunisia, 
Yemen and Libya, analysing the local conflict and elite environments to explain political 
outcomes and elite behaviour. Applying process-tracing methods to case study analysis 
allows investigating “the intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about 
hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome 
of interest” (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 5). 
3.2. Sources and data collection practices 
This thesis draws from a number of original and existing sources. Elite data were collected 
under the ‘Violence, Elites and Resilience in States Under Stress’ project, which 
supported the recording and classification of thousands of individual political elites across 
the African continent and the Middle East. For each of the political elites, relevant socio-
political identities were identified, in an effort to isolate patterns of inclusion and 
representation in the highest political offices. Importantly, the boundary problem in elite 
studies requires that elites are selected according to explicit and reproduceable criteria. In 
this thesis, the temporal and functional scope of the elite data vary according to the 
specific research question and methodological considerations, and is discussed in each of 
the analytical chapters presented below.  
Data collection was conducted using publicly available sources, including monthly 
bulletins of cabinet composition as well as official government documents and online 
media articles. Information were triangulated in order to verify their reliability and further 
supplemented with interviews with experts. In Chapter 4, data on government ministers 
and secretaries of state in Tunisia from 1987 through 2018 were collected using the 
weekly issues of the ‘Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic’ (Journal Officiel de la 
République Tunisienne, abbreviated as JORT) to reconstruct the monthly composition of 
the cabinet, along with international and local magazines providing information around 
the socio-political profile of the cabinet members, including political affiliation, regional 
origin, socio-professional background and age. Hard copies of Tunisian magazines were 
available in the library of the Centre d'Études Maghrébines à Tunis where I conducted 
fieldwork from January to April 2017. Data on African cabinet ministers in Chapter 5 
were drawn from the African Cabinet and Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), which tracks 
political and ethno-regional identities in several African countries from 1997 and 2018. 
In Chapter 7, difficulty of getting full, consistent information about wartime Yemeni 
political elites suggested that the focus of the paper was limited to a few dozen national 
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political elites, i.e. individuals occupying a position in one of the political, military and 
security institutions in the Sana’a-based government. However, data collection for Yemen 
extend to hundreds of wartime political elites affiliated to all camps and active between 
January 2018 and June 2019. 
For violence data, used extensively in Chapters 5 and 8, the main source is the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which collects geo-referenced data 
on conflict events in African countries from 1997 to real time (Raleigh et al. 2010). 
ACLED data are collected using a variety of local, regional, national and international 
news sources, constituting the most comprehensive public collection of disaggregated 
conflict and protest data for African states. Events are disaggregated by date, location, 
type, and groups involved, allowing for analyses of overall violence levels, subnational 
patterns of violence and individual armed groups’ activity. 
ACLED data were used in recent studies analysing several dimensions of conflict, 
including electoral violence in Africa (Wahman and Goldring 2020), territorial control in 
civil wars (Bhavnani and Choi 2012; Reeder 2018), social unrest in North African 
countries (Ketchley and Barrie 2019), changes in subnational power structures (Raleigh 
2016; Raleigh and Dowd 2018), and armed group fragmentation (Dowd 2015). The use 
of a rigorous and transparent coding methodology reduces the risk of reproducing 
reporting and coding biases through consistent inclusion criteria and extensive sourcing 
(Raleigh and Kishi 2019). 
In addition, interviews with selected members of Tunisian and Yemeni political elites 
were carried out during fieldwork in Tunisia and Lebanon between January and April 
2017, and in two rounds in June 2018 and October 2019. In total, around forty semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with current and former cabinet 
members, high rank party officials, members of parliament, and a variety of tribal, civil 
society and policy actors engaged in the political process in Tunisia and Yemen. The 
results of the interviews were interpreted taking into consideration the position of the 
researcher vis à vis foreign elites, and the potential agendas each of the elites might pursue 
in meeting with external researchers (Herod 1999). Three interviews with Algerian 
experts were conducted via email in relation to the Algeria section for Chapter 6. 
Additionally, participation to parliamentary sessions in Tunisia and passive attendance to 
workshops and public events, as well as informal discussions with elites and experts, 
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provided further benefits to the research during fieldwork. Whilst not all of these 
interviews are not included in this research project due to ethical considerations, they 
nonetheless provided a unique opportunity to engage with the wider socio-political 
context of these two countries, and to verify and cross-check information obtained in 
other interviews. A list of all interviews cited in this thesis is provided in Chapter 10.2. 
The most substantial fieldwork period was conducted between January and April 2017 in 
Tunis, with the support of the Centre d'Études Maghrébines à Tunis which I joined as 
visiting fellow. During this time, I adhered to the ethical and security standards set out in 
the policies of the University of Sussex. I obtained ethical approval to conduct fieldwork 
in Tunis based at the Centre d'Études Maghrébines, avoiding research-related travel in 
areas south of the country as a result of a travel warning issued by the Foreign Office in 
the aftermath of multiple terrorist attacks targeting foreigners in Tunisia. I also obtained 
a security briefing from the Centre d'Études Maghrébines in Tunis, in which I stated the 
intention to only carrying out in the Greater Tunis area. 
Interviewees were contacted upon arrival, either via email or through the intercession of 
a parliamentary officer with contacts across the political spectrum. The latter channel, in 
particular, was key to speeding up the organisation of interviews with members of the 
Tunisian Parliament, and gaining the trust of the prospective interviewees. As a result, 
these included members of Tunisia’s main political parties, as well as former ministers, 
non-party political figures, and investigative journalists. With one notable exception – a 
former minister with no public office at the time of the interview – all interview meetings 
took place in official settings, whether was this the Tunisian Parliament hall, party 
headquarters, or media offices. 
During this fieldwork, all interviews were conducted in French or Italian, with no 
translation assistance. A set of standard open questions, with slight variations, were 
prepared for each interviewee, although the semi-structured nature of these meetings 
meant that this list could be changed or supplemented depending on the direction of the 
interview. Prior to the interview, each respondent was asked to sign a standard consent 
and information security form – drafted in English and French – to uphold research ethics 
standards. These forms outline that the interviewee would agree to be recorded and the 
information used for research purposes only and stored safely. Importantly, a unique ID 
number was assigned to each consent and information security form, to ensure that any 
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notes – taken either electronically or on paper – would not be linked to the interviewees 
and therefore keep their identity anonymous.  
Anonymity was a key component of all interviews I conducted for this thesis, not limited 
to those collected during the fieldwork between January and April 2017 in Tunis. All of 
the interviewees’ identities have been anonymised at their request due to the sensitive 
nature of the domestic political and security environments and the possible repercussions 
that the attribution of controversial statements may cause. In addition to the fieldwork 
described above, other interviews were conducted in Beirut and Tunis during the 
‘Exchange’ sessions organised by Middle East Wire in Tunis and by the Sana’a Centre 
for Strategic Studies in Beirut, which provided arenas to meet a wide range of political 
elites under ‘Chatham House’ rule during roundtables and privately. Additionally, these 
sessions allowed verifying and cross-checking sources to avoid over-relying on unilateral 
information. Despite their short duration – around one week – the ‘Exchange’ sessions 
and the lack of control from the researcher over the individual elites invited to them, they 
contributed to obtain valuable insights into the dynamics under examination in this 
research project. 
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4. Non-party ministers and consensual politics in Tunisia 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years, analyses of the Arab uprisings have attracted a large body of scholarly 
interest highlighting the volatile and precarious character of these political processes. 
Among these are studies exploring the causes for the collapse of some regimes (Barany 
2011; Hale 2013; Makara 2013), the changing nature of contentious politics taking place 
within states (Barany 2013; Lynch 2014; Stacher 2015), or the micro-repertoires of 
protest movements across the region (Mekouar 2014; Bamert, Gilardi and Wasserfallen 
2015; Ketchley and Barrie 2019). Other works have emphasised the institutional 
transformations produced by the uprisings, heralding these events as potentially 
democratic breakthroughs and focusing on the changing electoral and partisan dynamics 
(Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds 2015). Taken together, these discussions have shown 
how the political transitions inaugurated in several Arab states have included 
contradictory elements of change and continuity, contributing to a more nuanced 
understanding of their wider political and societal implications (Valbjørn 2012). 
Typically overlooked in the literature on Middle Eastern politics (Schlumberger 2000), 
the academic scholarship has increasingly started to investigate the evolution and 
transformation of political elites, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings 
(Perthes 2004; Owen 2012). The role of elites is indeed crucial during political transitions: 
according to Banegas (1993), political transitions represent periods of intense fluidity that 
unsettle the existing social and political order and the relations between social groups. In 
these critical moments, old regime elites may cling to power, while aspirant incumbents 
face the question of whether re-integrating members of the old regime and how to 
influence the political process. Through the manipulation of parochial interests, political 
elites have leverage on, and secure the loyalty of, political, military, religious, regional, 
ethnic or other communities. As a result of this process, a political regime hinges on a 
mutually beneficial relationship whereby rulers are dependent on elites to hold onto 
power, and elites on rulers to influence the political process and access state resources 
(North et al. 2013). 
Despite an increasingly polarisation of the political spectrum and widespread elite 
entrenchment, calls for the appointment of independent executives in senior government 
positions have grown popular across Africa and the Middle East. In 2019 only, 
transitional governments largely consisting of independent figures and technocrats were 
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appointed in protest-hit Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. Technocrats also joined 
governments in Egypt, Morocco and war-torn Yemen. The magnitude of this trend was 
largest in Tunisia: oscillating between polarisation and consensus, three heads of 
government out of six since 2011 were independents, two cabinets were formed entirely 
by non-party ministers, and overall around 50% of the ministers appointed between 2011 
and 2017 were not affiliated to any political party. This raises the question of how are 
government elites changing across the region and, further, how are these choices 
embedded in the domestic elite environment?  
Although they make up an increasing share of total government positions, the existing 
academic discussion has often overlooked the role of non-party ministers in cabinet 
formation and elite politics. First, most works on political elites in the developing world 
focus on patronage and clientelism to predict the ministerial choices of incumbents. 
However, typical predictors of inclusion and exclusion – party affiliation or ethno-
regional identities – are unable to explain why incumbents appoint independent ministers 
in government. Second, non-partisans are often linked to a technocratic mode of 
governance, which privileges experts over politicians. This notion overlooks the political 
function of non-party ministers, and how their role varies according to the specific 
political order in which they operate. Third, there are questions over the degree of support 
enjoyed by governments with a large proportion of independents. Indeed, while parties 
may accept to appoint independents to address technical challenges, their ability to garner 
electoral support is arguable. These frameworks do not seem able to adequately explain 
the logic behind the increasing recourse to non-party ministers in the Middle East and 
North Africa region. 
Focusing on Tunisia, I argue instead that far from constituting ancillary figures, non-party 
ministers have been an integral component of the domestic political environment. 
Drawing on a dataset profiling more than four hundred ministerial appointments between 
1987 and 2017 and several interviews with party officials, former ministers, journalists 
and civil society activists, I show that the increasing participation of non-party ministers 
in government responded to distinct logics of consensual politics, reflecting the different 
governing strategies pursued by incumbents. While the participation of independent 
ministers between 1987 and 2011 was motivated by Ben Ali’s attempt to consolidate his 
domination over the party and the government, their broad participation in government 
after 2011 points to a different logic of including political groups in order to sustain the 
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political settlement emerged after the revolution. In other words, while Ben Ali imposed 
consensus through the neutralisation of the opposition, the post-2011 political landscape 
is characterised by consensus-based politics negotiated between the main political forces. 
During these distinct periods, non-party ministers represented important political elites 
with varying levels of influence and power. 
This chapter is therefore intended to be an investigation into the changing profile and role 
of political elites in Tunisia. In analysing the transformations of the country’s 
governments from 1987 to the present day, the paper seeks to address the debate over the 
wider political consequences of its democratic transition, and to contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of the patterns of change and continuity in this context. 
Additionally, it lays the basis for further analysis of how political elites manage and 
regulate access to the executive in changing political orders, and the wider implications 
for their emergence and consolidation. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores the relevance of political 
elites in times of transition, highlighting how cabinet formation affects inter-elite 
struggles. I then focus on non-party ministers, a category that has typically received little 
attention in the study on political elites in North Africa and the Middle East. In the 
following section, ministerial choices between 1987 and 2017 in Tunisia are analysed to 
show how political affiliations, regional origin and socio-professional background have 
been instrumental in influencing the selection of cabinet members both under Ben Ali and 
during the democratic transition. 
4.2. Political elites and non-party ministers 
During political transitions, elite struggles over who is included in the emerging 
architecture of power are critical to determining the (in-)stability of political regimes 
(Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1993). The existing literature has extensively discussed the problem 
of how it is possible to mitigate the damaging effects of elite struggles – including the use 
of violence by political elites – on social and economic development (Bueno De Mesquita 
et al. 2003; North et al. 2013). Incumbents engaging in co-option will resort to providing 
financial and political incentives that benefit restive rent-seeking elites (Goldsmith 2001; 
Arriola 2009). As long as the rents extracted from a peaceful setting exceed those 
extracted from a conflict situation, those elites will find it more convenient to cooperate 
with the incumbents than to defect (North et al. 2013: 6-7). 
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Among the incentives that incumbents use to secure the loyalty of elites are inclusion in 
state positions within the government, the bureaucracy or the military (De Waal 2015). 
Outsourcing of state-like functions to para-state groups, creation of informal institutions 
operating in parallel with formal state bodies and appropriation of economic resources 
belonging to the state, are also common. The expansion of the role of government into 
society since World War II has resulted in a dramatic increase in ministerial posts 
throughout the world (Blondel 1985: 2). In constituting an easily accessible resource, 
ministerial positions allow politicians to redistribute material and symbolic rents from the 
centre to the periphery, strengthening the ties with their regional and political 
constituencies. Providing broad government representation to multiple elite groups may 
ultimately increase the size of the cabinet through the creation of new ministerial 
portfolios, but is also found to negatively affect government performance (Haass and 
Ottmann 2017). 
Because of their importance, ministerial positions are not allocated randomly, but 
according to criteria that typically respond to specific party affiliations, ethnopolitical 
attributes, regional origin and gender (Altman 2000; Arriola 2009). The importance of 
each criterion varies depending on the political environment in which they are embedded: 
in a government dominated by a single party, ethnopolitical or regional identities may 
determine the different allocation of ministerial positions. In other contexts, political 
parties encapsulate multiple interests and ethnoregional identities, and inter-party 
dynamics are therefore often used as a criterion to explain cabinet formation and 
composition in both parliamentary and presidential regimes (Amorim Neto 2006; 
Cheibub 2007).  
Yet not all ministers are selected based on these criteria. Non-party ministers are 
increasingly influential actors in a variety of political systems across the world (Amorim 
Neto 2006; McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2015; Schleiter 2015; Lee 2018). In Europe, Africa, 
Latin America and Asia, non-affiliated technocrats have taken office as heads of 
government, while others occupy cabinet portfolios without being members of a political 
party. Likewise, technocratic governments consisting entirely of independent ministers 
have been appointed in the wake of acute political and economic crises. Their selection 
is said to reflect a weakening democratic process, which fails to enjoy electoral legitimacy 
and where their appointment alienates voters from democratic institutions (Runciman 
2018). 
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Non-party ministers are described as “cabinet members who do not act on behalf of a 
party in government” (Schleiter 2013: 35). Unlike technocrats who are defined by the 
lack of political experience and by the technical expertise they bring to the government 
(McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2015: 657), non-party ministers include all cabinet members 
without a recognised party affiliation, such as figures hailing from social organisations 
like trade unions or human rights groups or having held public office under the banner of 
a political party before their current appointment. Despite not having technocratic 
competence, these ministers selected from outside the political parties may be acting in a 
personal capacity, responding directly to the head of state or the head of government. 
When referring to ministers, the terms ‘non-party’ and ‘independent’ will be used as 
synonyms in this study. 
These figures have typically attracted little scholarly interest compared to other political 
actors. Academic literature has long focused on party governments, producing limited 
theoretical work on the subject of non-party ministers and non-party governments (Rose 
1969; Blondel 1985; Blondel and Cotta 2000). Non-party members of the cabinet are 
therefore treated as a residual category, whose profile is often associated with technocrats, 
with the latter term typically highlighting the technical competencies that justify the 
appointment of a minister or of an entire government from outside the parties (Cotta and 
Verzichelli 2002: 145). The use of the term ‘technocrat’, however, has been conflated to 
describe all ministers appointed according to their technical competencies, creating some 
theoretical confusion over the exact definition of this concept (Camau and Geisser 2003). 
Over the past decade, academic research has increasingly addressed the figure of non-
party ministers, with a strong focus on European, Latin American and Asian cabinets 
(Amorim Neto 2006; Schleiter 2013; Lee 2018). Incumbents are typically believed to 
appoint independents in contexts where the executive enjoys a strong negotiating power 
compared to the legislative assembly (Bermeo 2003; Amorim Neto 2006). These include 
an under-institutionalised party system (a common element in countries undergoing 
democratic transitions), complex technical policy challenges requiring specific expertise, 
or incumbents capable of imposing their rule over the parliamentary assembly (Schleiter 
2013: 35). Despite the increasingly technocratic nature of several governments across the 
region (Kenner 2010), academic studies have typically overlooked the role of non-party 
ministers in Africa and the Middle East or explained it as a result of exogenous or 
contingent circumstances. The involvement of technocratic elites in politics was often 
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related to changing authoritarian techniques (Heydemann 2007), the implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies (Bogaert 2013) and political scapegoating by shrewd 
politicians (Thurston 2018). At the same time, inter-elite struggles over access to power 
have gone hand in hand with an increase in the number of non-party ministers appointed 
in cabinet. How can we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory trends in political 
systems where cabinet formation is typically understood in terms of patronage and 
clientelism? 
To address these puzzles, this study situates the rise in the appointment of non-party 
ministers in Tunisia within changing logics of polarisation and consensus. In Tunisia, 
ministerial positions allocated to independents began to increase in the early 2000s, 
although they became leading political actors only after Ben Ali’s demise and the 
emergence of the democratic institutions. Today, they continue to account for a large 
share of total cabinet appointments. However, despite an abundance of studies that 
explore the nature of political elites in Tunisia (Latif-Béatrix 1988; Charfi 1989; Camau 
and Geisser 2003; Erdle, in Perthes 2004; Erdle 2010; Heurtaux 2014; Kchouk 2017; 
Buehler and Ayari 2018), non-affiliated cabinet members have largely remained at the 
margins of scholarly analysis. Rather, attention has more often focused on Tunisia’s 
democratising trajectory, the role of Islam in Tunisian politics, and the country’s electoral 
performance (see, among others, Gana, Van Hamme and Ben Rabah 2012, 2016; Stepan 
2012; Cavatorta and Merone 2013). 
In the following section, I examine the profile of all members of the cabinet appointed 
between 1987 and 2017, before discussing the incentives informing the selection of non-
party ministers under Ben Ali and under the new democratic regime. The data, collected 
using weekly issues of the ‘Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic’, local media 
sources, archival resources and other publicly available documentation, provide a 
monthly breakdown of all 404 Tunisian cabinet ministers and secretaries of state since 
1987. It should be noted, however, that cabinet ministers constitute only a subset of a 
country’s political elites, and that socio-political affiliations and characteristics also 
influence appointments in other sectors, including the local administration, national 
authorities and public companies. While these data do not allow determining whether the 
same considerations also applied to other domains, the selection of ministerial elites is 
typically viewed as replicating the dynamics regulating how key political groups are 
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included or excluded from ruling coalitions (Bratton and Van De Walle 1994; Bueno De 
Mesquita et al. 2003). 
4.3. Ministerial elites in Tunisia, 1987 to 20175 
Prior to the early 2000s, non-party ministers were an exception in Tunisian politics. The 
government had been typically dominated by the ruling Socialist Destourian Party (Parti 
Socialiste Destourien, PSD) and by its successor, the Constitutional Democratic Rally 
(Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD) set up by Ben Ali a few months 
after his rise to the presidency. Bourguiba had established a one-party, authoritarian 
system that marginalised opposition parties and trade unions while expelling potential 
challengers within his own party, the Neo Destour, starting with former independence 
leader Salah Ben Youssef (Henry 2007: 312). Trade unions and other opposition 
movements – the latter legalised in 1971 – continued to exist, yet they never constituted 
a substantial alternative to the ruling party. Within this system, Bourguiba had 
increasingly centralised power around himself. 
Cabinet members had responded directly to the President until 1970, when a 
constitutional amendment created the post of Prime Minister, which possessed, however, 
virtually no autonomous powers. As such, the government was regarded as an ancillary 
institution to the Presidency, in which the President could exercise control over his 
ministers and, through his party and the ministries, over Parliament, the military and the 
police (Barany 2011). The domination of the PSD over the cabinet was formalised at the 
eighth party congress, where an amendment to the statute stipulated that all cabinet 
ministers were also members of the party’s central committee. By reversing the traditional 
mechanism whereby ministers are recruited from the party executive body, Bourguiba 
turned the PSD into a para-state structure operating in parallel with the government 
(Charfi 1989: 52). 
In line with its predecessor, the RCD largely monopolised cabinet appointments: 
following its formation, Ben Ali preserved the confusion between party and state by 
requiring that all ministers also serve in the executive bodies of the party (Camau and 
Geisser 2003). At the grassroots level, thanks to a pervasive presence throughout the 
country, the ruling party operated as both an arm of the police state, and a clientelist cartel 
providing its members with lucrative opportunities (Erdle 2010: 216; Hibou 2011; Wolf 
 
5 The figures cited in this section are reported in the Appendix. 
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2018). At the government level, preference for technocratic officials resulted in an 
expanded role for non-affiliated ministers and secretaries of state, starting with Ben Ali’s 
first cabinets (Murphy 1999: 184). As the number of cabinet members grew over time, so 
the percentage of non-RCD ministers increased (Figure 4.1). While the first cabinet led 
by Hédi Baccouche in 1987 comprised thirty-one members of the ruling party and only 
two independents, Mohamed Ghannouchi’s cabinet in January 2011 was composed of 
thirty-seven RCD members and seventeen independent ministers. By then, nearly one 
third of cabinet members had no partisan affiliation. 
 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Tunisian non-party ministers on total cabinet ministers, 
from 1987 to December 2017 
The allocation of ministerial positions to non-party figures increased markedly after 2001, 
during the first government led by Mohamed Ghannouchi – himself a technocrat affiliated 
to the RCD. His cabinet epitomised the nature of Ben Ali’s system of governance, 
deprived of a strong political character that could overshadow or challenge the leader’s 
centrality. Non-party ministers were typically assigned economic portfolios – Industry, 
Economic development, Planning, International Cooperation, and Information 
Technology among others – tasked with the implementation of the neoliberal economic 
policies negotiated with international financial institutions. By contrast, the RCD 
continued to maintain a tight grip on the ministères regaliens (Foreign Affairs, Interior, 
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National Defence and Justice) and on all ministries that were considered key to the 
distribution of patronage.6 
In the post-Ben Ali era, the involvement of non-party ministers in government has 
substantially increased compared to the previous decades. Two governments out of seven 
– the Essebsi cabinet in 2011 and the Jomaa cabinet in 2014 – consisted entirely of non-
partisans, enjoying initial external support from the wider political spectrum and the trade 
unions. With the exception of the cabinet chaired by Ennahda’s member Hamadi Jebali, 
at least half of the cabinet members were not affiliated to a political party. In spite of their 
alleged technocratic profile, these figures point to the political role that independent 
ministers have played in the post-2011 scenario. Contrary to the Ben Ali era where 
technocrats often occupied positions in economic ministries, non-party ministers and 
secretaries of state have seen their roles widening significantly since 2011. Non-party 
members have occupied a wide range of positions, with some ministries – Culture and 
Religious Affairs – reserved exclusively for non-affiliated figures, also by virtue of their 
importance for the highly controversial cleavage separating Islamists and secularists. 
Characterised by marked political instability and frequent cabinet reshuffles, the post-
revolutionary context has witnessed an alternation of technocrat-led and coalition 
governments, which coincided with different phases of the emerging political settlement 
(Boubekeur 2016). The abrupt collapse of Ben Ali’s regime left Tunisia with a 
government led by his long-time Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. His 
government, which included members of the dissolved RCD, technocrats and opposition 
figures,7 faced widespread popular opposition that forced him to resign at the end of 
February 2011 (Willsher 2011). The crisis was solved when Tunisian interim President 
Fouad Mebazaa replaced Ghannouchi with Béji Caid Essebsi, an experienced former 
 
6 A notable example is the secretary of state for National Solidarity Funds. All Tunisians – individuals and 
businesses alike – were required to contribute to a national fund for development projects managed by Ben 
Ali himself and an ad hoc Secretary of State, typically a close collaborator of the president like Kamel Haj 
Sassi, an RCD member from the coastal town of Sfax who served in government almost continuously from 
1993 to 2008 (Beau and Tuquoi 2011). Through the National Solidarity Funds, otherwise known as the 
“26.26 account”, he could discretionally invest millions of francs each year in a multitude of projects in 
Tunisia’s rural regions, enhancing the image of Ben Ali – who was typically reported to be the prime 
sponsor of these projects – and of the RCD across the wider population. 
7 Three members of Tunisia’s largest trade union confederation, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT), resigned on 18 January before taking office due to strong criticism of their collaboration with 
members of the RCD (Ben Achour 2016: 101). 
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minister under Bourguiba who formed a caretaker government which was in charge until 
the first democratic elections were held in late 2011 (Ben Achour 2016: 102). 
Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, won the parliamentary elections, but lacking an 
absolute majority in the constituent assembly (Assemblée Nationale Constituante, ANC), 
formed a coalition government – popularly known as Troika – with two junior secular 
partners, the Congress for the Republic (Congrés de la Republique, CPR) and Ettakatol 
(Gana, Van Hamme and Ben Rabah 2012). The leaders of these two parties – Moncef 
Marzouki and Mustapha Ben Jaafar – would become President of the Republic and of the 
ANC respectively, while Ennahda would appoint the head of the government. In 2013, 
amidst a deteriorating economic situation and increasing political violence, Ennahda 
adhered to the National Dialogue, a roadmap brokered by the main political and social 
forces to placate political tensions and facilitate the approval of the new constitution. 
Under this agreement, Ennahda consented to cede power to a technocratic government 
that would lead the country until the new elections. After the ANC adopted the new 
constitution in January 2014, the President of the Republic designated former Industry 
Minister Mehdi Jomaa new head of government, which enjoyed the support of 149 ANC 
members out of 194 (Business News 2014). 
Nidaa Tounes – a secular party created in 2012 by former Prime Minister Essebsi bringing 
together several factions opposed to Ennahda – obtained the majority in the 2014 
parliamentary elections, while its founder became head of state (Gana, Van Hamme and 
Ben Rabah 2016). Despite its strong anti-Ennahda rhetoric, Nidaa Tounes entered a 
coalition government, under the auspices of President Essebsi, with its ostensible 
archenemy and other smaller formations, contributing to party splintering (Marks 2015). 
Essebsi appointed Habib Essid, former Secretary of State in the early 2000s and then 
Interior Minister during the transition, as head of the government. Essid, affiliated to no 
party, lacked a strong political backing and was eventually replaced in the summer of 
2016 by Local Administration minister Youssef Chahed, a member of Nidaa Tounes (Le 
Monde 2016). 
As non-party figures were allocated an increasing share of ministerial positions, the 
composition of the cabinet also reflected the inclusion or exclusion of key political elites. 
Since independence, regionalism has represented a key determinant for the selection of 
ministers in Tunisia (Charfi 1989: 28). This practice, which Michel Camau and Vincent 
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Geisser have termed ‘regionalism pour soi’ (2006: 199), has been instrumental in 
reproducing pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and shaping the nature and the 
forms of the ruling elite. Ben Ali typically privileged individuals from his home region 
of Sousse when assigning important ministerial positions. Data show that ministers and 
secretaries of state from the Grand Tunis and Sahel8 areas made up nearly half of the 
cabinet members under Ben Ali. By contrast, the regions of the interior – which have 
often been hotbed of protest in Tunisia’s contemporary history – have largely been 
marginalised. Le Kef, Sidi Bouzid and Tataouine had only one minister in twenty-three 
years, while Zaghouan and Kebili had no ministerial representation.  
These trends have radically changed since 2011. With the exception of the southern 
region of Tataouine, all governorates have enjoyed government representation, pointing 
to more geographically inclusive cabinets. The change is even more striking considering 
that the period under consideration is six years, while Ben Ali ruled for twenty-four years. 
Within this period, Ennahda has been the most inclusive party appointing cabinet 
members from almost all governorates. According to some observers, this shows the 
attempt made by the party to extend and reshuffle its historical constituency (International 
Crisis Group 2017a: 8). Importantly, although non-affiliated ministers continue to boast 
a stronger urban profile compared to the rest of the government, the percentage of non-
partisans drawn from Grand Tunis and coastal areas declined from more than 70% under 
Ben Ali to around 50% after 2011 (see Figure 4.2). Hence, a more balanced regional 
representation was achieved in the post-2011 landscape, in accordance with an ostensibly 
inclusionary logic that also permeated ministerial selection in technocratic cabinets (Ben 
Hammouda 2016: 19). 
 
8 The Sahel is a coastal region encompassing the governorates of Sousse, Monastir and Mahdia, the 
traditional hometown of Tunisia’s autocratic rulers. 
55 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Regional background of Tunisian non-party ministers in 1987-2010 
(left) and in 2011-2017 (right) 
The public administration constituted the main professional milieu of Ben Ali’s cabinets, 
in line with those of his predecessor (Latif-Béatrix 1988; Charfi 1989). At least 50% of 
ministerial appointments were hauts fonctionnaires, including diplomats, magistrates and 
high-ranking officials in the state ministries. Another 25% were university professors and 
schoolteachers. By contrast, despite the liberal economic policies promoted by Ben Ali, 
only nine cabinet members came from the private sector.  
At the same time, Ben Ali continued to limit the political involvement of the country’s 
military and security institutions.9 No more than five ministers were recruited from the 
army or the security services. Despite being an army official himself and retaining 
supervision of the police, Ben Ali increasingly promoted the professionalisation of the 
security services while keeping the army deliberately marginal in regime politics (Barany 
2011; Brooks 2013). Members of the security services close to Habib Bourguiba were 
 
9 Ben Ali, appointed Interior Minister in 1984, was called in October 1987 to form a new government that 
would deal with the growing Islamist threat. The new Prime Minister, who had previously served in the 
intelligence services and directed National Security, represented an exception in Bourguiba’s long-time 
policy to keep the military out of politics. He was indeed the first minister with a purely military background 
since 1956 (Charfi 1989: 63). 
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purged10 while Ben Ali’s closest affiliates were promoted to influential cabinet positions 
(Camau and Geisser 2003: 206). Army generals, such as Abdelhamid Escheikh and Habib 
Ammar, were appointed to ministerial positions in the earlier years of Ben Ali’s 
presidency, but only for short periods of time or with secondary portfolios. 
These figures are consistent with the professional profile of non-party ministers, who 
were largely drawn from the state bureaucracy and academia. This ‘non-political’ route 
to cabinet – which was not a well-practiced tradition in governments across the world 
until the 1980s (Blondel 1985: 58) – served different functions. These technocrats could 
boast several years of professional experience in the state apparatus and in academia prior 
to their appointment. Lacking considerable political or party background, however, civil 
servants were promoted to a political position but did not possess the political capital to 
challenge Ben Ali. 
One of the most notable examples of bureaucrats serving in the executive is former Prime 
Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, who graduated in social sciences from the École 
Nationale d’Administration in Tunis before beginning his career at the Ministry of 
Planning. After the coup in November 1987, he was appointed Delegate Minister of 
Planning, then promoted to full minister in July 1988. Often described as a technocrat, 
Ghannouchi took office as Minister of Finance and of International Cooperation, until his 
nomination as prime minister in 1999. In March 1988, he quickly joined the RCD after 
Ben Ali dissolved the PSD, of which he had never been a member. 
The professional background of ministers and secretaries of state is also revealing of the 
changes that have involved political elites in Tunisia since 2011. While the vast majority 
of cabinet members have continued to come from the public administration, this share has 
decreased from 50% to 35% (see Table 2). Post-2011 cabinets have promoted a larger 
involvement of the private sector – twenty-four cabinet members were corporate 
managers, entrepreneurs or bankers compared to the only nine in nearly thirty years of 
Ben Ali’s rule – and of professional figures traditionally excluded under Bourguiba and 
 
10 The case of Chedly Hammi, alias Mohamed Larbi Mahjoubi, is emblematic. Hammi had long served in 
the Ministry of Interior under Bourguiba, having a marginal role in the coup d’état that ousted the old 
president. He was nevertheless appointed Secretary of State in the Interior Ministry in the government of 
Hamed Karoui but arrested five months after his nomination for the assassination of Palestinian leader 
Khalil Al-Wazir. Hammi was allegedly tortured and eventually condemned to four years in prison by a 
military tribunal (Kéfi 2011). 
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Ben Ali. The army and the security services have also continued to play a limited role, as 
only two army and police officers were appointed to a ministerial position.11 
Regarding trade union membership, whereas Bourguiba’s ministers had often been 
members of the Destourian party and of national organisations – and especially the UGTT 
(Charfi 1989: 49) – Ben Ali was more likely to appoint ministers who had little or no 
experience in a national organisation or a trade union (Henry 2007: 311). Only a few 
ministers were militants of the UGTT, and none of the Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, 
du Commerce et de l'Artisanat (UTICA). These organisations were able to exercise little 
or no direct political influence, while the space for political contestation became 
increasingly limited as their leadership colluded with the government. Nevertheless, Ben 
Ali co-opted the leadership of the national organisations, which were an integral part of 
his extensive patronage network (Camau and Geisser 2003: 213, 222).12 
By contrast, the political participation of trade unions, human rights groups and other 
national organisations has represented the distinctive character of the Tunisian democratic 
transition (Boubekeur 2016). As many as nineteen organisations and trade unions took 
part to the Higher Authority for Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political 
Reform and Democratic Transition (HIROR, or Haute Instance pour la Réalisation des 
Objectifs de la Révolution, de la Réforme Politique et de la Transition Démocratique), 
tasked with reforming state institutions in the wake of the demise of Ben Ali’s regime and 
in preparation for the first democratic elections (Séréni 2011). The National Quartet 
consisting of the UGTT, UTICA, the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH, or Ligue 
Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme) and the lawyers’ organisation, played a key role in 
the political crisis that followed the assassinations of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed 
Brahmi in 2013. Additionally, in 2016, the UGTT and the UTICA adhered to a document 
sponsored by the President of the Republic known as the Carthage Agreement, stipulating 
policy guidelines on the economic, social and security fronts (Jeune Afrique 2016). 
 
11 These are: the former chief of the National Guard Lotfi Brahem, Minister of Interior in the Chahed cabinet 
between September 2017 and June 2018; and Rafik Chelly, former director of presidential security under 
Bourguiba, later appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior (Ghorbal 2015). 
12 By virtue of their proximity to Ben Ali, members of the Trabelsi, Mabrouk, Zarrouk, and Chiboub 
families owned several public enterprises; Hedi Djilani, who chaired UTICA for almost twenty-four years, 
was father-in-law to Leila Trabelsi’s brother; prominent businessmen Neji Mhiri and Lotfi Abdennadher 
were also personal friends of the presidential couple. According to a World Bank study, by late 2010 Ben 
Ali’s family network had captured nearly 20% of Tunisia’s private sector profits (Rijkers, Freund and 
Nucifora 2014). 
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This wider political role has reflected in the trade union’ participation in government. 
While only four ministers in the Essebsi cabinet hailed from the unions (although they 
were involved in the concomitant HIROR), their increased involvement in the political 
process continued under the Troika. Around one third of the Ennahda-led cabinets had 
been members of a national organisation, mainly Islamist-leaning students’ organisations, 
human rights groups or the UGTT. However, the vast majority of them were also party 
militants, which actually explains their participation in the cabinet. When considering 
non-affiliated ministers only, the participation of trade unions and national organisations 
has become more systematic under the Essid and Chahed cabinets, each of them including 
no less than five members hailing from the UGTT, UTICA, and other women or 
fishermen’s organisations. These figures marked a dramatic shift from Ben Ali’s non-
political cabinets, and point to a new and more dynamic role assumed by the unions in 
the post-2011 period. 
The data point to the different mechanisms regulating cabinet formation and ministerial 
selection in Tunisia. Dominated by the president, Ben Ali’s cabinets functioned according 
to an exclusionary logic structured along political, subnational and socio-professional 
lines. By contrast, cabinets in the post-2011 environment reveal an attempt to include a 
broad spectrum of political forces. Within this context, non-party ministers have 
constituted an increasingly large component of the government. In the next sections, I 
seek to illustrate which function independent ministers have served before and after 2011, 
and what the rise of these figures can tell about elite politics. 
4.4. Ben Ali and the politics of exclusion 
The changing composition of the cabinet under Ben Ali, and the increasing allocation of 
ministerial portfolios to non-party ministers, responded to two main logics shaped by 
domestic political calculations and external constraints. On the one hand, appointing 
ministers without a strong political connotation allowed Ben Ali to preserve his power by 
neutralising politics and preventing the emergence of a political challenger (Erdle, in 
Perthes 2004: 230). Elites who had served under Bourguiba were marginalised, 
privileging loyal officials to cultivate public support (Buehler and Ayari 2018). Ben Ali’s 
party was tasked with the representation of societal interests vis à vis an increasingly 
depoliticised government, whereas any form of opposition was discouraged or actively 
repressed through the use of force. His last cabinet – which was forced to resign as a 
consequence of the popular protests that rocked the country in December 2010 and 
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January 2011 – comprised ministers who had minimal political profile and were 
essentially subordinated to the president, thus constituting the natural outcome of the 
appointments he had made over the previous twenty-four years. 
Notably, strategic decisions were taken in the presidential palace in Carthage by Ben Ali 
and his closest advisers who acted like shadow ministers (Camau and Geisser 2003: 193; 
Wolf 2018: 254). The predominance of Carthage over Tunisia’s other political institutions 
was also demonstrated by the active role of Ben Ali’s family members, who were among 
the closest advisors to the president and managed to manipulate the day-to-day 
bureaucratic machine and ministerial appointments alike. At the same time, the 
penetration of the RCD in the bureaucracy was instrumental in centralising the 
administrative structure, as all initiatives were required to have the final approval of the 
Presidency (Hibou 2011: 329). 
Additionally, Ben Ali managed to control access to elite status through the domination of 
the government, the party structures and the security services, thus allowing the president 
to promote loyalists and exclude possible rivals from influential positions (Erdle, in 
Perthes 2004: 214). The former president privileged a wide range of highly qualified 
technocratic figures and security experts who lacked a strong and independent political 
base. These elites included long-standing ministers like Abdallah Kallel, Ali Chaouch and 
Abdelwahab Abdallah as well as his special advisor Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, security official 
Mohamed Ali Ganzoui and the long-standing leader of the Tunisian Confederation of 
Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de 
l'Artisanat, UTICA) Hédi Djilani. Ben Ali also operated frequent cabinet reshuffles to 
prevent elite members from occupying a ministry for too long, while holding regular party 
congresses – five in twenty years – that guaranteed regular turnover within his RCD. 
Although these strategies prevented competitors from alternative cultivating centres of 
power to the Presidency, they frustrated political ambitions and aroused dissent within 
the RCD (Wolf 2018). Despite this, no defections occurred among key party figures, and 
loyalty to the regime endured until Ben Ali’s eventual departure, preluding the eventual 
regime collapse (Kchouk and Mamuji 2019). 
On the other hand, international financial institutions had increasingly promoted a model 
of technocratic governance to implement economic reforms in Tunisia. Cabinet members 
under Ben Ali were largely selected from the bureaucratic or academic spheres, 
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possessing little or no political experience and hardly any popular support. Their names 
were often unknown to the general public, obscured by the ubiquitous public figure of 
Ben Ali. Co-opted into government, these groups were considered to have the necessary 
competence for implementing the liberal economic policies of the new regime while 
nurturing modest political ambitions. By contrast, only a few members of the cabinet were 
picked from the private sector, the army and the security services, thus excluding from 
politics groups with possibly conflicting agendas. 
Unsatisfied with slow economic liberalisation, in 2000 the World Bank encouraged the 
Tunisian government to improve economic governance by removing the political 
obstacles obstructing reform (Perkins 2013: 39). Despite the seemingly positive economic 
performance, a highly centralised decision-making process was detrimental to the private 
sector while “conditions seem[ed] right for a more active participation of civil society in 
the development process” (World Bank 2000: 26). In this sense, the presence of ministers 
not affiliated to the ruling party, whose pervasive occupation of institutional positions 
was perceived as an obstacle to achieving effective liberalisation, seems to have 
facilitated the ‘selective borrowing’ (Stone 2012) and implementation of economic 
packages negotiated with the international institutions, with the aim of preserving the 
rentier economy that flourished around Ben Ali and his family (Rijkers, Freund and 
Nucifora 2014). The appointment of non-affiliated, technocratic ministers in key 
economic portfolios therefore allowed Ben Ali to formally address external concerns 
while maintaining his tight grip on the cabinet and on the economy. 
Despite Ben Ali’s attempt to neutralise regime change from within and stifle popular 
dissent, his regime proved unable to weather critical junctures (Hibou 2011). The belated 
dismissal of secondary regime figures on December 29,13 followed by a pledge to hold 
legislative elections and step down in 2014, failed to placate the unrest that had spread 
across Tunisia. The ultimate identification of the state institutions with the figure of Ben 
Ali and the RCD allowed little margin for political manoeuvring and no alternative to the 
departure of the leader and his closest associates. As a result, the RCD was soon 
dissolved; Ben Ali and his family fled into exile or were arrested; and several ministers 
 
13 Among the dismissed were the Ministers of Communication, Commerce and Religious Affairs, along 
with the governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba and Zaghouan (cited in Kchouk and Mamuji 2019: 902). 
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and secretaries of state with ties to the ruling family faced trial on charges of corruption 
and embezzlement.14 
4.5. The politics of consensus in post-revolutionary Tunisia 
Under Ben Ali, the appointment of non-party ministers was motivated by the President to 
impose his logic of consensus over the decision-making process, his own party and the 
opposition. On the contrary, their increasing involvement in post-revolutionary Tunisia 
is a function of an inclusionary, consensus-based political environment which signals the 
attempt by the main political actors to seek mutual recognition and broader legitimacy 
(McCarthy 2019). Within this context, independents have been a key factor in building 
trust between the main political forces and sustaining the current political order. 
As early as March 2011, interim Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi formed a cabinet 
consisting entirely of non-affiliated ministers to replace the government led by the 
outgoing Mohamed Ghannouchi, who was forced to resign after widespread popular 
protests. However, the role of non-party ministers became apparent after the Troika took 
power, and tensions with opposition forces began to surface. In the summer of 2013, 
Ennahda agreed to leave the government after the tensions that followed the 
assassinations of two leftist politicians and the inception of the National Dialogue. Habib 
Essid, a former Secretary of State under Ben Ali with no party affiliation, was appointed 
Prime Minister in 2015 after Nidaa Tounes won the majority of seats in the parliamentary 
elections of October 2014. Similarly, key cabinet portfolios likely to ignite inter-party 
tensions, like Cultural or Religious Affairs, were often assigned to independent ministers. 
Importantly, Ennahda opted for a less divisive approach after March 2013 and the 
resignation of former Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali. According to senior party officials, 
in October 2012, the then Prime Minister had unilaterally proposed that his party would 
leave government, which faced the difficulty of reconciling three parties, and support an 
independent technocratic cabinet.15 The party’s central council rejected his proposal and 
forced him to resign after the assassination of Chokri Belaïd in February 2013. Faced with 
mounting criticisms over its management of internal security and accusations of having 
undermined democracy, Ennahda backtracked on his previous position and formed a new 
 
14 Notable examples include Leila Trabelsi’s nephew Imed, former ministers Abdallah Kallel, Tijani 
Haddad and Samira Khayach Belhaj, and Secretary of State for National Solidarity Funds Kamel Hadj 
Sassi. 
15 Author interview with members of Ennahda, March 2017 and June 2018. 
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government led by former Interior Minister Ali Laarayedh, which relied on independents 
for more than half of the cabinet. A few months later, Ennahda would cede power to a 
technocratic government. 
Not only did Tunisian political forces rely on several occasions on non-affiliated figures 
to placate heightened tensions between opposing factions (Ben Hammouda 2016: 29), 
they also created formal and informal arenas to reach a compromise over high-profile 
political issues. Among these was the so-called Consensus Commission, an unofficial 
parliamentary committee composed of a single member for each party in the assembly 
tasked with finding a compromise between the different positions.16 The commission, 
which had existed already under Ben Ali, assumed a new role in the ANC as all major 
policies would be informally adopted consensually. By setting the stage for a collusive 
competition (Boubekeur 2016: 123), this practice is accused of having hampered 
Parliament’s ability to adopt efficient policies while outsourcing responsibility for 
decision-making and policy implementation from the political parties to the technocrats.17 
At the local level, Ennahda similarly opted for a non-confrontational, consensual 
approach on local administration well after 2011 (Gobe 2017).  
All political forces thus have a strong incentive to appoint non-party ministers. While still 
virtually competing and publicly reluctant, the two main political forces in the post-2011 
political landscape – Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes – opted to join coalition governments 
that allowed them to remain in power without assuming full responsibility for the policies 
adopted by the government. Both parties are suspicious that if their counterpart takes too 
much power, it could be used to exclude them from political competition or to undermine 
democracy. According to Ennahda officials, the party has deliberately adopted a “low 
visibility” strategy renouncing ministerial positions in favour of independents to dispel 
scepticism over its allegedly authoritarian goals.18 At the same time, the Presidency has 
also privileged the appointment of non-party ministers in the ministères regaliens 
allowing him to play a more assertive role in some key policy domains, like internal and 
foreign affairs (Santini and Tholens 2018). 
 
16 Author interviews with MPs in the ANC and in Parliament, March 2017 and June 2018. 
17 According to a civil society activist critical of consensual decision-making, “you cannot take consensus 
accountable”. Author interview with civil society activist, June 2018. 
18 Interview with Ennahda officials, February 2017. 
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There is, however, an additional dimension as the nature of the non-party ministers also 
marked a radical change from the past. Contrary to Ben Ali’s practice of elevating 
technocratic figures who lacked a marked political connotation to exclude potential rivals 
within the RCD, the appointment of cabinet officials outside the existing political parties 
represented a visible attempt to include a wider range of socio-political categories into 
decision-making. Rather than merely occupying cabinet positions, political leaders have 
at times opted to recruit ministers from outside the existing parties, resulting in a more 
direct role for those social organisations that have directly participated and invested in 
the political process following 2011. This applies, for example, to Tunisia’s main trade 
union, the UGTT, which several parties see as a potential competitor.19 From this 
perspective, non-party ministers have acquired a more direct, significant political role 
since 2011. 
Consensual politics and the increasing involvement of independent figures were a direct 
consequence of the structural weakness of the Tunisian political system and of its parties. 
Not only were they unable to fully exercise power, they also operated largely as electoral 
cartels with little organisational structure or popular support (Grewal and Hamid 2020). 
Several political parties had long conducted their activities clandestinely or in exile, and 
likewise did not possess any experience in local politics, which was largely dominated by 
state-appointed bureaucrats (Mohsen 2016: 164). As such, lacking the necessary expertise 
to run the government, incumbents opted for independent technocrats with experience in 
the public administration and in the private sector for the negotiation of highly technical 
international agreements in the security and economic fields (Santini and Tholens 2018). 
At the same time, those who could boast previous political experience had typically 
served under Ben Ali, and their reintegration in cabinet could only come about under a 
technocratic label in order to avoid the public uproar that would accompany the return of 
the old regime.20  
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the role of non-party ministers in sustaining Tunisia’s 
political orders has changed since 1987. The increase in the number of independent 
ministers appointed in government positions reflects the changing strategies of domestic 
 
19 Author interview with members of Al Irada and Nidaa Tounes, June 2018. 
20 By the end of 2018, only three ministers had served under Ben Ali. These were former Prime Minister 
Habib Essid, Education Minister Hatem Ben Salem, and Finance Minister Ridha Chalgoum. Several others 
had collaborated at various levels with Ben Ali’s regime (Bobin and Haddad 2018). 
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political elites before and after 2011. Ben Ali relied on non-partisans to exclude rivals 
and centralise power around himself and his close circle. This form of ‘political 
micromanagement’ (Owen 2012), exemplified by cabinet appointments, reveals that, far 
from undertaking political liberalisation, Ben Ali acted to neutralise challengers to his 
power. His style of rule was based on a combination of repression and co-option, whereby 
the former was used to crush organised protests and silence the opposition and the latter 
to buy out key elites into the regime. Within this system, patronage became an essential 
instrument to anchor the regime into society by providing material benefits to selected 
social groups. 
In contrast, independent ministers in the post-revolutionary political environment were 
critical to placating inter-party tensions and consolidating the pact between Ennahda and 
Nidaa Tounes. The demise of Ben Ali’s regime saw the participation of previously 
marginalised or outlawed actors in Tunisia’s political life and a limited reshuffle of the 
country’s political elite. While a wide range of Islamist, leftist and secular organisations 
were eventually reintegrated as they participated in the transition, members of the elites 
linked to Ben Ali managed nonetheless to maintain prominent positions in the political 
elite networks. The late president Béji Caïd Essebsi was himself a representative of the 
old regime, having served under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The interaction between 
Islamists and old regime forces, swinging between polarisation and compromise, resulted 
in a bargained competition that restricted access for political actors outside elite networks. 
These considerations challenge frameworks that try to explain the transition only as a 
reflection of an Islamist-secularist cleavage, and highlight the gradual alignment of these 
rival political parties. 
It is unclear, however, whether these attempts at regulating political competition through 
a top-down, controlled reshuffle of the political elites have been successful in 
reinvigorating the regime. Ben Ali eventually failed as popular pressure, coupled with a 
lack of support from those elites that he helped to sideline, forced him to resign and flee 
in January 2011. Today, low voter turnout in the latest national and local elections and 
continuing unrest across the country show that years of consensual politics have eroded 
popular trust in the ability of political parties to implement sound policies. Whilst partially 
reining in party polarisation, the politics of consensus has contributed to stall legislative 
activity and frustrate real political competition, potentially undermining the consolidation 
of Tunisia’s democratic institutions (Kubinec and Grewal 2018). 
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As such, the increasing participation of independents and technocrats in government 
points to a need for further research into their role and the wider implications for political 
systems across the region. The extent to which non-partisans are changing the 
composition of cabinets in Africa and the Middle East is still under-explored, as is their 
impact on traditional party politics. Indeed, if political parties exist because they are able 
to formulate policy proposals and direct electoral legitimacy, independents may lack the 
former ability, thus contributing to shrinking the popular support of the government. 
Finally, future research may also address how independent ministers are selected and how 
they operate, shedding further light on the internal functioning of government institution. 
The appointment of independent ministers often challenges popular understandings of 
politics in Africa and the Middle East as mainly driven by clientelist or corrupt practices. 
While party, ethnic, regional and other attributes still influence the allocation of 
ministerial positions, the growing incidence of non-party ministers is embedded in a 
recurring logic of managing inter-elite struggles through inclusion and exclusion in 
cabinet. 
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5. Crisis cabinets and the influence of protests on elite volatility in Africa21 
Andrea Carboni, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, United 
Kingdom 
Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, 
United Kingdom 
5.1. Introduction 
Cabinets are the locus of government policy decision-making and state patronage 
opportunities, and cabinet changes are an important tool for sharing power and managing 
competing elites, groups and interests (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Quiroz-Flores 
and Smith 2011). An increasing body of literature interprets the appointment, reshuffling 
and dismissal of senior government officials as a tool of political survival (Arriola 2009; 
Quiroz-Flores and Smith 2011; Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; 
Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Kroeger 2018). However, this logic is often focused 
only on internal machinations within the regime and party. But events – such as political 
crises, disasters or elections – can mean previously effective elite power-sharing 
strategies become ineffective at ensuring political survival.  
Regimes and leaders across the world find themselves in positions where the composition 
of the elite within the government becomes unstable and threatens the political survival 
of either the leader or the regime. In democracies, governments frequently fall due to 
internal competition between parties or rival figures within the government, and leaders 
may apply drastic changes to their governments to retain the confidence of either the 
public or their party (Saalfeld 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Indridadson and 
Kam 2008). Other studies have similarly examined how volatility in the ruling elite has 
emerged from political crises such as scandals, intra-elite conflict, drops in popularity and 
economic stress (Roessler 2011; Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 
2015).  
This study introduces the notion of ‘crisis cabinets’, defined as instances in which regimes 
drastically reorganises ruling coalition in response to political crises, outside of the 
routine cabinet changes caused by elections or democratic regime change. It seeks to 
contribute to the existing literature that explores the composition and functioning of 
executives within and across African states, as well as their interaction with political 
 
21 An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the European Conference of African Studies in 
Edinburgh, 11-14 June 2019. 
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crises. Existing studies which examine how regimes alter their coalitions in response to 
crises focus on European and Latin American governments, and largely overlook 
dynamics in African states (Saalfeld 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; 
Indridadson and Kam 2008; Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). 
Specifically, this study examines the effect of a specific form of crisis that is occurring 
more frequently across Africa. Recent events such as the 2011 Arab Spring means that 
there is growing international interest in mass protest movements as a force for change, 
echoing the academic interest which followed the Third Wave of Democratisation in 
Africa and former Soviet Republics in the 1990s (Carothers and Youngs 2015). Protest 
movements involving large parts of the civilian population for an extended period of time, 
occur in part because the participants believe that these actions can affect the composition 
and direction of national, senior government. We investigate the effects and efficacy of 
protest movements on the formation of crisis cabinets, and specifically inquire how 
regimes change the composition of ruling elites to address the threat posed by mass 
protests.  
Recent events in Africa have increased this interest and suggested protest movements do 
impact senior, national government composition. April 2019 saw the toppling of two of 
Africa’s longest serving autocrats – Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Sudan’s Omar 
al-Bashir – following weeks of sweeping popular protests that brought millions of people 
to the streets (Kushkush 2019). Both leaders attempted to placate protesters through the 
mass dismissal of senior government officials, including cabinet ministers and local 
governors but were ultimately unsuccessful in securing their own leadership (Abdelaziz 
2019; Africa Confidential 2019b). Subsequently, segments of the wider regime elite 
debated and competed over what form a successor government should take to address the 
crisis. 
Examples like these may seem to suggest that protest movements do cause changes within 
the elite, but there is little firm evidence about whether this is the exception or the norm, 
and what kind of changes protests force on the regime. While there have been studies 
examining mass protests in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Carey 2002) and 
others analysing cabinet instability (Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; 
Kroeger 2018), existing studies have not examined the relationship between the two. 
Cross-national studies of African protests have tended to focus on the composition of 
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collective movements (De Waal and Ibreck 2013), the urban-rural divide (Isaacman 1990) 
or the links between different forms of contestation (Branch and Mampilly 2015), but 
have failed to systematically account for the impact of protest movements on cabinet 
instability, government composition and the regime’s use of elite accommodation 
strategies. Through an exploratory study of a selected number of African executives, this 
study aims to provide a better understanding of how regimes tailor their ruling coalitions 
to mitigate political crises and try to ensure their survival. 
This study proceeds by reviewing the literature on cabinets as tools of coalition building 
and mitigation mechanisms for political crises. Using quantitative data on African 
cabinets and protests, we examine whether there is a strong correlation between public 
protest and cabinet volatility, and whether protests are a common trigger for ‘crisis 
cabinets’. We then investigate whether protest-motivated crisis cabinets differ from other 
forms of crisis cabinet and, if so, what unique features they possess. Finally, we examine 
how the protests studied succeeded in forcing the regime to significantly change their 
coalition and how the cabinet changed in response to protester demands.  
Overall the study finds that protests are not robustly correlated with cabinet volatility and 
are responsible for only a sixth of the crisis cabinets studied. It does suggest however that 
when, in rare cases, protests do spur the creation of crisis cabinets, regimes create cabinets 
specifically designed to mollify and address protester demands. The cases where protests 
are influential in prompting crisis cabinets are those where the nature of the protests 
causes a split within the ruling elite, making the leader vulnerable to internal threats and 
the regime liable to disintegration.  
5.2. Cabinets as coalition building and crisis mitigation 
Existing literature describes the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointment 
as transactional. Studies on cabinet composition in Western democracies highlight that 
leaders appoint ministers who can provide loyalty or ideological cohesion to strengthen 
cohesion of their governments, or expertise to improve performance (Indridason and Kam 
2008). In other cases, ministers from outside parties can be brought into the government 
to allow the leader to form a viable government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008). 
In Africa, cabinet appointments are often explained as key positions in the regime’s web 
of patronage. Ministerial appointments are used strategically to counter external threats 
by bringing political elites and ‘big men’ into the regime’s patronage network, while the 
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newly incorporated elites deliver votes or political support from their network (Bratton 
and Van de Walle 1994; Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015). The 
composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into which groups and 
constituencies the regime considers integral to their coalition and political survival.  
The composition of the cabinet also reflects the threat posed by potential allies within the 
ruling coalition. Included elites can use the state’s resources to cultivate a base to rival 
the leader or can try to depose the leader (Choi and Kim 2018). Consequently, African 
leaders attempt to coup-proof their regimes by creating arrangements that raise the costs 
of elite coordination and hinder elite threats (Casper and Tyson 2014). Examples include 
purges (violent and non-violent) and the rotation of elites among different positions to 
prevent the cultivation of separate powerbases (Jackson and Rosberg 1992; Geddes 2003; 
Roessler 2011; Albertus 2012; Powell 2012; Woldense 2018).  
Elite volatility within the cabinet which happens outside ‘expected periods’, such as post-
electoral cabinet changes or democratic alternations in power, is therefore indicative of 
the regime reconfiguring itself to mitigate against internal and external threats. Political 
crises or upheavals will necessitate changes to the ruling coalition when changes in the 
demands and political strength of different subgroups or elites cause changes to what 
constitutes a ‘stable bargain’. Former allies may begin to become a threat to the leader, 
necessitating their removal (Roessler 2011). Rent-seeking elites, ideological movements 
at odds with the regime and dissatisfied ethno-regional communities may engage in 
protests or political violence to coerce the regime into granting them more state resources 
or more positions in government (De Waal 2009). A drop in public support may weaken 
the leader’s legitimacy, making them vulnerable to being ousted by either the opposition 
or rivals within government (Alesina et al. 1996; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). In her 
study on the effects of economic crises and falling regime popularity on ministerial 
stability in Latin America, Martinez-Gallardo describes the relationship between senior 
government composition and the political environment outlining how: 
“[u]nexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change 
these conditions and make bargains that were previously “stable” no 
longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that 
presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges.” (Martinez-
Gallardo 2014: 5). 
Economic crises, scandals, internal factionalism or mass protest all exert pressure on 
regimes to redistribute the balance of power among elites inside and outside of 
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government (Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Leaders 
managing divided or unruly governments, or who are under siege from opposition forces 
and widespread popular disapproval, are more likely to dismiss ministers who pose an 
obstacle to their hegemony, making changes to the ruling coalition to secure their political 
survival (Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Regimes which have become fractured or lost public 
confidence may need to implement a ‘changing of the guard’ to demonstrate a willingness 
to reform (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Rivera 2000; Albertus 2012) 
The notion of ‘crisis cabinets’ developed here identifies those instances in which leaders 
or regimes which are confronted with an existential political crisis are forced to operate 
non-routine cabinet reshuffles involving mass ministerial turnover. Crisis cabinets occur 
outside periods in which a large-scale change in personnel would be instituted as a formal 
government procedure, such as the resignation of the cabinet during electoral periods or 
the democratic transition from one regime to the next. 
5.2.1. The dangers of protests 
Politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as a process of continual bargaining between the 
leader and rival elites within and outside the government (De Waal 2009; Francois, Rainer 
and Trebbi 2015; Bagayoko, Hutchful and Luckham 2016). In contrast, the non-elite 
masses are ascribed secondary importance as resources to be mobilised by elites hoping 
to enhance their place within the political hierarchy (Ndegwa 1997; Chabal and Daloz 
1999; Langer 2005; Quiroz Flores and Smith 2011). However, demonstrations of 
discontent among a large section of the non-elite can damage a regime’s legitimacy and 
can embolden rival elites. Historically large-scale protests have provided elites within the 
government the opportunity to use the regime’s weakened legitimacy to launch a coup or 
extract concessions (Volpi 2013; Casper and Tyson 2014). During the early 1990s, 
opposition politicians or former insiders returning from exile sought to co-opt the pro-
democracy movements that spread across the continent against the existing autocratic 
regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992).  
It is well established in the literature that regimes rarely rely on repression or force alone 
to quash protests as these strategies may in fact cause escalation (Levitsky and Way 2002; 
Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Josua and Edel 2015). As a result, regimes employ a range of 
accommodation strategies when dealing with threatening protests, including national 
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dialogues, constitutional changes or important changes to the senior elite through crisis 
cabinets (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Thurston 2018).  
The recent large-scale cabinet reshuffles in Sudan and Algeria are both examples of the 
regime instituting crisis cabinets to mollify popular discontent. In the aftermath of the 
leaders’ ouster, factional struggles arose as elites attempted to reorganise the ruling 
coalition into a stable bargain which would ensure at least part of the regime’s political 
survival. In Algeria, President Bouteflika dissolved his cabinet in March in a last effort 
to contain popular protests, and appointed a technocratic caretaker government. As public 
support continued to wane, Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah, previously a Deputy 
Minister of Defence, moved on to oust the aging president and purge his faction while 
retaining key allies in the old guard (Africa Confidential 2019b, 2019c). Similarly, 
Sudan’s Oman Al-Bashir fired his government and all his regional governors after 
declaring a one-year state emergency in February, two months after demonstrations 
against the rising cost of bread had erupted across the country. Weeks later, a segment of 
the military ousted most political elements loyal to Al-Bashir, including members of his 
National Congress Party, and eventually agreed to a transition timetable with the 
protesters (Abdelaziz 2019). Other examples include Mubarak dismissing claims that his 
son would succeed him and firing the government led by long-standing Prime Minister 
Ahmed Nazif in an attempt to appease the Tahrir Square protester, or King Hassan of 
Morocco’s dismissal of his unpopular Prime Minister as a concession to opposition 
parties (Lust-Okar 2004; Josua and Edel 2015). 
These examples show that regimes will offer change in the senior government and 
turnover in the elite as a concession in return for peace. Existing large-N studies have 
attempted to approximate regime accommodation strategies through conciliatory rhetoric 
(Carey 2006; Bhasin and Gandhi 2013), while country-specific investigations have 
looked at how individual regimes have attempted to mollify protest through legal reform, 
policies and a change in the elite (Lust-Okar 2004; Volpi 2013; Bogaert 2015; Josua and 
Edel 2015). But there are no comparative studies examining the relationship between 
public unrest and volatility within the ruling elite.  
We aim to address this gap in the research through isolating ‘crisis cabinets’ and 
determining which are preceded by popular protests. Through this process, we aim to 
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determine whether protests are a common cause of crisis cabinets, and whether these 
crisis cabinets are distinctly tailored to address protester grievances. 
5.3. Protest, cabinet volatility and crisis cabinets in Africa, 2007-2018 
The above section ties the concept of ‘crisis cabinets’ to both the level of turnover in the 
cabinet, and the non-routine nature of the reshuffle. We therefore define a crisis cabinet 
as any reshuffle which results in the dismissal of over half of the cabinet and occurs 
outside of the post-electoral period, where large-scale reshuffles are routine.  
The first step is to assess whether protest is related to ministerial volatility. To explore 
this proposed relationship, we use ACPED, a dataset providing monthly list of cabinet 
ministers in twenty-two African states from 1997-2018 (Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 
2020). Each entry includes every minister’s name, position, ethnicity, home region and 
affiliated political party, along with their respective status in the cabinet. This is compared 
against protest data provided by ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED records 
disaggregated information on conflict and protest events across Africa, with data 
available from 1997 to the present. Available information includes the precise 
geographical coordinates of the event, the identity of actors and the type of event, and the 
outcome of the conflict. These features are ideal for the study, enabling accurate analysis 
of the geography of the protests.  
ACLED data are used to create multiple metrics to assess the intensity and geography of 
protest. There are multiple ways in which a regime may interpret protests to constitute a 
‘crisis’. Regimes may be most concerned by the escalation in protest – and the potential 
‘snowball’ effect than aggregate protest numbers (Yin 1998). Alternatively, regimes may 
be more concerned with protest deaths due to their potential to cause a crisis of domestic 
and international legitimacy (Josua and Edel 2015). Consequently, we use multiple 
metrics to capture these various methods by which a regime may assess whether protests 
represent a serious threat: 
1. The number of demonstrations in the previous six months 
2. The number of fatalities arising from the protests 
3. The percent change in the number of protests 
4. The percentage of demonstrations involving state forces 
5. The percentage of all conflict events demonstrations account for 
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6. The number of distinct geographical clusters of protest22  
Combining these two datasets, we surveyed cabinet changes in 20 African states between 
2007 and 2018.23 Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between change in the cabinet 
(calculated as the number of dropped ministers as a percentage of the previous cabinet’s 
size) against ACLED’s various protest measures. Figure 3 also highlights crisis in blue.  
 
Figure 5.1: Protest Correlated against Ministerial Volatility 
Overall, there is a weak correlation in all measures apart from percent change in the 
number of protests and the number of protest-related fatalities, where a seemingly strong 
relationship is driven by only a few extreme observations. Reshuffles which occur amidst 
a context of intense, escalating or geographically dispersed protest are not guaranteed to 
 
22 A more detailed explanation of each variable is included in Table 1 (see Appendix). 
23 Rwanda is excluded due to the high percentage of ministers who were born in Uganda and so have no 
home region, while South Sudan is excluded due to gaining independence mid-way through the period 
under study. Despite the data covering a larger timespan, the period of 2007 to 2017 is used to control 
biases due to the wider coverage of protest events in later years. 
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involve more turnover in personnel. Furthermore, crisis cabinets are frequently created 
during times of low-intensity protest activity.  
Overall, the data suggests that regimes do not reliably engage in a drastic reshaping of the 
cabinet when facing large-scale protests. Although this finding seems to contradict recent 
events in Algeria and Sudan, both countries had weathered previous large-scale protests 
– Algeria in 2011 and Sudan in 2013 – through a mixture of repression, bolstering the 
loyalty of regime elites and enacting superficial reforms (Volpi 2013; Berridge 2020). 
Figure 5.1 shows that events such as the recent protests in Algeria and Sudan or the crisis 
cabinets during the Arab Spring are the exception rather than the norm. 
These exceptional events are studied by isolating episodes of severe elite volatility. This 
will allow us to examine what factors led to the success of the protests in these select 
instances, how regimes implement crisis cabinets to mitigate the unrest and how the 
changes witnessed in protest-motivated crisis cabinets differ from other types of crisis 
cabinet.  
5.3.1. Variations in Crises and Crisis Cabinets 
A total of eighteen cabinet reshuffles were found to match the criteria for a crisis cabinet. 
The contexts of the sixteen crisis cabinets are laid out in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
However, a cursory look at some of the cabinets shows that a large range of crises can 
lead to drastic changes in the ruling coalition.  
There are cases where a victorious faction emerges from an internal struggle within the 
regime, and purges the government of their internal rivals. One example is Joyce Banda 
ascending to the presidency of Malawi after the death of President Mutharika. Banda had 
fallen out of favour with Mutharika’s party but gained the presidency in accordance with 
the constitution. She used the opportunity to expel all ministers loyal to Mutharika from 
the cabinet (Dionne and Dulani 2013). There are cases where mass changes to the cabinet 
are used to integrate a threatening opposition. Examples include Bozize’s attempt to 
create a unity government with the Seleka rebel coalition in early 2013 in the Central 
African Republic, to try to deter their march towards Bangui (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis 
2016). The crisis cabinets also include three coups – Zimbabwe 2017, Mali 2012 and 
Guinea 2009 – which cause significant volatility as the new regime tries to consolidate 
power and undermine elites associated with the old regime. 
75 
 
 
This raises a serious issue of how to accurately, and without bias, select which crisis 
cabinets were created as a direct reaction to protests by the regime or leader. To address 
this problem, we rely on the Worldwide Integrated Crisis Warning System (ICEWS). The 
ICEWS is an event dataset which consists of coded interactions between socio-political 
actors (Boschee et al. 2015). The main advantage of ICEWS is that the dataset records a 
large array of non-violent political interactions between actors such as criticisms and 
denunciations, attempts at mediation and diplomatic or material cooperation. The dataset 
is also considered to be more reliable and have fewer false positives than GDELT, the 
other main political interaction dataset (Ward et al. 2013). 
To assess which crisis cabinets were likely to be created in response to protest, we isolated 
instances in which the government explicitly yielded to or cooperated or negotiated with 
protests in the six months prior to the formation of the crisis cabinet.24 Using this 
classificatory mechanism only three out of the sixteen crisis cabinets, just under a fifth, 
were motivated by protest. They are: 
1. Guinea 2007 
2. Tunisia 2011 
3. Ethiopia April 2018  
The fact that only three crisis cabinets, a sixth of all isolated crisis cabinets, can be 
convincingly tied to demonstrations shows that popular protest is not a common cause of 
crisis cabinet formation. This supports the finding in figure 1 that high protest – defined 
by either aggregate protest events, fatalities or geographic dispersion – is not normally 
correlated with elite volatility within the cabinet.  
There are also crisis cabinets which are formed in high protest environments, yet the 
formation appears to be due to other political factors. Appendix Table 3 breaks down all 
crisis cabinets by ACLED protest metrics. For example, protest is high in the six months 
before the crisis cabinets which accompany the Zimbabwe 2017 coup or Goodluck 
Jonathan’s purge of the Nigerian cabinet in 2010. This raises the questions of what 
features and strategies define protest-motivated crisis cabinets, and what factors cause 
protests to be successful in forcing crisis cabinets. These questions are addressed in the 
 
24 Using the ICEWS classification, we consider the following government-protester interactions to be 
indicative of a ‘protest-motivated crisis cabinet’: engaging in diplomatic cooperation, mediating, and 
yielding. 
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next two sections through comparing patterns of cabinet change in the protest-related 
crisis cabinets to those in the remaining fifteen crisis cabinets, and through a qualitative 
investigation of the events preceding the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets and how 
the cabinet changes were specifically tailored to address protester grievance. 
5.3.2. Comparing Crisis Cabinets 
The crisis cabinets are compared using a number of metrics derived from the ACPED 
data to measure the degree of change and volatility. These metrics measure the following: 
1. Change in personnel in the cabinet; 
2. Change in personnel in the ‘inner circle’, the most important posts in the cabinet;25 
3. Change in the regional representation of the cabinet and inner circle; 
4. Change in how proportionally cabinet and inner circle posts are allocated among 
a country’s regions; 
5. The average length of time served by ministers dropped from the cabinet.26 
Table 4 shows the comparison between crisis cabinets formed in response to protest and 
those formed in response to other crises. The average metrics for all cabinet reshuffles27 
are also included for reference. Crisis cabinets, by our definition, have a much higher 
turnover of personnel than most reshuffles. But crisis cabinets motivated by protest have 
a higher turnover of personnel in both the cabinet at large and the inner circle than other 
types of crisis cabinet. The mean the tenure of dismissed ministers is much higher for 
protest-motivated crisis cabinets than other types of crisis cabinet and the average cabinet 
reshuffle. 
Due to the rarity of protest-motivated crisis cabinets and the low number of observations, 
it is impossible to draw statistical conclusions. However, this finding does corroborate 
with the argument that protesters often seek a visible change in the ruling elite. This can 
include a widespread changing of the guard or the dismissal of key ministers deemed 
emblematic of the regime’s failures or excesses. The interests of embedded regime elites 
frequently rely on the maintenance of the status quo and as a result are seen as obstacles 
to reform or change within the regime (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Rivera 2000; 
Albertus 2012). Therefore, the jettisoning of longstanding elites is an effective strategy 
 
25 The concept of the inner circle is borrowed from Lindemann (2011a) and Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 
(2015). The inner circle typically consists of posts such as  
26 A more detailed explanation of the variables is outlined in Appendix Table 4. 
27 Includes all reshuffles, including crisis cabinets and post-electoral reshuffles. 
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for the regime to signal that it is willing to engage in substantial reform and trade major 
concessions – in the form of key allies – for peace.  
All types of crisis cabinet involve larger shifts in regional representation and 
disproportion than the average reshuffle, suggesting that crisis cabinets frequently involve 
a recalibration in the regime’s regional power sharing strategy. Feelings of regional 
disenfranchisement have driven protests, rebellions, coups and internal struggles, all of 
which are potential triggers for crisis cabinets (Langer 2005; Boggero 2009; Lindemann 
2011a; Amin and Takougang 2018). Regional representation declines for crisis cabinets 
created in response to protest, while the inner circle becomes only marginally more 
inclusive compared to other types of crisis cabinet. These differences are less dramatic 
than those seen in ministerial turnover or the tenure of dropped ministers. This could show 
that issues of representation are less important in protest-motivated crisis cabinets 
compared to the widespread dismissal of enduring elites. However, further analysis in the 
next section shows that although overall regional representation does not drastically 
change, protest hotspots do appear to reap a boost in representation in the crisis cabinet.  
The final major difference is in the electoral quality of the regime overseeing the crisis 
cabinet. Electoral quality is measured by the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) electoral 
component index, an ordinal variable (0-1) which measures the “responsiveness and 
accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive 
elections” (Pemstein et al. 2017). Crisis cabinets in general on average occur in regimes 
with a lower VDEM score. This finding corroborates with the existing literature on 
anocracies and autocracies which describes elite rotation as part of the ruler’s ‘toolkit’ to 
ensure political survival (Roessler 2011; Albertus 2012; Woldense 2018). However, crisis 
cabinets made in response to protest occur in drastically less democratic environments 
than other crisis cabinets. Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix illustrate how the correlation 
between ministerial volatility and ACLED protest metrics is stronger in more autocratic 
or electorally dominant regimes. 
Less democratic regimes are generally understood to be more vulnerable to protest. In 
more democratic or competitive regimes, the legitimacy of government and leader is 
continually critiqued and protests against government actions are perceived as ‘politics 
as usual’ (Schedler 2013). In these settings, the political opposition has a greater chance 
of either gaining the leadership through elections or capturing a significant amount of 
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power through the legislature and so have an incentive not to support protests calling for 
radical change (Lust-Okar 2004; Trejo 2014). In contrast, in more autocratic regimes, the 
public’s perception that the regime is invulnerable is a major political asset. This 
perception is fed through supermajorities in elections, repression or popular mobilisation 
(Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2013; Arriola and Lyons 2016).28 Accordingly, 
protest-motivated crisis cabinets occur in settings where the regime dominates 
parliament, occupying on average over three quarters of the lower house.  
Within these settings, public protest can inform would-be dissenters that dissatisfaction 
with the regime is widespread and could encourage cascading protests against a weakened 
and delegitimised government (Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni 2011). Major protests in 
authoritarian regimes provide useful information for rival elites, showing that public 
loyalty to the government is low, reducing the cost of launching a coup (Magaloni and 
Wallace 2008; Caspar and Tyson 2014). In short, large-scale protests form a more severe 
political threat to the regime in autocratic governments, necessitating drastic changes in 
the elite coalition to mitigate the political threat and satisfy the public’s demand for 
change.  
The dramatic changes seen in protest crisis cabinets can be interpreted as a pre-emptive 
revolution, in which widespread changes to the elite coalition are implemented, albeit 
under the stewardship of the regime. Out of the three protest crisis cabinets, only in 
Guinea did the incumbent retain power. In Ethiopia the ruling party remained in charge 
but under a new leader, while both the incumbent and the ruling party were ousted in 
Tunisia.  
In the following section, the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets are qualitatively 
investigated to show how the protests caused a fissure within the ruling elite, leading to 
dramatic change in the ruling coalition; and secondly, how the resulting crisis cabinets 
were specifically tailored to address the protesters’ grievances. 
 
28 For example, during the 2010 Egyptian Parliamentary elections, President Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party increased its share of seats to occupy 81% of parliament. In Burkina Faso, President 
Blaise Compaoré won 80% of the presidential vote in 2010 and 55% of the parliamentary vote in 2012. 
Both Mubarak and Compaoré would be ousted through mass protests within the next few years. 
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5.4. The politics of crisis cabinets after mass protests 
5.4.1. Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, a number of cabinets were created between 2016 and 2018 by the ruling 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) to address the widespread protests and 
violence that had occurred since late 2015. The protests were concentrated in the Oromia 
region in response to the Addis Ababa Master Plan which would expand the boundary of 
the capital into farms in the surrounding area, leading to fears amongst Oromo farmers 
that they would lose their land (Fisher and Gebrewahd 2018). The EPRDF’s use of 
repression and coercion during the previous elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 had 
demonstrated that the regime could not be removed at the ballot box (Arriola 2013; 
Arriola and Lyons 2016). The government reacted to the protests with repression, a tactic 
used during previous post-election protests (ibid.). The crackdown led to a widespread 
loss of life while a state of emergency led to a restriction of rights and civilians being 
arrested for social media posts.  
The government also sought to assuage protester demands by suspending then scrapping 
the Master Plan in early 2016. In spite of this gesture, other regions harboured grievances 
against the EPRDF and the perceived Tigray domination of the supposedly multi-ethnic 
ruling coalition (Fisher and Gebrewahd 2018). As a result, the protests spread to the 
Amhara region and the Southern Nations and Peoples region. Though these protests were 
largely rooted in ethno-regionalist grievances, protesters from different regions began to 
associate their struggles with each other. The regime then engaged in a reshuffle in late 
2016 in which the number of Oromo ministers increased, but longstanding party loyalists 
retained important posts in Defence, Telecommunications and the Deputy Premiership, 
while Tigrayans continued to dominate the senior military and intelligence sectors (Africa 
Confidential 2016). These changes were perceived as token or cosmetic by the opposition. 
The government crackdown on Oromo and Amhara protesters eventually created a split 
within the EPRDF regime. The Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) – members of the ruling EPRDF 
coalition – eventually openly criticised the government in order to retain some connection 
with their protesting constituents (Fisher and Gebrewahd 2018). Furthermore, the 
EPRDF’s use of repression was condemned by the US through a bipartisan bill in the 
House of Representatives (Jeffrey 2018). Internal factionalism and external 
condemnation of the regime eventually led to leader Hailemariam Desalegn resigning 
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under pressure from his own party as the regime tried to restore its legitimacy with a new 
power configuration. 
Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, was elected the new leader of the EPRDF at the start of 2018 in 
an internal election which was marred by open conflict between the coalition’s constituent 
parties (Africa Confidential 2018a). Abiy was presented by the regime as a reformist who 
could placate the protester’s demands for renewal. Abiy announced his inaugural cabinet 
in April 2018.  
Abiy’s cabinet showed a high degree of ‘renewal’, representing the largest turnover in 
cabinet personnel in a Ethiopian reshuffle outside elections recorded in ACPED (52.5 
percent, against a previous average of 7.9 percent). Many of the ministers who were fired 
were longstanding stalwarts of the now discredited regime. Out of the 21 dismissed 
ministers, three had been in cabinet since the 1990s and ten had been in cabinet before 
2012, when Meles Zenawi was in power. Zenawi was seen as the architect of both Tigray 
domination within the EPRDF and the ‘developmental state’ system which prioritised 
economic development over political consensus and deprived people of their land 
(Záhořík 2017). It was also during the latter part of the Zenawi era that repression became 
the method by which the regime held onto power (Arriola and Lyons 2016).  
Another major change was a regional rebalancing of the cabinet. The protests had been 
stirred by largely regionalised grievances against the state, though the complaints of the 
different groups – primarily Oromo and Amhara – resonated with other groups critical of 
the regime. Figure 5.2 shows that the crisis cabinet regionally rebalanced the allocation 
of posts to mollify these two restive regions. The Amhara region saw its representation 
in the cabinet at large increase from 23 to 30 percent. The crisis cabinet also allocated 
more than half of the important inner circle posts to the Oromo region. Outside of the 
more visible executive, Abiy Ahmed also reduced Tigray influence in the security sector 
which the protesters held responsible for the government atrocities during the crackdown 
(Africa Confidential 2018b). 
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Figure 5.2: Regional Changes in Representation - Ethiopia 
In short, the Abiy’s crisis cabinet (and the EPRDF’s appointment of Abiy as the party’s 
leader) was tailored to address the demands of the protesters. The dismissal of long-term 
ministers and the appointment of a new leader satisfied the protesters demands for 
significant change, short of the replacement of the EPRDF regime, from a government 
that was perceived to be both unwilling to cede power and unwilling to consult its citizens 
or constituent parties. The rebalancing of the cabinet and inner circle towards more 
Oromo and Amhara representation addressed the repeated accusations that the EPRDF 
was merely an extension of its Tigray faction, and did not represent the interests of all 
Ethiopians. 
5.4.2. Guinea 
In Guinea a crisis cabinet was appointed after a year of highly organised strikes and 
protest against the regime lead by a coalition of two large trade unions, the Union 
syndicale des travailleurs de Guinée (USTG) and the Confédération nationale des 
travailleurs de Guinée (CNTG). The regime of long-time president Lassana Conte had 
lost much of its popularity due to decreasing wages and rampant inflation during the 
2000s. Since the introduction of elections in the 1990s, the opposition had failed to 
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present a credible alternative to the Conte regime and most opposition parties boycotted 
elections. The different opposition parties were overwhelmingly believed to represent 
particular ethnic or subnational interests (Engeler 2008). In contrast, trade unions retained 
a national identity due to their role in the independence struggle and managed to 
encourage passive strikes in early 2006 which were observed by the population at large 
(McGovern 2007). 
Following these strikes, two relatives close to Conte were convicted of embezzling $22 
million from the treasury, prompting Conte to overtly intervene on their behalf and break 
any pretence of separation of powers within his government. This prompted the USTG 
and CNTG to launch a strike in January 2007 which lasted nineteen days and was widely 
supported by the Guinean population. Protests in Conakry were violently repressed by 
the military and Conte declared a state of emergency which imposed martial law (ibid.) 
Conte tried to placate union demands for new leadership by returning substantial powers 
to the post of Prime Minister. However, he appointed Eugene Camara, a close ally, as the 
new Prime Minister. This half-hearted attempt at negotiation led to the unions renewing 
their protest while the National Assembly – previously a rubber stamp parliament – 
reasserted its independence by refusing to prolong the state of emergency (Engeler 2008). 
This signified a break within the regime elite and the increasing political isolation of 
Conte.  
No longer able to rely on the regime elite and facing pressure from the strong Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve the issue, Conte capitulated 
and selected the unions’ preferred candidate, Lansana Kouyate, as the new Prime Minister 
and a new cabinet with much of the old guard purged. The new cabinet, appointed by 
Kouyate, was constructed to project the impression of renewal, efficiency and integrity. 
The number of ministers was cut from 28 in December 2006 to 21 in March 2007.  
Nearly all former ministers tied to Conte were dropped, resulting in the highest turnover 
of personnel in the cabinet and inner circle – 88.9 and 85.7 percent respectively – recorded 
during Conte’s reign. This changing of the guard included a candidate to be Conte’s 
successor, Minister-Secretary General to Presidency, Fodé Bangoura.  
The Guinea case differs from Abiy’s crisis cabinet in that the dropped ministers did not 
have particularly long tenures, averaging a tenure of just over two years. This is because 
Conte pursued a personalist strategy of repeatedly rotating elites to prevent independent 
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bases of power from forming (Roessler 2011; Kroeger 2018).29 Nevertheless, the 
dismissal of his possible successor showed that Conte was willing to replace core 
members of his elite circle to placate the protesters. 
The main complaints against Conte’s regime were corruption and ineffectiveness at 
rectifying the country’s economic problems, as opposed to ethnic or regional complaints. 
Nevertheless, Kouyate’s cabinet expanded regional representation within the inner circle 
(see Figure 5.3). The opening of the political space was also demonstrated by the political 
backgrounds of the new ministers. The majority were technocratic professionals who 
were unconnected to Conte’s clique, the ruling party or the opposition. These technocrats 
occupied the key ministries of Finance and Justice (Wikileaks 2007). Ministers associated 
with the unions secured the positions of Financial Oversight and Transparency, Labour 
and Administrative Reform, and Education. However, the military and security apparatus 
managed to gain the Defence and Internal Security portfolios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 In the previous ten years Conte had enacted eight large-scale reshuffles outside of the post-election 
period. 
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Figure 5.3: Regional Changes in Representation - Guinea 
All these factors meant Kouyate’s cabinet was interpreted as a “victory for the people 
over a totally discredited power – a real revolution” (Engeler 2008). Kouyate’s crisis 
cabinet was designed to address the grievances that had driven the protest. The turnover 
of most of the cabinet including Conte’s potential successor signalled government would 
no longer be stuffed by loyalists. The appointment of technocrats and union officials 
demonstrated that the new government would be staffed by those who could fix Guinea’s 
economic issues and effectively represent the populace. Finally, by ceding a large amount 
of power Conte had held onto the presidency and the ability to get the regime back under 
his control.30 
 
30 Just over a year later Conte fired Kouyate and packed the cabinet once again with loyalists. Kouyate’s 
new government had failed to resolve the cost of living issue while soldiers and police rioted over salary 
arrears (Engeler 2008). Furthermore, Kouyate had launched an independent audit into embezzlement by 
the president’s relatives (Africa Confidential 2008). Conte and the old guard reacted as soon as Kouyate’s 
support among the general public and unions was waning, enabling Conte to retain control until his death 
at the end of 2008. 
 
85 
 
 
5.4.3. Tunisia 
In Tunisia, the appointment of two crisis cabinets in January and February 2011 was a 
direct consequence of the protests that spread across the country starting in December 
2010, when a street vendor set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid. Demonstrations 
were held in several cities, quickly coalescing into a large protest movement against 
Tunisia’s long-time ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The response to the sweeping unrest 
consisted of a mix of repression and accommodation.  
While security forces were responsible for killing dozens of people between December 
20 and January 14, Ben Ali also attempted to mollify the demonstrators by firing ministers 
and local governors in late December, announcing job creation plans and pledging to hold 
legislative elections and step down in 2014. The reshuffle announced on December 29 
involved changes to minor cabinet portfolios, including the communications, trade, 
religious affairs and youth ministers, which ultimately failed to placate the protesters who 
continued to mobilise well beyond the autocrat’s departure on January 14. 
Furthermore, the protests caused a splinter in the regime. Both the Minister of the Interior 
and Chief of Presidential Security chose to mutiny against the regime, and some security 
service units mobilised to arrest members of the Ben Ali family (Holmes and Koehler 
2018). Ben Ali subsequently fled to Jeddah. Three days after Ben Ali left the country, the 
long-time technocratic Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi announced a crisis 
cabinet composed of members of the dissolved ruling party, technocrats and opposition 
figures, many of whom resigned before taking office to express their unhappiness about 
the continued presence of associates of the former regime. Although only five ministers 
from the previous regime were reappointed and the most unpopular figures had left the 
government, demonstrations continued unabated for over a month with protesters 
denouncing the continuity of the interim government and demanding more radical 
changes. On February 27, Ghannouchi announced his resignation, leaving the post of 
Prime Minister to Béji Caid Essebsi, a former ambassador and minister in the 1970s who 
formed a caretaker government consisting entirely of non-party ministers (Ben Achour 
2016). 
In the months between December 2010 and March 2011, widespread, persistent unrest 
pressured Tunisian elites to make significant changes to the government and to increase 
its overall representation. By March 2011, all ministers associated with the Ben Ali 
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regime had been purged from the cabinet, representing an unprecedented level of 
turnover. Previous reshuffles outside of elections resulted in an average 8.5 percent 
change in personnel. The first attempt at a crisis cabinet in January 2011 resulted in the 
dismissal of three quarters of the cabinet, and the subsequent reshuffle in February 2011 
resulted in half of the new cabinet being dropped. Some of Ben Ali’s closest associates, 
including members of his extended family, the head of presidential security Ali Seriati 
and the former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem, were arrested and faced judicial 
charges for their role in the crackdown of the uprisings.  
The continuation of the protests following Ben Ali’s departure contributed significantly 
to the ongoing changes in the cabinet (Boubekeur 2016). Despite Prime Minister 
Ghannouchi expelling Ben Ali’s loyalists from the executive’s inner circle and his own 
technocratic profile, he was himself still tainted by his association with the former regime, 
and demonstrators accused him of retaining some of Ben Ali’s ministers to water down 
the outcomes of the revolution. As a result, popular pressure mounted between January 
and February 2011 to also expel ministers that, despite their alleged technocratic profile, 
had served under Ben Ali, in some cases for more than a decade. The role played by the 
protests during the interim period therefore explains the high rate of observed ministerial 
turnover, as well as the relatively long average tenure – five and a half years – of the 
dismissed ministers. 
At the same time, the protests also contributed towards modifying the cabinet’s 
geographical representation. Under Ben Ali, ministerial positions were disproportionately 
distributed among elites from Tunisia’s coastal areas, and particularly from his home 
region of Sousse (Camau and Geisser 2003). In December 2010, the Prime Minister, as 
well as the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture ministers, were all from Ben Ali’s 
region. By contrast Tunisia’s inner regions, which had been a hotbed of protest, had often 
been marginalised, sparking highly contentious popular grievances. Among these regions, 
Zaghouan and Kebili never enjoyed ministerial representation, while Le Kef, Sidi Bouzid 
and Tataouine had only one minister each in twenty-three years (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Regional Changes in Representation - Tunisia 
It is therefore not surprising that one of the main goals of the protest movement was to 
ensure more equitable political representation. As shown in Figure 5.4, the cabinet 
appointed by Essebsi in March 2011 was more geographically diverse, in spite of the 
number of available ministerial posts being reduced by one third and the technocratic 
profile of many of its ministers, who typically came from the capital and the largest urban 
centres. The government’s inner circle, comprising ministers appointed to the most 
influential portfolios, also became more representative as a consequence of the expulsion 
of Ben Ali’s Sousse clan which had traditionally monopolised these positions. 
In sum, the appointment of two consecutive crisis cabinets in Tunisia was a consequence 
of the protest movement that led to Ben Ali’s ousting in January 2011. The pressure 
exerted by popular protests pressured transitional elites into appointing more inclusive 
governments and breaking with the authoritarian past by dismissing ministers that had 
been part of Ben Ali’s cabinets. At the same time, hostility to Ben Ali’s former prime 
minister heading the transitional government led several opposition figures to resign from 
Mohammed Ghannouchi’s government in January 2011, and to cease any collaboration 
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with former regime members, who were eventually banned from running in the 
subsequent elections.  
In Tunisia, as in the other two cases, the protests caused a split in the ruling elite when 
members of the regime recognised that peace was unattainable while Ben Ali remained 
in power and that the old regime was unsustainable. In Ethiopia, the protests and the 
violence of the government crackdown forced internal elites to confront the regime on 
the behalf of their constituents while providing disgruntled factions in the regime with 
the opportunity to become dominant. In Guinea, the protests enabled a previously pliant 
legislature to start imposing its authority on the leader and demanding that the regime 
negotiate with external elites to end the violence.  
5.5. Conclusion 
This study illustrates how regimes react to existential challenges through the appointment 
of crisis cabinets, using the example of mass protest. The cabinet constitutes one of the 
main arenas where democratic and non-democratic leaders renegotiate the bargains that 
sustain their regimes, and are therefore vitally important during times of political stress. 
It investigated how non-routine mass cabinet reshuffles enable regimes to increase their 
chances of survival during periods of acute crisis. 
This study adds to the literature on political survival strategies through focussing on how 
actions external to the regime elite can drive change. Much of the current literature on 
leadership transitions and elite volatility emphasises the role of elite decisions and internal 
rivalries (Lindemann 2011a; Roessler 2011; Albertus 2012; Albertus and Menaldo 2012). 
Yet how external events, such episodes of popular unrest, inform elite decisions is rarely 
studied.  
Protests have the potential to exacerbate internal splits within the government, weakening 
the perceived strength of the leader and the regime. External elites can then pressure a 
fractured regime for concessions, as shown in Guinea. Factions within the regime can 
capitalise on public discontent to improve their position in the political hierarchy, as 
shown in Ethiopia. Mass protest can convince regime elites that the existing order is 
destined to fall and can encourage insiders to steward a managed transition, as shown in 
Tunisia. This study demonstrates that, although crisis cabinets in Africa are rarely made 
in response to protests, the occasions where protests do result in substantial cabinet 
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turnover is when the unrest changes the political calculations and strategies of elites both 
inside and outside of the regime.  
Existing literature on protests and government response has typically focused on the 
timing and the geography of repression, but has often failed to account for strategies of 
regime accommodation or co-option. When accommodation has been examined, the lack 
of data on political appointments means that researchers have had to use 
regime/opposition rhetoric to approximate for concessions (Carey 2006; Bhasin and 
Gandhi 2013). Protest-motivated crisis cabinets, albeit rare, are influential and display 
high rates of ministerial turnover, the removal of long-tenure ministers and increased 
representation of regional centres of unrest. These substantial changes represent a 
dramatic shift in the distribution of political power. This in turn signals to the protesters 
that the regime is changing the status quo and is willing to engage in significant reform. 
Because of the limited sample used for this study, this analysis cannot infer causal claims 
about the origin of cabinet volatility in Africa, but should be best viewed as a theory-
building exercise to generate hypotheses. More stringent statistical studies covering a 
wider sample of country-year cases could test the theories outlined in this paper to better 
assess the impact of protests on cabinet composition in the medium and long term. 
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6. Rebooting the System. Regime cycles, elites, and succession in African States 
Andrea Carboni, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, United 
Kingdom 
Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, 
United Kingdom 
6.1. Introduction 
Authoritarian regimes continue to be a reality in many African states. While regimes have 
incorporated a variety of democratic institutions to regulate political competition and 
succession, autocratic practices of power are widespread across the continent. Several 
leaders have survived for decades by limiting any successful opposition, curtailing 
dissent, extending presidential term limits, foiling attempts to curtail central power 
through constitutions, and recycling loyal elites in different roles. Hence, rather than 
assuming that African states represent an ´institutionless’ space (Cheeseman 2018), 
regimes are creating and adapting institutions as a vehicle for elite management and to 
perpetuate power. The result is a paradox: African states have institutionalised, yet a 
perpetual cycle of regime crisis, factionalisation and senior elite power appear to drive 
internal authority and stability.  
The ‘modern authoritarian’ literature argues that leaders stay in power because they 
distribute power and authority to senior elites and engage in successful strategies to repel 
threats (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2006; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2009). 
However, the integration of elites requires careful management and containment 
(Quinlivan 1999), as authoritarian leaders face their most substantial threats from within 
their inner circle than those from rebels, opposition leaders or popular masses. Elite 
management under autocracies is a rich area of investigation, yet conclusions often 
suggest that survival begets survival, until it does not. What is missing is an explanation 
of internal regime shifts that acknowledges the cyclical nature of elite management and 
change. 
In contemporary Africa, extra-constitutional regime changes occurs less frequently 
through traditional coups orchestrated by senior army officers establishing military juntas 
(Albrecht 2015), and more often by removing established autocrats through 
‘constitutional coups’ in an effort to appease domestic and international publics alike 
(Manirakiza 2016). Examples of such removals include the recent cases of Algeria, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe where recalcitrant leaders faced intense pressure to leave power. In these 
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cases, regime change did not follow the patterns of traditional coups, nor were the result 
of protest movements demanding the ouster of the leader. Despite being heralded as 
successful revolutions, no revolution in government has occurred and there is a striking 
continuity of people, systems, policies, and political relationships. Incumbents were 
ousted by internal regime apparatchiks, who previously were supporters of the former 
leaders. In the post-removal environment, this has resulted in select elites entrenching 
their own authority and ‘restarting’ processes of elite accommodation and consolidation. 
We argue that repeating the same process of centralizing authority will lead to further 
factionalisation and eventual crisis. Indeed, far from constituting a pre-determined 
itinerary towards an ultimate outcome, political transitions often include contradictory 
elements of change and continuity: in the words of Fred Halliday, “there are two 
predictable, and nearly always mistaken, responses to any great international upheaval: 
one is to say that everything has changed; the other is to say that nothing has changed” 
(Halliday 2002: 235). 
In this article, we argue that regime changes in African autocracies are a part of a regime 
cycle driven by a process of elite contestation and consolidation, and stages are defined 
by expectations as to when leaders may leave office. We use this framing to review the 
recent regime changes in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In all cases, we find that the 
crisis moment that removed the leaders was spurred by processes of factionalisation that 
preceded the rupture. In turn, these were triggered by the leader’s political relationships 
that created fault lines for senior regime elites to see opportunities to remove a recalcitrant 
incumbent.  
We argue that the lessons and similarities in these recent removals offer a far more 
coherent narrative for how regimes change in modern African states. The first is that inner 
circles and the factions that arise therein are threats to leaders, but these same select elites 
are the building blocks of future governments (Luttwak 1969; Haber 2006; Geddes, 
Frantz and Wright 2018). These elites hold onto power during periods of change, rather 
than incorporating the public or the country’s political opposition in any meaningful way. 
Other elites are ‘reorganised’ into a hierarchy that reflects an initial process of 
accommodation to gain legitimacy. This is followed by a process of narrowing, as 
consolidation and centralisation processes with a smaller cadre of senior elites remove 
senior and junior regime elites. The competition that emerges within the narrow elite 
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cabal can limit any possibility of future development or democratic transitions: claims of 
‘managed democracies’ maintain a veneer of legitimacy and implied ‘temporary’ nature 
of oversight by security forces. This process also creates factionalisation across the 
remaining elites, who build networks to protect themselves from future purges. In turn, 
these factions look for opportunities to replace the leader, which reignites the cycle 
beginning with crisis. 
Our analysis suggests that this guide to authoritarian politics may serve as a roadmap for 
what is likely to occur in other African states dealing with upcoming leadership 
succession. What do the elites of these states see when they observe the cases of 
Zimbabwe, Sudan and Algeria? What clear incentives and disincentives have become 
evident? Unless succession is managed carefully by leaders, and the successor can quickly 
centralise and consolidate power – such as in Angola and Ethiopia – disorder and 
contestation at the senior level will continue and metastasise into further elite instability 
and violence throughout the state.  
6.2. Explanations of regime change in Africa 
Academic literature often tends to explain drastic political changes, like a leader’s 
removal, by focusing on the characteristics and impacts of critical junctures. An example 
of such work is ‘coup politics’, which explores the conditions and immediate logistics 
that lead to the forceful removal of a leader. The existing scholarship tells us that coups 
are relatively rare, and especially so amongst established leaders (Svolik 2009; Singh 
2014; Albrecht 2015). Yet modern regime changes are increasingly deviating from typical 
coup dynamics (Souaré 2014) and displaying irregular patterns (Geddes, Frantz and 
Wright 2018). Additionally, the form of irregular replacement and power seizures from 
within are underspecified. If coups no longer follow the patterns of a standard military 
takeover, and often do not remove the regime but simply the leader, what facets of coup 
literature remain as useful to explain modern regime change? Further, outside of these 
variations in form, the literature on coups emphasizes the minutia of coup strategy, but is 
silent on what happens in its aftermath. This implies that the ‘moment’ is somehow 
suspended within the political environment, changing everything but with little reference 
to the regime politics that created its conditions.  
Another body of literature highlights the revolutionary function of social movements, and 
their transformative impact on regime change (Carothers and Young 2015; Yarwood 
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2016). This thesis is summarised by Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, who argue that 
“the collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large scale mobilization 
and collective action by elements of the populace” (2014: 764). In elevating the role of 
protest movements as catalysts of political change, these arguments resonated widely in 
relation to the 2011 Arab uprisings, where mass protests are said to have caused the 
collapse of regimes across the region (Ishay 2013; Khatib 2013; Asseburg and Wimmen 
2016). These cases, however, do not seem to suggest that the organised opposition and 
the public have had more relevance in bringing about a leader’s removal and determining 
the political trajectory of a state, than senior domestic elites (Barany 2011; Albrecht and 
Ohl 2016). Despite this reality, the role of protestors and civil society has been pushed as 
the key factor of change in several cases across the African continent, including both 
Sudan and Algeria (Kushkush 2019; Thomas 2019; Welborn 2019). Again, the presence 
and magnitude of protests is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor in explaining the 
likelihood of regime change. If it did, we would expect far more regimes to integrate civil 
society into new dispensations, and significant change in the composition, policies and 
politics of subsequent governments who submit to popular will. There is little evidence 
to believe this has happened either in the Arab spring cases, or in the recent transitions 
across Africa.  
A third debate arises from the ‘transitology literature’, which interprets regime change as 
evidence of a trajectory towards or away from supposedly democratic or autocratic 
models (Huntington 1991; Geddes 1999; Dresden and Howard 2016; Lührmann and 
Lindberg 2019). Inspired by the political transformations ushered in after the end of the 
Cold War, this body of work explains regime changes as either a transition towards 
Western-style democracies, or an inverse backsliding into authoritarianism. These 
arguments presume a teleological trajectory from one regime to another, interpreting 
political changes in either direction as an oscillation towards ideal-typical regimes. In 
contrast, failure to consolidate new regime practices is evidence of continuity. Often 
coupled with an emphasis on democratic practices and democratisation (Hall and 
Ambrosio 2017), the specifics of regime change are dismissed in favour of the number 
and quality of political junctures such as elections, without reference to the composition, 
politics and perseverance of elites and their manipulation of institutions (Magaloni 2006; 
Blaydes 2010).  
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While they single out key political processes, these frameworks fail to situate the 
occurrence of regime changes, public protests and regime transitions within a state’s 
political environment. These approaches instead explain change by “chasing events, 
rather than explaining or anticipating them” and subsequently categorise these events as 
ideal-type examples or deviations (Hale 2005: 134). This has led to misinterpretation of 
important dynamics within regimes that precede and follow regime crises. In particular, 
we suggest that the changes occurring after a leader’s removal are slight but significant: 
far from constituting a revolution of the existing political order, the alterations in elite 
jostling, leadership, senior composition and agendas are fundamental to understanding 
the future actions and stability of subsequent governments. 
During recent removals across Africa, neither the ‘coup’, ‘protest’ or ‘transition’ 
frameworks explain the activity that preceded and followed the leader’s removal. In 
Zimbabwe and Sudan, Mugabe and Bashir, respectively, reshuffled frequently in the 
months before their removal. They sought to shore up their political leverage by securing 
the loyalty of subnational elites, rather than appealing to public support. They both 
vacillated between emphasizing inclusivity and loyalty to placate the elite class, not the 
public. In Algeria and Sudan, robust public protests did not result in producing democratic 
breakthroughs, nor in ‘authoritarian backsliding’ (Dresden and Howard 2016; Lührmann 
and Lindberg 2019). Sudan, in particular, integrated civil society elites but significant 
political power remains in the hands of former loyalists of Bashir.  
But these removals did have several common elements, including the structure, incentives 
and behaviour of the authoritarian elite that spurred these regime changes. The most 
senior elites who conspired to overtake leaders established a ‘dictatorship by committee’ 
before moving onto stages of purging and brutal selection. The results across all three 
states are volatile transitions oscillating between the entrenchment of new leaders and 
senior elites, the degradation of governance institutions, and limited openings of the 
political space. 
We argue that insights from the political survival literature offer a more coherent narrative 
for explaining change as a component of the overall political cycle. In particular, a 
common misperception of African polities is that a single leader – a ‘big man’ – 
orchestrates a hierarchical patronage network of elites who exploit, suppress and extract 
from citizens, while not subject to any external constraints (Tullock 1987; Kuran 1991; 
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Wintrobe 1998). When these leaders are replaced, so too are their ‘networks’. However, 
modern African autocracies have institutions that restrain the ‘tyrannical’ tendencies of 
any single ruler, and regulate competition among regime insiders more so than from 
external and opposition elements (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Boix and Svolik 2007; 
Heydemann 2007). 
In such systems, the power structure requires constant strategic manipulation and 
management because the survival of the leader is dependent on the willingness of those 
around them – his ‘rival allies’ – to support continued rule. In other words, regime elites 
are the foundation of the incumbent’s political survival (Raleigh and Dowd 2018). In turn, 
leaders privilege two practices: spreading power around to keep it, and co-opting enough 
of the ‘right’ elites to sustain a mutually beneficial commitment (Bueno De Mesquita et 
al. 2003). This framing emphasizes that power is transactional, and that the relationships 
between the leader and elites determines the level and distribution of power to be shared 
(Van De Walle 2007; Bove and Rivera 2015). Yet the practices of power require great 
dexterity and political flexibility by leaders and senior elites: a leader’s elite management 
strategies to arrange association, loyalty, and alliances are variously illustrated in the 
work of several scholars as ‘political bargaining’, ‘political calculus’, ‘ethnic balancing’, 
and ‘political marketplace’ (Benson and Kugler 1998; Goldsmith 2001; Arriola 2009; 
Lindemann 2011b; Svolik 2012; De Waal 2015). Each detail how leaders accommodate 
powerful elites and communities, who in turn leverage their local influence for rewards 
and recognition by regimes. Failure to consolidate, centralisation and accommodate 
power between powerful elites will create opportunities to remove a leader (Geddes, 
Frantz and Wright 2018). 
Rather than debating whether a revolution or no change is the result of a regime crisis, 
we argue that this moment reboots a cycle of elite dissension and consolidation. It creates 
a reconfiguration of power structures in which members of the former regime assume 
new roles, and integrate new elites to build legitimacy. Following the fall of a long-term 
leader, remaining senior elites then cooperate, consolidate, and curtail each other’s power. 
The result is a volatile, unstable, and autocratic structure which creates incentives for 
future factionalisation. 
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6.3. The authoritarian regime cycle  
In following Hale’s work on post-communist regimes (2005), we aim to extend regime 
cycle research to African states by introducing a logic of elite collective action to explain 
political change in African authoritarian states. This work is based on the consideration 
that political changes display cyclical qualities, rather than progressive or regressive 
trajectories, and that variations in the relations among elites dictate regime change (Higley 
and Burton 1989). Within a regime cycle, the expectation as to when a leader may leave 
office shapes elites’ strategies of political survival. This expectation underlies the politics 
and determines the form and magnitude of contestation between leaders and elites that 
emerge in each stage of the regime cycle. 
By introducing the notion of regime cycles, we suggest that critical junctures in a regime’s 
lifetime are unlikely to determine the collapse of the existing political order, or a dogged 
persistence of the same political actors. Rather, regime crises produce a controlled 
reconfiguration of existing power structures that injects new legitimacy into the system 
through the disposal of the old leader, the co-option of elites, and a limited opening of the 
political space (Gerschewski 2013). These processes are, however, a prelude to the future 
centralisation of political power in the hands of a narrow ruling coalition.  
We identify four stages in the political cycle of authoritarian regimes that culminates with 
the removal of the leader (see table 6.1). These include factionalisation, crisis, 
accommodation, and consolidation. Factionalisation and crisis are signs of dissension and 
breakdown; accommodation and consolidation are episodes when leaders engage in 
strategies to build elite coalitions. These dynamics do not necessarily follow a 
chronological order, but rather reflect the logical sequence of elite collective action. 
Across all dynamics, there is minimal, if any, attempt to meaningfully integrate the 
opposition or the public. 
Factionalisation. The gravest threat facing dictators is a potential coup or usurpation by 
high-level individuals organised in factions (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov and Sonin 2011; 
Svolik 2012; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). The central driver during a factionalisation 
phase is the assumption that a leader’s power is overly centralised and suppressing the 
authority of surrounding senior elites. Leaders are dependent on their ‘elite court’ to 
assure their continued survival. Therefore, ruptures in the senior regime elite coalition 
suggest significant problems for a leader’s continued power. In pushing collaboration 
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among factions, elites seek to renegotiate and bargain their combined access to power 
through the threat of their own collective action. 
Stage Elite 
expectations 
Logic Mechanism Composition of 
senior ranks 
Factionalisation Maximisation of 
power 
Differentiation Tactical 
alliances 
Rival allies 
Crisis Leader’s 
removal 
Replacement Takeover of 
power 
Dictatorship by 
committee 
Accommodation Co-option Integration Distribution of 
rents / positions 
Broad inclusion 
Consolidation Controlling 
internal 
competition 
Centralisation Purge Leader-
dominated 
coalition 
Table 6.1: Dynamics of Authoritarianism 
In turn, leaders limit alternative power centres in ‘rival ally networks’ and manage risks 
through purging detractors, controlling political appointments, selectively sanctioning, 
abusing, forcing retirements, imprisoning and exiling elites associated with the potentially 
rival factions (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). Likewise, leaders can increase the 
coordination costs among the potential factions through institutional duplication and 
counterbalancing (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Lust-Okar 2004; Haber 2006; 
Magaloni 2006; Myerson 2008, 2015). Because of these tactics, senior elites prepare to 
seize opportunities to replace the leader. Some common opportunities include economic 
downturns endangering distributive rents, a leader’s illness requiring an impromptu 
succession, geopolitical tensions, and increasing domestic unrest following an escalation 
in violence or the emergence of mass protest movements (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). 
Crisis. Regime crises can occur at any point after, when the factional band of rival allies 
seizes power ousting the leader. Once initiated, removals can follow patterns that are 
described in the classic texts from Luttwak (1969), and in more updated interpretations 
from Geddes, Frantz and Wright (2018), but may also result in forced resignations, 
constitutional coups, or in power-sharing agreements depriving the deposed leaders of 
any executive power. However, a commonality across modern removals is that a ‘seizing 
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group’31 locates and controls the central nodes of power, disenfranchises or dissembles 
those who could possibly organise against the group, and quickly work to reassure other 
elites and assuage the mobilised publics in the event of mass uprisings (Haber 2006). 
While the duration of this interim phase can vary, the elite bloc who conspired to remove 
a leader share power in an interim ‘dictatorship by committee’. Once the leader is 
deposed, uncertainty surrounds the regime’s political trajectory, as well as the intentions 
of the new incumbents, but this small group consisting of key regime figures typically 
seeks to ally with military and security elites at this stage in order to make decisions about 
subsequent governance structures.  
Accommodation. In the accommodation stage, many of the former regime’s positions are 
vacated, and elites begin competing for offices. The cardinal rule of modern 
authoritarianism is that, to keep power, you must spread it around (Haber 2006). This 
requires building elite coalitions, which aims to co-opt the most authoritative and 
coordinated group of highly networked individuals in positions of power, with the 
ultimate goal of selecting a public leader. The focus at this stage is to incorporate 
subnational elites, expand the beneficiaries of the new regime, and stabilise the coalition. 
Aspiring to increase its legitimacy and reach, the resulting coalition is therefore broadly 
inclusive and comprises a variety of elites. This elite pool includes a number of recycled 
figures such as loyalists who turned, competitors who waited, strongmen who conquered, 
and technocrats who abstained. However, the ultimate power to appoint, authority, rents 
and monopoly of force remain centralised amongst the very senior elites. 
Following the initial phases of accommodation, the new powerholders begin to unveil 
their political survival strategies. Common measures are to restrict the distribution of 
political rents, remunerate their own loyalists, counterbalance security institutions to 
secure their rule and access to armed forces, engage in mock trials, often around ‘rooting 
out corruption’ campaigns targeting loyalists of the former regime, and purge disposable 
elites. Those who remain may become the new ‘rival allies’ within the coalition: these 
are typically elites whose independent leverage is important to the legitimacy and reach 
of the government, but whose authority and strength may compete with the leader. The 
 
31 Several terms are used to describe the group that initiates a coup, including ‘seizing organization’ 
(Geddes, Frantz and Wright 2018); ‘launching organization’ (Haber 2006); plotters (Wig and Rød 2016). 
Here we use the term seizing group to denote the known participants at the senior regime level. 
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overall result is an inconsistent transition, entrenched elites, and the continued 
manipulation and degradation of governing and economic institutions as new leaders and 
senior elites extract in order to build their power bases (Geddes, Frantz and Wright 2018). 
Consolidation. Processes of consolidation occur when leaders seek to control competition 
within their coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The ultimate objective of this stage 
is to create an “unbalanced equilibrium” between a dominant leader and his coalition of 
rival allies. The power of leaders rests in their ability to coalesce a team of elites that 
includes loyalists and rivals who individually cannot overthrow them, or who are unlikely 
to cooperate due to mutual mistrust and difficulty. In this stage, a gradual realignment of 
power occurs within the elites, with leaders consolidating their grip on the regime and 
new groups struggle to emerge as potential spoilers or challengers (Frantz and Stein 
2017). The elites continue to learn about each other's leverage, actively build their own 
networks and patronage opportunities. 
Leaders often have multiple strategies that limit the degree to which senior elites can 
coordinate (Powell 2012). Among these is to engage in transactional loyalty in packing 
cabinets, governorships, military positions and intelligence positions: while this may 
decrease the degree of competence in positions, as loyalty is bought but merit may not be 
a priority, it also acts as a survival mechanism (Sudduth 2017). Loyalists are unlikely to 
be key allies of conspirators and therefore can work towards mitigating coup actions in 
the early period. As a result, this is the height of a leader’s independent power and the 
lowest risk of his being removed. 
We apply the observations of a cyclical process to three recent cases in Africa where long 
serving leaders were removed from office. Each regime is at alternatives stages of the 
cycle outlined above, but display multiple reference points to the practices relating to 
factionalisation, crisis, accommodation and consolidation.  
6.4. Reassembling the regime: The Army’s power grab in Algeria 
In February 2019, the official announcement that the incapacitated president Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika would seek re-election for a fifth presidential term sparked a wave of 
unprecedented protests in contemporary Algeria. As the demonstrations gained 
momentum drawing thousands of Algerians across the country to demand Bouteflika to 
step down, the regime’s stakeholders – a collection of ageing civilian and military elites 
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that have ruled the country since the end of the civil war – faced increasing internal and 
external pressure to abandon Bouteflika. As minor concessions failed to quell the 
mounting discontent,32 the army’s secretive chief of staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah publicly 
manifested his support for the protests, just a few weeks before calling for Bouteflika’s 
formal impeachment. Faced with increasing pressure from the elites and the public, 
Bouteflika was forced to resign on April 9, succeeded by the president of the Algerian 
Parliament’s upper house Abdelkader Bensalah. 
The Algerian protests undoubtedly contributed to break a political deadlock and force the 
country’s entrenched political elite into concessions. Described as a bulwark of stability 
and an emblem of exceptionalism and apathy in a region that has experienced sustained 
turmoil since 2011, Algeria has rarely seen meaningful political transformations over the 
past twenty years (Bouandel 2016). Increasing mobilisation across the Algerian public 
over the past years and the fading memory of the civil war, which had long prevented 
direct challenges to the regime, were signs that the country was ripe for change (Wolf 
2019). The protests precipitated the crisis of the regime, which already faced a 
deteriorating economic situation and a long-time political stasis.  
As the crisis kicked in, Algeria’s army positioned itself as the institution most capable of 
orchestrating and stalling change. Indeed, the army has stamped all presidents since 
independence, and until today continues to be the main power broker despite a less visible 
role played in the last two decades. Upon achieving independence in 1962, Algerian 
armed forces turned from National Liberation Army into its current denomination of 
National Popular Army. The country’s leading military institution, invested with 
revolutionary legitimacy, cultivated a symbiotic relationship with the Algerian state, 
receiving extensive constitutional prerogatives (Calchi Novati and Roggero 2018: 197).33 
Despite a constitutional amendment in 1989 that limited its participation in the political 
process, the army’s societal and economic role had ballooned, growing increasingly 
bigger during the civil war years (Joffé 2002). 
 
32 Two weeks after the protests began, Bouteflika fired his unpopular campaign director and former prime 
minister Abdelmalek Sellal, and replaced him with the technocrat minister of Transport Abdelghani 
Zaalane. The following week, Bouteflika announced he would not seek a new term but did not resign. 
33 According to Article 8, the army would protect national territorial integrity and contribute to the country’s 
political, economic and social activities. This mandate was amended after President Chadli Bendjedid 
passed the new constitution in 1989, limiting the army's role to protector of territorial integrity. 
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Accommodation followed the initial crisis stage. Since the onset of the demonstrations, 
the army continued to publicly side with the protest movement by reinstating its nature 
of people’s army and guardian of the nation while attempting to assuage and manipulate 
popular demands for political change. Initial resistance to the uprisings, largely motivated 
by General Gaïd Salah’s support for Bouteflika’s candidacy, rapidly faded as opposition 
to the outgoing president risked dragging the army into the political dispute. Later, when 
plans for a managed transition faced the protesters’ hostility due to the proximity of the 
proposed candidates to the regime, the army’s Chief of Staff increasingly stepped up his 
public appearances voicing support for the demonstrations and ultimately calling for 
Bouteflika to resign (Cristiani 2019). What motivated the army’s decisions between 
March and April is difficult to say with certainty, as its decision-making structures are 
notoriously shrouded in secrecy. However, this behaviour seems to be a reaction to an 
emerging scenario in which the army faced the risk of either losing its role of custodian 
of national stability, thus plunging the country into heightened conflict, or of being 
outmanoeuvred by its ‘rival allies’, chiefly Bouteflika and his most proximate clan 
consisting of family kin and business elites. 
These dynamics highlight how the pact that has propped up Algeria’s regime since 1999 
had become increasingly unsustainable, igniting a tug-of-war between its constituent elite 
networks. Typically described as cliques in constant competition between each other over 
patronage and power, these networks included the army, the security services, and 
Bouteflika’s civilian component, along with a variety of party, civil society and 
bureaucratic elites that have contributed to sustain and legitimise the regime across the 
wider society (Roberts 2003; Werenfels, in Perthes 2004). In recent years, Bouteflika – 
and as his health deteriorated, his increasingly influential clan – attempted to centralise 
power to the detriment of the military and security elites striking tactical alliances for 
contingent political gains (Calchi Novati and Roggero 2018). These switching alliances, 
which previously brought the presidency to tactically side with either the security services 
or the military depending on the circumstances, succeeded in removing hostile elites such 
as the former army leader Mohamed Lamari in 2004 and intelligence chief Mohamed 
Mediène ‘Toufik’, forced into early retirement in 2015, and in dissolving the country’s 
powerful intelligence agency, the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité, DRS 
(Fabiani 2015; Arezki 2016). In the months preceding Bouteflika’s ouster, several 
military officials were arrested on charges of corruption and abuse of power, allegedly in 
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an effort to purge the senior levels of the army more hostile to Bouteflika’s fifth mandate 
(Ghemrassah 2018). 
While the president’s past manoeuvres managed to partially shift power from the military 
and security apparatus and to bring them under closer civilian supervision, these same 
tactics failed in March 2019. As calls for Bouteflika to step down increased, the 
president’s clan attempted to defuse the crisis seeking support from the security services 
for a technocratic government that would sideline the army (Alilat 2019; Poletti 2019). 
The subsequent resignation of Bouteflika and the concomitant downfall of his clan – 
including Bouteflika’s brother Saïd and some of his prominent political and business 
associates – highlight how this faction was critically dependent on the army’s ultimate 
support, and the latter’s pivotal, continued role in Algeria’s power politics. 
With Bouteflika eventually ousted, the conspirators’ goal consisted of identifying and co-
opting new allies from across the political landscape, entering the consolidation stage. 
Despite his decisive contribution to the removal of the ailing president, the army has not 
opted for a clear-cut, “risky power grab” (Africa Intelligence 2019a). The army has 
instead orchestrated the selection of the post-coup regime elites supporting an extensive 
anti-corruption campaign to liquidate political and business elites closely associated with 
the former president and his clan, while recycling technocrats and politicians who had 
mildly opposed Bouteflika into a new, army-dominated political settlement (Ghanem 
2019). To do this, the army has used formal institutions, namely the judiciary and the 
executive, which fell under its virtual control. Dozens of Algeria’s most prominent 
politicians and businessmen – including the former prime ministers Abdelmalek Sellal, 
Youcef Yousfi and Ahmed Ouyahia, Saïd Bouteflika and former intelligence chiefs 
Toufik and Athmane Tartag, among others – were arrested in the weeks following 
Bouteflika’s departure, facing years-long corruption charges (Akef 2019). Their arrests 
helped shore up the army’s popularity among the public but were also instrumental in 
purging potentially dangerous opponents. 
At the same time, the army has orchestrated the centralisation stage through the co-option 
of elites believed not to constitute a threat to its hegemonic position. State bureaucrats 
like Abdelkader Bensalah – former President of the Constitutional Court – and 
Nourredine Bedoui – former governor and Minister of Interior – were appointed as 
interim President and Prime Minister, while a new interim cabinet largely consisting of 
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non-party ministers was sworn in few days after Bouteflika’s resignation. Jockeying 
around the presidential elections, initially scheduled for April 2019, followed shortly, 
with a new vote first announced for July and then called off for the lack of credible 
candidates. After further pressure from the army, presidential elections were eventually 
called for December 12 (Agence France Presse 2019). The screening process retained five 
presidential candidates, four of which served in Bouteflika’s cabinets, although none of 
them was part of his inner circle.34 These elite reshuffles reveal that the army did not 
intend to dismantle the political settlement that has ruled Algeria since the end of the civil 
war. It rather sought to reassemble the regime through the removal of the most proximate 
threats for its stability – i.e. the Bouteflika clique, unpopular among the public and 
perceived as an increasingly volatile rival in the ruling coalition – and the shaping of a 
political class largely consisting of individuals and groups who lack a strong support base 
and the resources to challenge the army’s dominant position through divide-and-rule 
strategies (Cristiani 2019). As such, the election of the independent candidate Abdelmajid 
Tebboune as the country’s new president is unlikely to shift the power balance within the 
regime. 
The army is likely to retain its role as leading force in Algeria’s “controlled democracy“ 
(Daoud 2015), in which power is nominally exercised by a civilian government under a 
closer tutorship of the army and the security services. In Algeria’s current political 
landscape, the country’s ruling elites – and among them, the army’s top brass – have 
manipulated opposition to Bouteflika to sustain the nascent political settlement. In this 
context, dissent is tolerated as far as it does not challenge the pillars of the regime or calls 
for a radical overhaul of the system. The escalation of the army’s repressive tactics and 
of the arrest campaign, which have targeted Amazigh activists and opposition leaders, 
suggests that dissenting voices who have not accepted to be co-opted are not contemplated 
in the new political order. 
6.5. The power being the curtain: Managing the transition in Sudan 
The events surrounding the overthrow of President Omar Al Bashir on 11 April 2019, and 
the subsequent negotiations for power, are often reported through the lens of the popular, 
 
34 Ali Benflis – former Prime Minister and head of the ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) –run 
against Bouteflika in 2004 and 2014 presidential elections, even though his candidacy was destined to fail. 
Abdelmajid Tebboune served as prime minister for three months in 2017, before being sacked by Bouteflika 
for his zealous anti-corruption campaigns. Azzedine Mihoubi and Abdelkader Bengrina also served in 
ministerial capacity during Bouteflika’s presidency. See Africa Confidential (2019f). 
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public protest movement known as Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which swept 
across Sudan since December 2018. The movement arose in response to the dire 
economic and human rights conditions that characterised Bashir’s latter rule. The level of 
protest was unprecedented in Sudan, with hundreds of cities experiencing sustained 
mobilisation against the regime (Matfess 2019a, 2019b). In the aftermath of the transition, 
the movement’s strength resulted in Abdallah Hamdok negotiating the key position of 
Prime Minister. But this success should not obscure that the power in Sudan, and the 
dynamics of the removal, were closely related to the internal machinations of the Bashir 
regime. In turn, Bashir’s removal was determined by select members of his inner circle 
and did not constitute a revolution, but an internal crisis.  
At the end of 2019, a power sharing agreement stipulated that Sudan is to move towards 
a ‘managed democracy’ led by a civilian government, with the military exercising veto 
power over economic, security and political policies. The 39-month transition agreement 
period has the first 21 months chaired by the military council; the latter 18 months is 
civilian-led. A Sovereign Council (SC) oversees both legislative and minister councils, 
and has five military and five civilian members; the eleventh member is a jointly agreed 
civilian. The military members all sat previously in the ‘Transitional Military Council’ 
(TMC) formed during Bashir’s removal, and were also members of Bashir’s security 
committee (International Crisis Group 2019). All sitting members in any council of the 
transitional government have procedural immunity for past events. As a consequence of 
these combined agreements, Prime Minister Hamdok appears to wield little to no power 
over politics and force in Sudan, which remain firmly in the hands of the former regime’s 
inner circle (Berridge 2020). 
Two members of the SC are key to understanding the current regime and its ‘dictatorship 
by committee’: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is the current head of the SC, and his deputy, 
Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”. They are strongly allied, in part due to the 
inability of either to seek the ‘front’ position as leader, due to their discrediting pasts. 
Instead, they have reorganised the Sudanese regime to their benefit. Burhan led the 
notorious National Intelligence Security Service, now General Intelligence Services 
(GIS). Hemedti is instead the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) military unit: 
once a pro-government militia that worked with the NISS since 2013 in Darfur, the RSF 
transformed from a semi-autonomous entity to be attached to the regular army in 2017. 
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Its budget and abilities were greatly increased, and their actions were placed under the 
direct control of President Bashir who branded Dagalo his “protector” or “Hemedti” (De 
Waal 2019). The RSF is now Sudan’s best equipped and largest military force at 70,000, 
which assumed control of Khartoum at the time of the removal. Both the intelligence 
services and RSF were crucial elements in the previous protection of Bashir, as well as in 
his subsequent fall.  
Promoted by Burhan, Hemedti and other members of the SC, a dramatic series of events 
eventually led to Bashir’s removal. This had originated as a quiet faction, built from 
frustration within Bashir’s inner circle as the president proved unable to control his 
regime’s mounting external and internal crises. The competition amongst the senior 
echelon of military leaders, and strong influence of Islamists around Bashir, contributed 
to a typical autocratic environment of distrust and elite volatility. The factionalisation that 
resulted put Bashir at high risk of replacement, to which he responded by removing 
different senior leaders. For example, a previous NISS leader, Salah Gosh, was ousted in 
2009 and imprisoned in 2011 before being released and reinstated in a senior position in 
2018 (Middle East Monitor 2018). Bashir’s former Chief of Staff, and close advisor, Taha 
Osman al-Hussein was accused of working on behalf of the Saudis, removed from his 
post, only to return during the coup as a Saudi representative. Bashir’s excessive counter-
balancing had weakened the security services, and paramilitary organisations were 
increasingly prominent towards the end of the Bashir’s tenure. Paramilitary leaders like 
Hemedti became closer to Bashir through transactional loyalties: they were bought with 
better terms that they could secure elsewhere.  
Of those elites who populated Bashir’s later regime posts, few remain. Burhan and 
Hemedti soon constituted a ‘dictatorship by committee’, and were reluctant to distribute 
authority, appointments or rents much further than those who composed the first TMC. 
The SC’s military members are closely associated with the exceedingly small group that 
removed Bashir, consisting of Burhan, Hemedti, Salah Gosh, Taha Osman, Ibn Auf, the 
new head of NISS General Abu Bakr Mustafa “Damblab” (Africa Confidential 2019a), 
and the head of police Ibrahim Othman. Others suggest that the Military Council still 
includes figures who have sympathies to the Islamist Movement including Jalal Eddine 
El-Sheikh, deputy head of the intelligence service, and Omar Zein El-Abidine, chairman 
of the political committee in the Council (Jo 2019). All of these elites served in Bashir’s 
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government. Between them, they hold the monopoly of force, the power to appoint, the 
control of rents and total discretion over economic, security and political policies. 
However, they made concessions to create a public face of the regime, including the co-
option of members of civil society with little authority or decision-making power.  
For these reasons, the accommodation dynamics of the current Sudanese government are 
conducted as two separate engagements: a public front populated by various members of 
civil society and resuscitated parties who vie for renewed recognition, and those who 
engage with the key members of the Sovereign Council. Sudanese accommodation 
dynamics are therefore characterised by purges as much as co-option. While Burhan and 
Hemedti are engaged in strategy of accommodating regional elites and forces, and high 
value senior elites, hundreds of arrests have taken place during a purge of the security 
services (Africa Intelligence 2019b).  
At the same time, during the post-coup period, several TMC members reiterated the 
importance of Hemedti – a seemingly junior elite outside of the Khartoum power structure 
– due to his control of force (Africa Intelligence 2019c). His role as the power-broker 
between post-Bashir political elites is built on both his monopoly of violence but also his 
claim to peripheral bridge-building. Given the support for Hemedti, how did he not 
capture power and become leader, as is seen in both the Algerian and Zimbabwean cases? 
The limits of his immediate support are evident: he hails from the Mahariya Rizeigat 
ethnic group straddling the Chad-Sudan border, and despite his role in the Janjaweed and 
his continued violent service to the regime in Darfur, he was not accepted into the fold of 
paramilitary or military elites due to his ethnicity and his lack of formal military 
education. But outside of the constraints of the formal military system, Hemedti 
flourished. His relative political, economic and military independence from Bashir proved 
vital to his continued rise, especially as Bashir culled senior leaders due to ongoing palace 
politics. 
Hemedti emerged as the most important political figure in Sudan as deputy leader of the 
TMC that ruled Sudan between April and August. His control of the RSF, extensive 
economic rents through mining revenues and payments for Sudanese participation for the 
war in Yemen from the Gulf countries, and his political backing from the Saudi and UAE 
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governments give him significant authority.35 His power of appointments is not 
consolidated, but he exerts significant veto power and purging abilities.  
Hemedti has cleverly positioned his ‘populist’ alliance by bolstering the representation of 
Darfur, including the Darfuri Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi, Abdelaziz Al-Hilu 
of the SPLM-North, and possibly JEM support; engaging with Kordofan, as he met with 
Nuba chiefs in Dilling where he reportedly hired youth for the RSF in exchange for 
support; and winning support from other tribal authorities who were previously rebuked 
by many senior military elites. He has courted previously peripheral or removed players 
in Sudanese politics by engaging with armed movements and now disbanded National 
Congress Party (NCP) Islamists; and former military officers. This coalition is unknown 
in Sudan as Bashir focused largely on security professionals (De Waal 2019).  
However, Hemedti knits together fragments of the larger political environment that had 
been distorted and suppressed, and all suffered from an economic crisis that prevented 
serious attempts at political transactions and consolidations. In the last days of Bashir, his 
firing of all governors, ministers and mayors, and their replacement with rank loyalists 
strained the perception that a united front would support those inside the tent. Instead, 
Hemedti and Burhan have generated a multi-ethnic, cross regional, group with no 
individually powerful members. Both are unlikely to be removed through any public or 
elite processes: they have increased their co-dependence, while generating a wide, 
inclusive and violent coalition to support their continued power. When the transition 
period elapses, this unique powerbase may be deployed against the supporters of a civilian 
government. Therefore, Hamdok continues to be vulnerable to charges of 
mismanagement or a failure to quell crises (Appiah-Mensah 2019), and may function as 
a ready ‘fall guy’ for the continuing problems of Sudan.  
6.6. Zimbabwe’s Second Republic is indistinguishable from the First 
In November 2017, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was ushered out of power in 
a series of military and party “assisted manoeuvres” that culminated in the Presidency of 
Emerson Mnangagwa and the elevation to Vice President for General Constantine 
Chiwenga (Fabricus 2018). Two years after ascending to power following Mugabe’s 
 
35 Hemedti supplies 10,000 of his Rapid Support Forces soldiers to the Gulf Cooperation Council for the 
war in Yemen. The RSF earns USD 3,000 per month for each fighter it rents to the UAE-Saudi 
Arabia coalition in the Yemen war. See Africa Confidential (2019d). 
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removal, Mnangagwa has presided over further economic ruin, the deaths of over a dozen 
protestors, and a questionable election in 2018. Yet, he successfully navigated both 
political accommodation and consolidation by securing key allies in posts and co-opting 
vital interests, eliminating many rivals and neutering the opposition.  
Mnangagwa came to power through senior positions in both the ZANU-PF party and 
Mugabe’s regime. From his last post of Vice President (2014-2017), he created the 
‘Lacoste’ faction, which openly recruited amongst the most senior political elites in 
Mugabe’s government, involved the co-option of multiple provincial coordinating 
committees, and integrated the War Veterans and military elites (Raleigh 2017). The 
faction openly contradicted Mugabe’s personalisation of power through his centralisation 
of authority in his family and inner circle (Allison 2017). The period of factionalisation 
and decline in Mugabe’s regime was characterised by purges, high level firings, 
suspicious deaths, questionable election totals, a bankrupted economy, land seizures for 
political elites, firing and replacements of local and provincial level officials and episodes 
of targeted violence (Dzirutwe 2014; Times Live 2016; Cheeseman and Klaas 2018; 
Raleigh 2018). 
To limit the power of internal challengers, Mugabe rewarded loyalty, replaced ambitious 
contenders and threatened the position of others. The ‘pro-Mugabe’ faction were 
commonly referred to as G-40, or ‘Generation 40’, and characterised by their relative 
youth compared to senior party members, the lack of ties to the liberation struggle, their 
disagreements and disrespect for the War Veterans group, the senior military command, 
and their attempted co-option of both the Police and Central Intelligence Organisation. 
The leaders of this faction included Grace Mugabe, Saviour Kasakuwere, Jonathan Moyo 
and Patrick Zhuwao. Mugabe placed each in key positions to create obstacles for Lacoste 
to advance threatening Mnangagwa’s position in power. Crises arose when Mugabe, 
facing illness and advanced age, did not have the means to placate, pay for and otherwise 
fund the loyalty of his chosen elite circle (De Waal 2015). Following patterns outlined in 
Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003), these circumstances encouraged Lacoste’s ambitious 
elites to replace their ineffective leader. The removal and crisis, when it finally occurred 
in November 2017, was largely farcical: Mugabe attempted to accommodate the interests 
of the Lacoste faction, and resisted leaving until the parliament was posed to vote for his 
replacement (Graham-Harrison and Burke 2017). 
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The group that initiated the crisis included Mnangagwa and the former head of the 
security services, Constantine Chiwenga. Chiwenga had recruited amongst the top 
echelons of the armed forces, and Generals Anselem Sanyatwe, Douglas Nyikayaramba, 
Shebba Shumbayawonda, Martin Chedondo were central to the events in November 
2017. Mnangagwa and Chiwenga entered into a phase of accommodation soon after 
assuming their positions of President and Vice President. The Lacoste faction were well 
placed in senior positions, as were elites with significant leverage in other political 
networks, regions or potential voting areas. Many of the co-opted elites had served in 
Mugabe’s previous cabinets.36 While these elites were not originally in the Lacoste 
faction, their positions amassed their individual clout for the stability of the new 
government, and their inclusion sent a message that not all pro-Mugabe ZANU-PF party 
elites would be purged.37 Only those who had strong ties to the now defunct G-40 faction 
– who had openly challenged Mnangagwa – were initially expelled in November 2017 
and largely remain so. However, no representatives from the opposition or civil society 
were included. Further, Vice President Chiwenga widely appointed military figures to 
civilian cabinet posts, such as Terrance Shiri’s (former head of the Airforce) undertaking 
of the Ministry for Agriculture; and Sibusiso Moyo holding the ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. The Vice President was also the Minister of Defense for 
the first eleven months of the new government. 
The accommodation at the early part of the transition government suggested that the new 
government favoured a ‘stability-elite’ pact: it benefitted both Mnangagwa and Chiwenga 
to pursue their respective goals by distributing power to others, rather than centralizing 
it. These actions were designed to settle the political class, and to pursue the early election 
agenda. The ‘dictatorship by committee’ understood that to keep power, they needed to 
share it with others, and they successfully navigated through the elections of 2018. 
That election secured Mnangagwa’s position into the near future and ended 
accommodation. The president made several sweeping changes to the composition of 
senior regime circles in the post-election consolidation phase. The election resulted in the 
loss of fifty-two ‘reliable’ ZANU-PF seats, which indicated that Mnangagwa would need 
 
36 These include Kembo Mohadi, Oppah Muchiguri, July Moyo, and Joram Gumbol. 
37 These include Simbarashe Mumbengegwi (Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and Monitoring 
Government), David Parirenyatwa (Minister for Health and Child Welfare), Sithembiso Nyoni (Women 
and Youth Affairs) and Obert Mpofu (Home Affairs and Culture). 
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to fortify and consolidate his regime into a smaller, more loyal group to continue his 
agenda. Several elites were purged when they no longer served an electoral purpose, and 
were not a threat to government .38 The most significant change in this consolidation phase 
is the removal of Chiwenga from the Ministry of Defence (Chan 2019). Chiwenga was 
removed from this crucial position as other former generals retained their positions in 
government. Mnangagwa had become less dependent on the Vice President and his 
network to retain the position of President. Both had come to government with their own 
cliques to support and ‘feed’. Mnangagwa’s group were senior ZANU-PF heavyweights, 
strong leaders of the business and international communities. Chiwenga’s support 
included the former military personal and middle level security service figures who 
depend on the kickbacks and patronage of the service to continue. Mnangagwa sought to 
replace senior members of the security service, suggesting that loyalty to him is necessary 
to survive the near future.  
The result of the consolidation process is that Mnangagwa’s power is largely unchecked 
by political elites: the former faction of Lacoste has been integrated, the opposition is 
unmoored and unable to gain traction in any formal positions, and Vice President 
Chiwenga has lost the power to challenge or contest the president. Mnangagwa loyalists 
now dominate cabinet (Africa Confidential 2019e). These moves confirmed that the 
President will his superior authority to lessen or remove the influence of close elite, 
thereby securing his own consolidated authority. The next step in this process is the 
factionalisation of the regime, which may be hastened by the desperate economic situation 
of the state. Recent report confirm that the competition between Mnangagwa and 
Chiwenga are hastening deep factional divides within the state (Africa Confidential 
2020). 
6.7. Conclusion 
Understanding regime shifts and reconstitution through a logic of elite collective action 
is useful to explain recent crises across Africa. The leaders of Algeria, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe had a combined ninety years in power: their removals were not the reflection 
 
38 Among those purged are Simon Kaya Moyo of Matabeleland South, David Musabayana of Mashonaland 
West, David Parirenyatwa of Mashonaland East, Martin Dinha of Mashonaland Central, Mike Bimha of 
Mashonaland East, Mirriam Chikukwa of Harare, Obert Mpofu of Matebeleland North; Patrick Chinamasa 
of Manicaland; Petronella Kagonye of Mashonaland East, Pupurayi Togarepi of Masvingo, Simbarashe 
Mumbengegwi of the Midlands, Supa Mandiwanzira of Manicaland, Terrance Mukupe of Harare and 
Webster Shamu of Mashonaland East. 
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of sudden rise in instability, nor they were overthrown by organised oppositions, violent 
non-state groups or public protest. While these events may have occurred during these 
regimes’ crises, they did not significantly affect the subsequent reconfiguration of power. 
Rather, state leaders were each removed by members of their own inner circles, who went 
on to reconstitute regimes that follow similar practices and policies.  
Rather than regime breakdowns, the crises culminated with the ouster of Algeria’s 
Bouteflika, Sudan’s Bashir and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe are best viewed as moments in a 
regime cycle where senior elite actors have capitalised on ripe factionalism to seize power 
and reconfigure inter-elite relations. In no cases have regimes been cleansed of their 
previous powerholders, with the exception of the ousted leaders and their closest loyalists. 
Powers of appointment and veto, control of violent means, and means of rent allocation 
still resides in the hands of senior elites that previously collaborated with the outgoing 
leaders. These regimes are not transitioning towards democracy, nor entrenching into full-
fledged autocracies, but are rather following largely predictable patterns of regime cycles 
consisting of several interlocking stages of elite factionalisation, change, accommodation 
and consolidation. This regime cycle is produced through authoritarian practices and 
based on political survival logics. 
Autocratic leaders are consistently at risk for irregular removal, but in some stages of the 
authoritarian cycle, they are far more likely to be overthrown that others. At each stage, 
regime elites respond to the vulnerability of a leader for removal, and calibrate their 
expectations accordingly. For example, during a factionalisation phase, elites collectively 
organise to seek opportunities to remove a weak leader. Elites in political factions are not 
necessarily close or cooperative: they recognise each other’s leverage and accept the 
transactional costs of association. Their alliance is based on incomplete and volatile 
circumstances.  
During a crisis, leader attempt to renegotiate power distributions with strong factions to 
reinforce their positions. In the cases covered here, all leaders engaged in significant 
reshuffles, replacements, firings and counterbalancing to sustain their tenure. But these 
practices, although central to political survival, traded one risk for another, rather than 
mitigating threats. In Algeria, during the months prior to the uprisings, Bouteflika’s clan 
purged hostile elements from the intelligence services and the army. Rather than seizing 
power directly, the army assembled a coalition of bureaucrats and political figures loosely 
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associated with the regime through which it could assuage the masses and keep control 
on the country’s national institutions. In Sudan, Bashir changing his cabinet and all 
regional governors in the months preceding his ouster. However, he did little to alter the 
structure of the armed forces, in part because he had extensively counter-balanced those 
forces before, and continued to rely on them. A combination of his most senior elites in 
intelligence and paramilitary forces quickly removed him. In Zimbabwe, Mugabe 
shuffled elites, purged the ambitious, arrested for corruption those he believed in 
opposing factions, supported the rise of other factions, side-lined long-term allies, 
contained the political ambitions of his wife, and so forth. Mugabe kept enemies close 
both to observe their behaviour, but also because he was vulnerable without them: they 
were highly component senior members of his government. A ready-made shadow state 
replaced him.  
In each of the cases noted, the senior elites who replaced the leaders pursed extensive 
accommodation to increase the legitimacy and elite ‘buy-in’ for the new regime. In 
Algeria, this occurred through the appointment of technocratic governments consisting of 
old regime members and the holding of controversial elections won by former Prime 
Minister Tebboune. In contrast, original factional members in Sudan and Zimbabwe 
garnered significant positions and were complemented by an inclusive cast of elites to 
bolster the new regime. At this stage of the cycle, the new regime is vulnerable to counter-
removals, and co-opts widely to integrate and leverage the multiple power centres across 
the state. When secure in their positions, new leaders will consolidate their power by 
removing any elements of their regime who may counter their authority going forward. 
This stage represents the height of a leader’s powers, and the most unstable period for 
regime elites, as leaders purge and move elites to suit their centralisation agenda. 
Excessive personalisation and consolidation, in turn, produces the impetus for elite 
collective action to check the power of the executive through factions, thereby restarting 
a process of instability and possible leader removal.  
We suggest that the three cases of regime change discussed may come to constitute a 
template for future regime transitions across the continent. Several African authoritarian 
states – such as Burundi, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda – currently oscillate between the 
consolidation and factionalisation phases. Rather than these regimes transitioning into 
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democracies when there established leaders fall, we suggest that these are likely to be 
reconstituted as slightly more unstable versions of their current facets. While the 
occurrence of public protests, elections, and coups that deviate from the cycles cannot be 
ruled out, interpreting political trajectories through the notion of cycle represents a more 
fruitful way to understand regime change in Africa. 
  
114 
 
 
7. Taming the snakes. The Houthis, Saleh and the struggle for power in Yemen39 
7.1. Introduction 
The war in Yemen is one of the most devastating conflicts of the modern era, having 
killed dozens of thousands of people and resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis (Moyer 
et al. 2019). Escalated in 2014 after the end of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), 
the war pits the internationally recognised government of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi 
against the Houthis, an armed group hailing from northern Yemen that has intermittently 
been at war with the central state since 2004 and that seized the Yemeni capital Sana’a in 
2014. In March 2015, a coalition of states led by Saudi Arabia launched a large-scale air 
campaign in support of the Hadi government, forcing the Houthis out of Aden, Yemen’s 
second largest city. Simultaneously, armed insurgents linked to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula managed to capture large swathes of Yemeni territory, including the port city 
of Mukalla, while secessionist militias linked to the Southern Transitional Council and 
supported by the United Arab Emirates exercise de facto control over southern Yemen. 
Existing studies on the war in Yemen often interpret these dynamics through a sectarian 
lens (Durac 2019). On the domestic level, the conflict is a result of the essential 
incompatibility between different versions of Islam; on the regional level, it is described 
as the by-product of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies and Iran 
(Juneau 2016; Brandt 2017: 2). According to these narratives, the internationally 
recognised government is regarded as a mere appendix of its powerful regional sponsors 
lacking any agency of its own, while the Houthis are anything but an Iranian surrogate. 
Other accounts of the conflict privilege a state-centred perspective, branding Yemen as a 
‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state whose chronic instability requires external intervention (Clausen 
2019). Such explanations eclipse the agency of local actors, and tend to view the 
emergence of local political orders as either the mere reflection of geopolitical or sectarian 
logics or as a ‘temporary situation’ that is set to retake its ‘Weberian’ statehood (Baron 
and al-Hamdani 2019). Further, they obscure the practices of power that exist in these 
virtually ‘ungoverned spaces’, failing to capture how violence is used to advance local 
political interests, the behaviour of domestic armed groups and the prospects for peace 
(Raleigh and Dowd 2013). 
 
39 An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the ‘Political Elites in Yemen: Agency, Structures, 
Networks’ workshop in London, 4 July 2019. 
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Indeed, institutional approaches often adopt an artificial distinction between ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ institutions, whereby the state is treated as an actor existing independently 
from, or in opposition to, the societal forces that populate it. Paradoxically, despite a ‘state 
of chaos’ nationwide (Salisbury 2017), in wartime Yemen “the state has all but ceased to 
exist” (United Nations 2018a: 2). Its resilience is reflected in the proliferation of state and 
quasi-state agents and institutions operating independently or on behalf of the different 
warring statelets (United Nations 2018b). Many of these groups are formally recognised 
as state actors, yet in practice they behave like militias responding to local elites or to 
self-styled governments. Consequently, rather than a conflict pitting a state and a non-
state actor, Clausen (2018) has suggested that the war in Yemen reflects a violent 
competition between multiple actors for the control of the state, in which the 
fragmentation of its conflict landscape has had disastrous consequences for the 
chronically weak Yemeni state. 
Rather than uniform institutional entities, Yemen’s wartime institutions are better seen as 
networks connecting influential elites in perennial competition with each other, which 
transcend the boundaries between the formal and informal arenas. Governing institutions 
are marred by internal power struggles involving competing elites and their respective 
power networks. In some cases, such rivalries turned violent. In the south, rifts between 
the Hadi government and secessionist elites escalated in several armed clashes. In the 
capital Sana’a, months of increasing tensions in the power-sharing government born out 
of an agreement between the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi 
movement culminated in December 2017, when Saleh attempted to spark off an uprising 
against the Houthis (Brandt 2017). The alliance materialised in 2015 amidst widespread 
surprise, since Saleh he had fought the Houthis in six rounds of war between 2004 and 
2010, outplaying both his friends and foes. The bid ultimately failed, leading to the killing 
of the president who had “danced on the head of snakes” for over thirty years in the 
outskirts of the capital (Clark 2010). 
In both these cases, leaders attempted to mobilise their respective networks of allies 
making use of patronage, ideological, and economic resources. Some were more 
successful than others, raising the question of what factors determined their eventual 
success or failure. Focusing on Saleh’s failed uprising in 2017, I argue that the low 
cohesion of Saleh’s camp hampered his ability to mobilise and coordinate elites in a 
critical juncture, leaving them exposed to repression and co-option by the Houthis. The 
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vulnerability of his camp lied largely in the depletion of the patronage network centred 
around the General People’s Congress (GPC), the big tent party founded by the former 
president in 1982, leaving Saleh unable to sustain the uprising and ultimately doomed to 
a debacle. 
Using an original sample of political elites that served in national institutions under the 
Sana’a-based regime in 2017 and 2018, I apply social network analysis (SNA) to compare 
the structure of the Houthis’ and the GPC’s elite networks. I show how the Houthis used 
appointments in political and military bodies to overrun Saleh’s historical patronage 
practices and populate the state hierarchy with a cohesive network of elites, many of 
whom had strengthened links during the Sa’dah wars or shared strong ideological ties. 
By contrast, the GPC’s fragmented network, consisting of weaker and sparser ties, 
reflected the patronage-based, pragmatic nature of Saleh’s support base, whose 
vulnerability proved crucial in December 2017 when Saleh unsuccessfully tried to 
mobilise loyalists against the Houthis. Although the alliance between Saleh and the 
Houthis was indeed based on a power-sharing agreement between the two camps, mutual 
power relations were not organised hierarchically according to the positions occupied in 
the state nor dictated by power-sharing arrangements, but were rather a function of how 
elites are situated within the network and of the strength of the ties they share. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of elite networks, highlighting how elite cohesion 
is conducive to distinctive political outcomes. After providing an overview of patronage 
politics and elite bargaining in Yemen under the regimes of Ali Abdullah Saleh and 
Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, it explores how the Houthis seized the country’s political and 
military institutions, overthrowing the internationally recognised government and forging 
an uneasy alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The following section 
introduces the elite data sample and the methodology used to construct the elite network 
of the Sana’a-based regime. The cohesion of the two elite networks are also analysed. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the results of the analysis focusing on the role of elite 
cohesion in influencing the outcome of the December 2017 attempted coup, and the wider 
implications for state trajectories in Yemen. 
7.2. The role of elite cohesion 
Within the civil war scholarship, the notions of cohesion and fragmentation are widely 
used to explain the rise and duration of conflict. The cohesive or fragmented nature of 
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conflict spaces can affect the onset, intensity, and modalities of violence in civil war 
(Pearlman and Cunningham 2012; Brenner 2015; Warren and Troy 2015; Carboni and 
Moody 2018). Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour (2012) show that variations in the 
fragmentation of non-state armed groups in civil war contexts can explain the onset of 
infighting within internally split movements. These studies typically focus on how rebel 
groups, self-determination movements or ethnically based militias interact with state 
structures. However, in situations of protracted or endemic conflict, political elites 
routinely negotiate access to political power through the use or the threat of force. Hence, 
elite fragmentation can produce specific incentives to use violence as a means to achieve 
political goals (Raleigh and Dowd 2018). The resulting scenario is the emergence of 
subnational ‘wartime political orders’ oscillating between active cooperation and 
collusion to coexistence or open conflict (Staniland 2012), and displaying distinct patterns 
of violence and hierarchies of power (Carboni and Moody 2018). 
The role of elites is indeed of great significance in shaping the trajectory of political orders 
(Burton and Higley 2001). Elite behaviour is widely understood to determine fundamental 
political changes, and ultimately to explain patterns of stability, regime transformation 
and violence (North et al. 2013). Elite cohesion constitutes a pillar of regime stability 
(Magaloni 2006). Different levels of elite cohesion are associated with distinctive regime 
types, in which the unified or divided nature of the elites dictates how power is organised 
and exercised. Elite scholars Burton and Higley distinguish between four types of 
political elites based on their levels of integration – the extent to which they share 
common ties and values – and differentiation – the extent to which they are specialised 
functionally and significantly plural (Higley and Burton 2001). According to their 
typology, four elite types and related regimes are identified: consensual elites are highly 
integrated and possess extensive functional differentiation, producing stable 
representative regimes; ideocratic elites are highly, and often forcibly, integrated but the 
organisation of power allows little extensive functional differentiation and autonomy, 
producing stable unrepresentative regimes; fragmented elites operate across several 
functional domains but are weakly integrated, producing unstable representative regimes; 
divided elites have limited functional specialisation and actively seek to destroy their 
rivals, producing unstable unrepresentative regimes. Changes in the levels of cohesion 
trigger political elite transformations that generate new elite types and political practices. 
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Reflecting the distribution of power among elites and consequently the nature of the 
relations between key political actors, elite cohesion is defined as the “rulers’ ability to 
maintain the loyalty and cooperation of allies within the regime” (Levitsky and Way 
2012: 870). When cohesion is high, key political actors are expected to support the regime 
resulting in low levels of defection or insubordination. As a result, united elites are more 
likely to ‘tame’ politics by agreeing on the norms that regulate political competition 
(Sartori 1995). By contrast, when cohesion is low, elites are less likely to collaborate with 
the regime, which is subject to a variety of threats such as elite splits, coup attempts and 
rebellion. Unity is said to enhance the success of collective action by maximising the 
elites’ ability to enforce coordination and restraint among the adherents (Luttwak 1969; 
Pearlman 2012). 
In short, higher coordination among groups and individuals raises an elite’s ability to 
survive existential crises. Highly united elites can leverage entrenched partisan identities 
consolidated over years of conflict, military party bodies, uncontested leadership and an 
effective control over the means of coercion to successfully mobilise supporters and 
fighting resources (Levitsky and Way 2012: 872). By contrast, disunited elites face 
typical coordination problems related to the aggregation of a variety of groups, relying 
mainly on patronage for their mobilisation. Indeed, patronage is not a substitute for 
stronger non-material ties. As highlighted by Levitsky and Way, “although the 
distribution of material resources is a critical component of authoritarian durability, it is 
hardly the only one, and in times of crisis, it may not be the most important one” (Levitsky 
and Way 2012: 880). The absence of strong ties hinders elite cooperation as mutual trust 
is low and access to rents or public office is scarcely institutionalised. When non-material 
sources of cohesion are absent or weak, incumbents can enhance elite unity through 
patronage, the creation of formal institutions or repression, or further obstruct 
coordination through institutional fragmentation and elite circulation (Lutscher 2016; 
Woldense 2018). 
The elite network paradigm provides a theoretical framework to explain the emergence 
of distinct wartime political orders in Yemen. Nationally, Yemen resembles the divided 
elite model, with multiple camps fundamentally opposed to each other engaging in a 
violent competition over the control of the state. Networks are weakly connected, 
reflecting the deep divisions that separate them. At the same time, each of these camps 
conforms to the fragmented elite model, whereby elite pluralism offsets the absence of 
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unifying ties preventing an all-out conflict within the warring blocks. While multiple 
groups possess the capacity to use violence, no faction is strong enough to seize authority, 
privileging an uncomfortable cohabitation over a violent struggle (Higley and Burton 
2001: 187). 
When conflict escalated within these camps, thus triggering a transformation from 
fragmented into divided elites, different levels in elite cohesion between the warring 
factions contributed crucially to their success or failure. This was the situation prior to 
the rebellion that broke out in Sana’a in December 2017, following the collapse of the 
alliance between the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh. Before turning to the analysis of 
this case, I trace the evolution of elite networks in Yemen under the presidencies of Saleh 
and Hadi. 
7.3. Patronage politics and elite cohesion in Yemen 
Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen in 1978, and of unified Yemen in 
1990, until his final ousting in 2011 when he agreed to transfer power to his long-standing 
vice president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. During his thirty years of rule, Saleh, who hailed 
from the small Sanhan tribe, forged a political settlement regulated by a “politics of 
permanent crisis” alternating repression and co-option (Phillips 2011). Describing his 
ability to weather several political, security and socio-economic threats, Saleh himself 
compared ruling Yemen to “dancing on the heads of snakes” (Clark 2010). Saleh’s regime 
constitutes an example of ‘limited access order’, where leaders control and restrict access 
to the system for non-elites in order to create rents and distribute patronage to selected 
elite groups (Phillips 2011: 59). Generating expectations that the rents extracted under 
peacetime conditions exceed those extracted through the use of violence, this mechanism 
is an essential means to control violence, limit competition and secure the survival of the 
regime (North et al. 2013: 38).  
Under Saleh, the Yemeni elite was comprised of several groups holding uneven levels of 
power and influence (Phillips 2011). The regime’s inner circle, a shadowy clique that 
included the president himself, his closest relatives and the Sanhan tribal elite, occupied 
key positions in the army and the security services while also controlling large sectors of 
the national economy. A disparate network of tribal and religious leaders constituted the 
outer circle of the regime’s core, which also disproportionately benefitted from the 
regime’s patronage. Finally, selected political dynasties, business and political party 
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elites, technocrats and co-opted opposition groups were included in the patronage system, 
and retained intermittent political influence, as long as they accepted the informal rules 
of the game and provided a minimum level of support to the regime (Alley 2010). 
Although patronage was distributed broadly, it sowed discontent among excluded elites 
and the wider population, which saw little in the way of trickle-down effects from state 
patronage. It also resulted in the manipulation of Yemen’s tribal system (Phillips 2011). 
By elevating prominent tribal shaykhs to senior government and military positions, Saleh 
bolstered the tribal order in order to eradicate Hashemite and southern influences from 
northern and southern Yemen (Clark 2010: 154). While the system allowed shaykhs to 
extend their influence well beyond their traditional tribal fiefdoms,40 it created disparities 
and made them increasingly dependent on state patronage, supposedly insulating central 
government from the threat posed by heavily armed tribes (Brandt 2017: 57). Their 
political influence was limited, and patronage typically consisted of privileged access to 
contraband trade or the regular payment of stipends, which often alienated them from the 
communities they claimed to represent (Phillips 2011: 53). According to Higley and 
Burton’s framework, Saleh’s elites are identified with an ideocratic model centred around 
a highly cohesive inner circle, largely consisting of family kin and tribal allies which 
created a relatively stable but unrepresentative regime. 
The collapse of Saleh’s regime in 2011 was the result of two concomitant and interacting 
factors. On the one hand, the popular belief that without Saleh and his regime the country 
would disintegrate dissolved, and millions of Yemeni citizens followed the steps of 
protesters in other Arab countries (Alwazir 2011). On the other hand, Saleh’s attempts to 
centralise power and groom his son Ahmed Ali as successor, prompted the defection of 
key military and tribal elites, including army chief and designated successor Ali Mohsin 
al-Ahmar and the paramount shaykhs (shaykh mashaykh) of the Hashid and Bakil tribal 
confederations. Saleh could nevertheless rely on the elite Republican Guard, Central 
Security Forces, and other loyal army units, whose commanders included his sons and 
nephews (Barany 2011: 33). After months of protracted negotiations and mounting 
international pressure, Saleh agreed to sign an agreement brokered by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) to hand power to his former defence minister and vice 
president Hadi. 
 
40 Brandt (2014) referred to the northern shaykhs serving as army officials as colonel shaykhs. 
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Lacking popular support and an autonomous domestic power base, the new president 
turned to the influential patrons who had previously defected from Saleh’s regime, 
including Ali Mohsin and the al-Ahmar clan whose influence extended over the Hashid 
confederation and the former opposition al-Islah party (Transfeld 2016). Their support 
was critical to pushing military and bureaucratic reforms aimed at curbing Saleh’s 
influence within state institutions and the GPC: Hadi’s appointments in government, the 
judiciary and military bodies reveal how the transition process sought to eradicate Saleh’s 
centralised patronage system to replace it with “a political order with multiple patrons 
and power centres” (Thiel 2018: 123). However, Hadi also attempted to reduce his 
dependence on Ali Mohsin and al-Ahmar by steering the NDC – of which he had laid 
down the rules and imposed significant presidential quotas – and later dismissing senior 
government officials close to his patrons.  
At the same time, Saleh resisted Hadi’s military reforms that would eventually result in 
sidelining him and his loyalists. As the new president purged his predecessor’s family 
members under the pretext of restructuring the army, Saleh mobilised his extensive 
patronage network which stretched across the party system, the media and the tribes 
against Hadi and his allies (Carvajal 2015). As a result, Saleh successfully blocked 
reforms undermining his family interests in the NDC while also establishing contacts with 
the Houthis through mediation committees and qat chews (Transfeld 2016: 163; United 
Nations 2016a: 16). 
Mutual distrust and profound divisions therefore marked elite relations between 2012 and 
2014. While Saleh had managed to craft a cohesive inner circle largely consisting of kin, 
fellow tribesmen and loyalists, Hadi’s bid to consolidate his power clashed with the 
interests of Islah-aligned political actors. Contrary to the Saleh era, no actor or group was 
now able to exercise a monopoly in the political marketplace (De Waal 2015), and elites 
increasingly attempted to co-opt outsider actors to overcome their relative weaknesses 
and gain leverage vis à vis their rivals. In this context, the Houthis emerged as Yemen’s 
critical power broker. The transitional period’s elites therefore conform to the fragmented 
elite model, where weak institutionalisation and conflictual elites resulted in an unstable 
but more representative regime. 
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7.4. The Houthi-Saleh alliance 
Traditionally marginalised under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Houthis assumed a new political 
role in the aftermath of the revolution that unseated the former president in 2011. Amidst 
a heightened fragmentation of central political power, the group, which began to be 
known as Ansar Allah after the 2011 revolution, laid the foundation for the takeover of 
the state, completing their transformation from local insurgents into a political force 
extending its influence across northern Yemen (Ardemagni 2017; International Crisis 
Group 2014). They also took advantage of their experience in mediation committees and 
in-depth knowledge of tribal networks to co-opt local tribal actors who estimated that 
they would gain from allying with the Houthis (Knights 2018: 17). 
They were not alone in enabling the Houthis’ rise to power. Through the mediation of 
Saleh, the Houthis concluded several ceasefire agreements with armed tribes in Amran, 
Dhamar and Sana’a, which proved critical to undermining Islah and overrunning army 
units loyal to Ali Mohsin (United Nations 2015: 27). Hadi also contributed to this 
outcome, most notably in refusing to deploy the army against the Houthis in Amran in a 
supposed attempt to weaken Ali Mohsin and al-Ahmar (Transfeld 2016: 163), and in 
pushing through fuel subsidies cuts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund. 
Capitalising on a wave of protests that rocked the capital against the government’s 
economic policies and the political stalemate, the Houthis, ostensibly aided by Saleh’s 
loyalists (Hill 2017: 269), overran Sana’a facing little or no resistance. 
Whilst distrustful of their intentions, many domestic actors saw in the Houthis’ 
ascendance a way to weaken their respective adversaries (Day and Brehony 2020). Yet 
the calculation that the group could ultimately be controlled badly backfired. On the 
political level, Ansar Allah replaced local authorities with Houthi loyalists and local 
shaykhs in territories falling under their control, while also appointing shadow officials, 
or “supervisors”, to oversee political and military authorities after the signing of the Peace 
and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) with the government in November 2014 
(United Nations 2015: 23). The PNPA stipulated the appointment of a new inclusive, 
technocratic government led by Khaled Bahah to implement the outcomes of the NDC 
(Hill 2017: 266). However, the initiative failed after a technical commission appointed 
by Hadi formulated a six-region federal plan that by-passed the NDC, facing fierce 
opposition from Ansar Allah and the southern opposition al-Hirak movement (Transfeld 
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2016: 163). By the end of 2014, the Houthis exerted de facto control over the state 
institutions, but they had not formalised the takeover. 
This process was completed in early 2015. Under the pretext of lack of progress on the 
new constitutional draft, Houthi militias abducted the president’s chief of staff, Ahmed 
bin Mubarak, and put Hadi, Bahah and several ministers under house arrest. A 
constitutional crisis ensued when the government resigned, as the Parliament was 
prevented from voting on the president’s resignation. This allowed Ansar Allah to 
dissolve the government, and issue a constitutional declaration establishing a new 
executive body, the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC), chaired by Mohammed 
Ali al-Houthi (United Nations 2016a). The new state institutions comprised members of 
Ansar Allah and of the GPC wing loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as of smaller 
political parties allied to both factions. This alliance indeed constituted an integrated 
“hybrid armed group” advancing the interests of Yemen’s northern elites (ibid.: 16). 
The pact between Ansar Allah and Saleh lasted for almost three years. Whilst seeds of 
infighting were present from the onset of the alliance as reflected by sporadic clashes 
around Sana’a between Saleh’s loyalists and Houthi militants in the first half of 2015, the 
launch of the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm eclipsed the breakup (Alley 2018; 
International Crisis Group 2016). However, despite the consolidation of the alliance and 
the creation of new state institutions in the second half of 2016, distrust between began 
to mount throughout 2017, and escalated in August when Houthi armed men killed a 
Saleh loyalist in Sana’a (United Nations 2018a: 71). Concerns arose over a supposed 
attempt by the Houthis to isolate Saleh and the GPC and consolidate their control over 
the state.  
The events precipitated in December, as the former president called on his supporters to 
fight against the Houthis and reached out to the coalition for military support. After two 
days of intense fighting in and around the capital Sana’a, Saleh and his closest associates 
were killed on December 4 and the attempted coup suppressed. Although Saleh has still 
been able to count on several loyal fighters, his camp was structurally vulnerable, 
hindering its ability to mount a successful revolt against the Houthis. In the next section, 
I apply SNA to understand how differences in elite cohesion between the two groups can 
help explain the outcome of the events. 
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7.5. Methodology and data 
All interactions between individuals are ‘socially situated’ in wider networks of 
interpersonal relations that are the basis for the formation of social capital. The notion of 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) assumes that the behaviour of individual and collective 
actors is constrained by complex networks of social relations. Through the study of 
network properties and actors’ positions within a network, SNA allows the investigation 
of complex elite interactions, their configurations and the distribution of power across 
elites (Keller, in Best and Higley 2018). Within the abundant scholarship on political 
elites, studies of elite networks have investigated interactions between powerful political 
actors, enhancing understanding of how power is distributed in political systems and 
enabling empirical analyses of elite cohesion (Moore 1979; Gil-Mendieta and Schmidt 
1996; Kostiuchenko 2012; Osei 2015; Keller 2016). 
The first methodological challenge is how to identify political elites, which is known in 
the literature as the boundary problem (Laumann, Marsden and Prensky 1989). Political 
elites typically describe a wide set of individuals, groups, and networks in a given country 
“who wield political influence and power in that they make strategic decisions or 
participate in decision making on a national level, contribute to defining political norms 
and values (including the definition of ‘national interests’), and directly influence political 
discourse on strategic issues” (Perthes 2004: 5). This definition, however, does not solve 
the boundary problem; rather it requires us to explicitly assign the term “elite” to a group 
of people with specific characteristics (Zartman 1974).  
In this study, I focus on a subset of political elites – the national state elites – which 
include 77 individuals (nodes) who occupied a senior position in one of the political or 
military state institutions under the control of the Sana’a-based government in the year 
preceding the December 2017 events. After identifying the members of the elite, I then 
identified relevant biographical characteristics using official government and UN 
documents, relevant books, open-source material detailing the elites’ background, and 
supplementing these documents with further interviews with experts. National state elites 
consequently include the members of the Supreme Political Council – an executive body 
consisting of five members nominated by Saleh and five by Ansar Allah – senior 
government ministers and their deputies, as well as senior officials serving in either the 
military and security committees or in one of the senior military bodies (such as the army, 
the National Security Bureau, or the military intelligence). 
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Due to the difficulty of determining the boundary for the inclusion of non-state elites and 
of collecting relevant biographical information for elites holding junior government 
positions, political leaders without a formal state position,41 and civil or military elites 
serving in lower levels of the state hierarchy were not included, despite the relative 
influence they can exercise over decision-making. However, this subset makes up the 
actual core of the Sana’a-based government, and can be considered a good approximation 
of the wider socio-political coalition that supports the regime, as individuals appointed in 
executive bodies are typically associated with the role of “super-representatives” who 
serve in government to protect the interests of the communities on behalf of which they 
claim to operate (Bratton and Van De Walle 1994). 
Table 1 in the Appendix summarises the relevant institutional affiliations of the sample 
in 2017 and 2018. Although only 77 and 69 individual elites were recorded in the two 
years, some of them served in multiple institutions.42 It can be seen that the number of 
political elites appointed in these institutions declined between 2017 and 2018, largely as 
a result of a number of defections and dismissals. The high number of cabinet members 
is explained by the appointment, in November 2016, of an inclusive National Salvation 
Government comprising members of the GPC, Ansar Allah and smaller political parties. 
The cabinet did not include most influential members but was largely seen as a step 
towards the consolidation of the Houthi-Saleh alliance (United Nations 2017a). In 
November 2017 and in the year following the attempted uprising, the Houthis occupied 
most senior positions in the military and in security, while members of the GPC and of 
smaller political parties were relegated in the cabinet and in the Supreme Political 
Council, suggesting that small-size, homogenous security institutions were crucial to 
coordinate the ongoing war efforts (see Table 2). 
The second methodological challenge lies with the identification of the network ties. Due 
to ongoing conflict and the relatively shadowy nature of the institutional structure, 
collecting first-hand information on the relations between members of the Yemeni elites 
in Houthi-controlled territories is difficult or impossible. To determine such relations, I 
therefore adopt a structured approach introduced by Keller’s study of Chinese political 
 
41 These include Ansar Allah leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who 
did not hold formal state positions as of 2017. 
42 Notable examples include Deputy Interior Minister Abdulhakim al-Khaywani, Deputy Prime Minister 
Jalal Ali al-Ruwayshan and Transport Minister Zakaria Yahya al-Shami, who all served on the Military and 
Security Committee. 
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elites (Keller 2016). The analysis infers ties based on the existence of shared 
characteristics between individuals, such as common provincial origin, revolutionary 
legacies and alumni and co-worker ties, which are more easily identifiable when 
analysing large elite networks and help to mitigate information bias. According to the 
author, these ties create a social structure among elites, “which grants some individuals 
easier access to others, and facilitates alliance formation between two individuals that 
share such a tie” (ibid.: 22). As a result, elites may “activate” these ties to form alliances 
with other groups or factions, expanding or shrinking their coalition depending on 
strategic considerations.  
This is particularly relevant in Yemen, where regional, tribal, sectarian and party ties may 
not constitute cohesive corporate groups in themselves, yet dictate inclusion within the 
wider political elite and in institutional structures (Phillips 2011). In this study, I include 
several structural ties. Actors are connected if they were born in the same province, if 
they belong to the same tribal confederation, if they share family ties and if they have a 
common social status.43 These attributes are all found to be relevant factors in attributing 
elite status and determining patterns of co-option in contemporary Yemen (vom Bruck 
2005; Alley 2010; Day 2012; Bonnefoy 2016; Brandt 2017; Thiel 2018).  
As shown in Figure 7.1, Houthi elites (in yellow) occupy the centre of the network, while 
the GPC elites (in purple) are relatively marginal. Members of smaller political parties 
(highlighted in different colours) are also included, but the relatively small number of 
their affiliates appointed in state institutions prevents the creation of clusters. 
Furthermore, the size of each node is proportional to its degree centrality, in other words 
the number of connections each node shares with others. Houthi elites have also the 
highest levels of degree centrality, reflecting the multiple ties they share with other nodes 
in the network. 
 
43 Hashemite, or sayyid, background in particular seems to play a role in the selection of state officials 
appointed in Houthi-controlled institutions. Hashemites ruled over northern Yemen for centuries until 1962, 
claiming direct descendance from the Prophet. The Houthis, along with several other prominent families, 
are Hashemite and support the revival of Zaydi Shiism. It is important to note that although many among 
its core members share Hashemite Zaydi origins, the Houthi movement does not represent all Yemeni 
Zaydis. As a matter of fact, Zaydi elites are also found in the GPC and in other minor parties (Alley 2010; 
Brandt 2017). 
127 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Political Elite Network of 2017 - by Political Party 
The metrics of the network prior to December 2017 are summarised in Table 3. Measures 
of density, average degree centrality, average path ratio and clustering coefficient point 
to whether a network is composed of highly clustered nodes connected by strong ties – a 
“provincial” structure – or of distinct sub-networks with low levels of clustering and 
weaker ties – a “cosmopolitan” structure (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson 2013; Walther 
and Christopoulos 2015: 503). The graphs shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, along with Table 
3 in the Appendix, show that the GPC network largely conforms to a cosmopolitan 
structure, suggesting that it is far less cohesive than the Houthi network. This difference 
is explained by the existence of fewer ties connecting members of the GPC compared to 
the Houthis: the latter – and particularly the movement’s inner circle – share several ties, 
including regional origin, social status and tribal background, while the former does not 
possess a similarly cohesive core group, as they typically consist of elites recruited from 
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a more diverse social background. In other words, the data attest the GPC’s lower elite 
cohesion in the run-up to the coup attempt. 
     
 
It is possible that structural connections linking GPC members not included in this 
analysis may influence the results, artificially driving down the GPC’s overall cohesion. 
Educational or co-working ties were shown to have a significant influence on a multitude 
of elite networks (Keller, in Best and Higley 2018), while others, such as shared life 
experiences, common military background or joint institutional exchanges, may help to 
cement connections between individuals. Whilst this remains plausible, the structural 
nature of the GPC makes it unlikely that other relevant ties were omitted from the 
analysis, skewing the results. The GPC is typically described as a big tent party, whose 
supporters are united by a loose republican ideology and are drawn from several regions 
and social groups (Bonnefoy 2016). Indeed, the party’s leadership consists of elites 
hailing from different backgrounds, including technocrats, tribal shaykhs and Saleh’s 
kinsmen, who have little in common other than loyalty to Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
7.6. Elite cohesion and the crumbling of the Houthi-Saleh alliance 
The network data presented in the previous section illustrate the differences in elite 
cohesion between the Houthi and the GPC factions at the outset of the coup attempt in 
December 2017. Houthi state elites consist of a cohesive inner circle including individuals 
sharing multiple ties, such as regional background, social status and family kin, and an 
Figure 7.2: GPC Elite Network  
of 2017 
 
Figure 7.3: Houthi Elite Network  
of 2017 
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outer circle made up of satellite parties and a limited number of tribal figures. Ansar Allah 
occupy positions across multiple institutions, creating an institutional network through 
which they effectively run the state. By contrast, the GPC subnetwork presents low levels 
of clustering and weak ties, reflecting the wide patronage-orientated support base of the 
party. Although the co-option of several tribal shaykhs enables the inclusion of several 
local elites into the state structure, GPC elites are largely concentrated in the cabinet, 
resulting in an institutionally isolated and structurally vulnerable network.  
Such imbalances in the distribution of power within and across the GPC and Houthi 
subnetworks helped to determine the outcome of the December 2017 events in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the erosion of Saleh’s patronage network and his increasingly weaker 
grip on state institutions undermined the GPC’s ability to mobilise its disparate support 
base. The gradual depletion of Saleh’s financial and patronage resources, a process started 
after stepping down from the presidency and accelerated after formalising the alliance 
with the Houthis as a result of an international asset freeze, seems to have fatally 
weakened the GPC’s mobilisation capacity (Bonnefoy 2016: 57). In absence of solid 
ideological ties, relying merely on patronage fails to ensure strong elite cohesion and 
cooperation in times of crisis (Levitsky and Way 2012). 
By contrast, the Houthis could capitalise on a stronger ideological cohesion and on a wide 
range of identities, norms and structures forged under violent conflict. Several members 
of Ansar Allah’s inner circle had participated in the Sa’dah wars that the Houthis fought 
against the central government between 2004 and 2010 (Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells 
2010), while many others had long opposed Saleh’s regime. Although many that joined 
the Houthi movement did not pledge to the still loose ideological tenets of the movement, 
they had turned into an increasingly effective insurgent group capable of engaging in 
guerrilla warfare, seizing territory from the central government and rallying local 
consensus in Sa’dah as well as in Al Jawf and Amran (Knights 2018). As a result, the 
Houthis succeeded in taking advantage of the widespread discontent among the 
marginalised tribes of Bakil and Khawlan bin Amir, further threatened by the 
government’s violent tactics and the deployment of Hashid tribal militias fighting 
alongside the regular army (Brandt 2013). 
This ‘social capital’, accumulated in years of insurgency and strengthened after the Saudi-
led intervention, which they frame as foreign aggression, was crucial to maintain elite 
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unity after seizing the state. Narrative and discursive resources can indeed contribute to 
greater political stability, even in the absence of functioning state and non-state 
institutions (Phillips 2019). To this end, Ansar Allah’s leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi has 
on multiple occasions stressed his loyalty to those who fought alongside him during the 
Sa’dah wars (Nevola 2019). Through the control of state institutions and the appropriation 
of profitable wartime revenues, the Houthis also acquired patronage resources to 
distribute among their support base (Salisbury 2017). In contrast to Saleh and his GPC, 
however, patronage did not represent the only source of elite cohesion, rather it further 
contributed to the consolidation of Houthi dominance in the state.  
Secondly, the Houthis could hinder the GPC’s mobilisation capacity by disrupting the 
movement of, and the communication between, the party elites. In times of crises, 
communication and movement are essential to enable elites to coordinate and organise 
collective action, especially when they do not form a cohesive network (Levitsky and 
Way 2012). After the escalation of August 2017, the Houthis were reported to have placed 
checkpoints across the capital Sana’a and its outskirts to prevent GPC fighters organising 
militarily (United Nations 2018a: 71). Additionally, several GPC ministers were put 
under virtual house arrest before and after the coup attempt because it was suspected that 
they may leave Sana’a and defect to the internationally recognised government.44 
In the same vein, the persistence of the revolutionary committee and of the supervisory 
system in the ministries was not intended to merely oversee the ministers’ work from 
inside the administration, but to also supersede the decision-making process by operating 
as a shadow government (Nevola 2019). Reports emerged of Houthi supervisors (mushrif) 
entering the ministries in Sana’a shortly after the Houthis occupied the capital and signed 
the PNPA with the government. Between February 2015 and August 2016, the Houthis 
retained most of the existing administrative structure, including several ministers 
operating in acting capacity under the close supervision of Houthi delegates (United 
Nations 2017a: 10). After the appointment of the Supreme Political Council and of the 
National Salvation Government in late 2016, Houthi supervisors continued to be stationed 
in offices run by non-Houthi ministers, including those of the Interior and International 
 
44 An example, among many, is Said Muhammad al-Hariri, former member of the Military and Security 
Committee. Al-Hariri was put under house arrest in May 2017, accused of looting salaries from the 5 th 
Military District in Hodeidah. Al-Hariri, a former al-Hirak militant who later joined Ansar Allah, was then 
replaced by Houthi loyalist al-Madani. 
131 
 
 
Cooperation.45 This pervasive control of state institutions was crucial in preventing Saleh 
loyalists in the bureaucracy, far more experienced in running the state, from coordinating 
or taking control of the state’s ministerial infrastructure at a critical time. 
Thirdly, the GPC’s structural weakness left the party prone to the Houthis’ selective co-
option of national and local elites. Several leading GPC supporters, including the Prime 
Minister of the Sana’a-based government, Abdulaziz bin Habtoor, and the influential 
GPC leader, the shaykh Sadiq Amin Abu Ras, reportedly did not support Saleh’s move, 
and quickly rallied their followers in support of the Houthis.46 At the same time, 
prominent Houthi leaders Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim and Mohammed Ali al-Houthi – 
both holding senior positions in the state architecture – were reported to have held 
meetings with senior tribesmen traditionally allied with Saleh outside the capital Sana’a 
in an effort to convince them to withdraw their support to the former president (United 
Nations 2018a: 11). The eventual capitulation of Saleh is largely seen as a result of the 
unsuccessful mobilisation of tribes in Sana’a and across northern Yemen, which 
pragmatically chose to either remain neutral or to tacitly support the Houthis as the latter 
side started to gain the upper hand (Salisbury 2017: 14; Schmitz 2018).47 
In other words, taking advantage of the GPC’s fragmenting support base, the Houthis 
implemented a careful divide-and-rule strategy which paradoxically replicated governing 
tactics under Saleh’s rule. During his presidency, Saleh used political appointments and 
co-option to fragment the opposition and defuse political challenges (Alley 2010). While 
such manoeuvres had been instrumental in sustaining his regime until 2011, they seem to 
have ultimately enabled the Houthis to isolate Saleh and his supporters and foil the coup 
attempt. In the weeks following the events of December 2017, the Houthis further 
orchestrated a campaign of arrests and purges to break what was left of Saleh’s network 
 
45 In April 2017, an altercation erupted between the then Minister of International Cooperation, Hisham 
Sharaf Abdullah, and his supervisor, Houthi loyalist Yahya al-Babili, after the former refused to be placed 
under supervision. Reports also emerged showing that Abdulhakim al-Khaywani, appointed supervisor in 
the Interior Ministry, quickly acquired a higher military rank than the minister he was supposed to 
supervise, Muhammad Abdullah al-Qawsi. Throughout 2017, anti-Houthi outlets similarly reported 
episodes of violence and harassment in other ministries. 
46 According to some sources, neither men did not respond to Saleh’s call in the days of the uprising. Weeks 
later, the Houthi-allied faction of the GPC elected Sadiq Amin Abu Ras party leader and pledged support 
to the Houthis during a party conference in Sana’a. 
47 This pragmatic behaviour is a reflection of the non-hierarchical character of tribal structures, in which 
the authority of the shaykhs is conditional upon their ability to provide the tribes with regular access to 
resources. Shaykhs enjoy only chequered control over their groups, and indeed splits within tribes have not 
been rare instances during the war. For a further discussion on the role of tribes and tribal shaykhs in the 
civil war, see Al-Dawsari (2020). 
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from the state (United Nations 2018a: 20). Several cabinet ministers were dismissed and 
replaced with Houthi loyalists and Houthi-aligned GPC members, leaving the party 
founded by Saleh in a largely ancillary role.48 
The data reported in Table 4 also illustrate that the GPC’s position has continued to 
decline in the post-uprising period and that despite a shrinking coalition, the cohesion of 
the GPC’s network continues to be significantly weaker than that of the Houthis. The elite 
network has overall higher density levels, which may be a by-product of the shrinking 
number of elites (only sixty-eight occupied senior state position at the end of 2018, as 
opposed to seventy-seven in the previous year). Indeed, by the end of November 2018, at 
least ten members of the GPC had left state positions, bringing the party representation 
in national state institutions from twenty-eight to a mere eighteen. Several ministers, 
including the holders of the Oil and Finance portfolios, left the cabinet in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup, while other party members defected to the coalition months later 
fearing reprisals or further purges. Similarly, the position of vice president of the Supreme 
Political Council was not filled until January 2019 after two of Saleh’s loyalists also 
defected. However, while the number of GPC elites has markedly declined as a result of 
defections and purges, the subnetwork’s density has not increased, suggesting that the 
surviving elites share very few connections. In other words, rather than constituting a 
strong, cohesive junior coalition partner, data confirm that since 2018 the GPC has lost 
much of its leverage capacity and it is unable to exercise any effective influence on 
decision-making. 
On the other hand, higher levels of network density and elite cohesion indicate that the 
Houthis have increasingly consolidated their power through appointments in state 
institutions. The network has evolved towards an increasingly “provincial” structure, 
where the appointment of well-connected elites has contributed to higher rates of 
cohesion despite the higher number of Houthi members in the state network. Members of 
the Houthi family, or drawn from allied Hashemite families, were appointed to key state 
positions strengthening the movement’s control over the state.49 While in earlier months 
the Houthis had recruited state elites from a wider spectrum of social and political forces, 
 
48 Examples include the ministers of the Interior, Communications and Information Technology, Oil and 
Mineral Resources, Finance, Information and the Deputy President of the Supreme Political Council. 
49 Among these are the Deputy Interior Minister Ali Husayn Badruddin Amiruddin al-Houthi, son of the 
movement’s founder, the new Health Minister Taha al-Mutawakkil, and the newly appointed president of 
the Supreme Political Council, Mehdi al-Mashat, promoted after an air strike killed his predecessor Saleh 
al-Sammad. 
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these later developments, which have followed changing war dynamics, may indicate a 
less inclusive approach to political appointments, and an increasingly important role of 
family and Hashemite ties in the Houthi-controlled state institutions. Using Higley and 
Burton’s typology of elites introduced in Chapter 2, elites in Houthi-controlled Yemen 
have evolved from the fragmented and divided model into an ideocratic elite that 
dominates a largely stable but unrepresentative regime. 
7.7. Conclusion 
Through an empirical study of the national state elites in northern Yemen’s wartime 
political order, this paper has sought to explain how differences in elite cohesion shaped 
political dynamics within the Houthi-Saleh alliance during the events of December 2017. 
Capitalising on an ideologically cohesive elite, the Houthis are effectively in control of 
the country’s main institutions and have engaged in extensive institutional remaking and 
elite reshuffling. The group has transformed from an insurgent organisation into the actual 
power holder in the country’s capital. The comparatively less cohesive configuration of 
Saleh’s GPC network and its reliance on what was left of the former president’s patronage 
resources have instead proved crucial in undermining the party’s ability to coordinate and 
mobilise elites, as well as to resist co-option, during the uprising against the Houthis. 
While patronage may prove useful to anchor elites to a regime and cement a coalition in 
normal times, patronage-based elite networks are unlikely to strengthen collective action 
and prevent defections when crises erupt. The outcome of the December 2017 events 
shows instead that cohesive groups, which combine patronage resources with non-
material sources of cohesion, are likely to be more effective and capable of enforcing 
repression, and less vulnerable to internal splits or defection in times of crisis. Structure, 
however, does not inhibit agency, and increasing crackdowns against suspected dissidents 
can potentially fuel even more destructive infighting in the future. 
The limitations of this study should be acknowledged. It focused on a relatively limited 
sample of elites that have occupied a position in one of the main national institutions 
controlled by the Houthi-Saleh coalition, which I considered to be an approximation for 
its broader support base. While this choice helped address the boundary problem, 
extending the sample to other state and non-state elites may provide further insights into 
the internal dynamics of the coalition – provided that it is possible to collect socio-
biographical details concerning individuals in lower levels of the state hierarchy, and 
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therefore to identify the ties linking the nodes in the network. A second limitation 
concerns the limited number of ties considered in the analysis. For the purpose of this 
study, I only considered provincial, tribal, family and social ties, in addition to identifying 
the political affiliation of the state elites. While it was highlighted that additional 
educational or co-working ties are unlikely to have played a role in the creation and 
consolidation of networks among members of the elites – and especially within the GPC 
– it cannot be ruled out that other factors contributed to elite cohesion. In particular, 
further research may shed light on how shared institutional experiences, such as 
participation in tribal mediation committees (Brandt 2017) or institutional collaboration 
(such as in the National Dialogue Conference), have cemented links between Ansar Allah 
and GPC members during the transition. 
In conclusion, the analysis highlights four additional points. First, the Yemen crisis 
indeed reflects the combination of global, regional and local dynamics (Day and Brehony 
2020). A multitude of foreign powers vying for influence have meddled in Yemeni 
politics for years, often drawing Yemen into a wider regional battleground. Despite years-
long military interventions and massive financial investment, external actors have rarely 
determined political outcomes, and reading Yemen through a mere proxy war lens risks 
overlooking important dynamics. In reality, concerns of political survival drives the 
struggle for power in Yemen, and domestic actors have a long history of manipulating 
foreign support to serve their own political agendas. The study of local elites, their 
alliances, networks and structures is therefore key to understand political developments, 
especially at critical junctures like the one observed in December 2017. 
Second, inclusion in government or in other state institutions does not equate power. 
Power-sharing agreements that focus merely on how political appointments are 
distributed across party lines often overlook the role of informal networks in creating ties 
between elites and affecting the stability of political orders. As such, institutional 
arrangements stipulating an equal division of government positions may still result in an 
unbalanced distribution of power and produce grievances among the elites. This seems to 
be a recurring theme in contemporary Yemen, where institutional structures designed to 
guarantee an equal access to power to various groups in the aftermath of national unity in 
1990, the 2011 uprisings and the current civil war have generated further instability. Far 
from reining in predatory elites or uprooting pre-existing elite networks, they have often 
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exacerbated mutual distrust and instead produced perverse incentives to state capture for 
the more powerful groups. 
Third, analyses that describe political systems merely as pervaded by informal networks 
fail to acknowledge how formal institutions also matter. Patronage-based systems 
regulated by transactional mechanisms are more vulnerable when an authoritarian leader 
is ousted from power or is forced into a cohabitation with a more cohesive political ally. 
Expectations that the ousted leader – especially if subject to sanctions or intense external 
pressures – may run out of patronage resources and not sustain their networks can 
influence the behaviour of intermediate elites, leading them to switch allegiances. 
Pragmatic actors, like Saleh’s long-time tribal allies, are likely to withdraw their support 
to a leader or a party should they find a new and more credible power broker. In particular, 
the GPC’s ancillary position left the party more vulnerable to internal splits while Saleh’s 
depleting political and financial capital hindered his capacity to weather an existential 
political crisis.  
A final consideration concerns the stability of the government in control of northern 
Yemen. Based on a pragmatic power sharing agreement from the outset, the Houthi-Saleh 
alliance capitalised on the looming threat of the conflict and the Saudi-led air intervention 
to garner popular support and unite restive elites. Requiring regular resource extraction 
and capital accumulation (Tilly 1985), the Houthis’ war effort has been crucial to the 
emergence of the wartime political order centred in Sana’a. The survival of that order, 
however, may face new challenges should the risk of conflict escalation fade or become 
less pressing. The evolution of the regime since December 2017 seems to suggest that, if 
challenges to Houthi rule are to emerge, these are unlikely to come from the centre. Unless 
simmering tensions over strategic interests exacerbate divisions within Ansar Allah’s 
leadership, the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted, family-based inner 
circle seems to rule out the possibility that splits from marginal elites, such as what is left 
of the GPC, could weaken the ruling coalition. On the contrary, widespread discontent in 
the periphery over Ansar Allah’s repressive practices may induce local elites and groups 
to defect or rise up against the regime, as increasingly observed throughout 2019 (Carboni 
and Nevola 2019; al-Deen 2019). The extent to which such outcomes are likely is, 
however, unclear and will be influenced by the ongoing conflict dynamics. 
  
136 
 
 
8. Between the cracks. Actor fragmentation and local conflict systems in the 
Libyan Civil War50 
Andrea Carboni, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, United 
Kingdom 
James Moody, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, United 
Kingdom 
8.1. Introduction 
The fragmentation of non-state armed organisations is closely related to patterns of state 
failure in post-Cold War Africa and the Middle East: rebel groups contesting the 
legitimacy of the central state fail to consolidate power, and are susceptible to internal 
divisions. The result is a high level of opposition fragmentation that prolongs and 
complicates violent political transitions. Armed group fragmentation often goes hand-in-
hand with the decentralisation of security and territorial control. The ‘lawlessness’ of 
armed militias is perceived to prevent enduring peace settlements by disrupting the 
economic sector, violating human rights, and episodic clashes (Cunningham 2013; 
Willcoxon 2017).  
Armed group fragmentation is also seen as a major cause of conflict escalation in Libya, 
where the state is highly contested. State building projects from 2011-2013 fell short of 
their intended consequences due to their state-centric focus on elections, governance and 
capacity building. The establishment of a transitional government, the General National 
Congress (GNC) contributed to the fragmented political landscape by institutionalising a 
process of political isolation, itself a product of a Weberian concept of ‘statehood’ 
(Lamont 2016). In the absence of authority over the legitimate use of force, attempts to 
centralise the ‘rules of the game’ lacked nation-wide legitimacy and enabled the 
emergence of post-revolutionary groups to contest the developing and nascent political 
order.  
Despite the presence of two parliaments and three governments, no central authority has 
emerged to govern and administer the political functions of the Libyan state. Academic 
and policy analyses alike characterise Libya as a failed state with the near total collapse 
of state institutions and the country divided along multiple tribal, political, religious, and 
 
50 An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the ‘Conflict, Borders and Contested Space 
Postgraduate Conference at the University of Exeter, 24-25 May 2017. The article was published in Small 
Wars and Insurgency: Carboni, A and Moody, J. (2018). Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and 
Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(3): 456-490. 
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ideological cleavages that have exacerbated tensions into an all-out conflict escalation. 
These analyses portray Libya as an ungoverned space that provides non-state armed 
groups with a safe haven and easy access to weapons, and where its prolonged crisis risks 
reverberating across neighbouring countries (Lacher 2016). As such, explanations that 
Libya is on the brink of, or has slid into, a protracted period of escalation abound. 
Contrary to civil war studies that treat the state as a unitary entity, where armed groups 
operate uniformly, and which give precedence to national configurations of power, we 
suggest that local state-building processes are key in determining the conflict landscapes 
that develop. Through a case study on the Libyan Civil War (2014-2017), this paper 
demonstrates that armed group fragmentation does not lead to conflict escalation on the 
national level. Despite sustained rates of violence throughout the war, actor proliferation 
and violence escalation are only correlated in the localised conflict environment of 
southern Libya. How can we begin to understand why the proliferation of non-state armed 
groups, particularly during developments in the political settlement, has not led to a 
nationwide increase in the overall levels of violence as expected? What is the logic of 
these groups emerging if they do not sustain their violence levels?  
We interpret this subnational variation in armed group fragmentation and conflict activity 
as an indicator of the presence of areas of limited statehood across Libya. In each of these 
subnational conflict environments, violence signals an attempt to renegotiate and contest 
the existing political order on the local level. National and local political considerations 
interact to motivate or constrain armed groups from fragmenting and perpetrating 
violence. Consequently, the relationship between violence and armed group 
fragmentation is the product of locally-situated political opportunities.  
The paper begins with an overview of the existing literature on limited statehood to 
discuss the role of non-state actors in wartime political orders, and their contested 
relationship with state actors. The following section explores how the proliferation of 
armed groups in civil wars is critical for influencing wider conflict dynamics and fuelling 
violence escalation. After briefly introducing the fragmented nature of the Libyan 
conflict, we analyse patterns of violence escalation and armed group fragmentation during 
the second Libyan civil war, from May 2014 to April 2017. The paper then explores how 
armed groups have emerged and used violence both nationally and locally, comparing the 
different patterns observed across the Libyan territory. Finally, the discussion explains 
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how these discrete conflict dynamics are relevant to the emergence of local political 
orders, and to a broader understanding of the relationship between fragmentation and 
escalation in civil wars. 
8.2. Governance: limited statehood, political order and non-state authority 
Classifying conflict-ridden states as a failed or fragile overlooks the multiple arenas of 
governance that are operational within the states’ territory. Scholars have instead explored 
the multiple and unconventional forms of statehood (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009) 
through the concept of ‘Areas of Limited Statehood’ (ALS) (Risse 2017). Thomas Risse 
contends that ALS “refer to those parts of a country in which central authorities 
(governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in 
which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least 
temporarily” (ibid.: 6-7). In such scenarios, non-state and state actors compete for 
resources and the support of the population through hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
governance. 
Applying the concept of ALS to conflict dynamics, Staniland argues that the existing 
academic scholarship on civil wars fails to illustrate ‘the nature of authority, politics, and 
order in a particular area or war at any given point in time.’ In short, research falls short 
of explaining the formation of what Staniland terms “wartime political orders”; the 
structures of power and authority that emerge during a violent conflict and are sustained 
by armed actors (Staniland 2012: 247). While the link between state building and violence 
is well established, little empirical insight has been developed into the configurations of 
power between state and non-state actors and how this impacts processes of war-making, 
state-making, extraction and protection (Tilly 1985). Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and 
Vlassenroot (2008) advance Tilly’s concept of state building in historical European 
contexts to contemporary African wars and extend the process to non-state political 
agents. They highlight how rather than anarchy, disorder, and chaos, “state and non-state 
actors are making systematic attempts to control economic activity by establishing modes 
of rent-creation and elaborating systems of capital accumulation that have significantly 
altered the balance of power among social constituencies” (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and 
Vlassenroot 2008: 13). Other studies have explored how territorial control increases the 
prospects of acquiring resources and popular support focusing on the rivalry between state 
and non-state actors (Krasner and Risse 2014; Risse 2017). 
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Ana Arjona further applies notions of ALS to sectoral and social dimensions of 
governance through her definition of a ‘wartime social order’. This is “the set of rules that 
structure human interaction in a given community during wartime, allowing for that 
predictability to exist” (Arjona 2014: 1374), which in turn shapes the incentives, payoffs 
and strategies employed by political groups contesting power in ALS. Investigating the 
social institutions established in rebel-held areas, including schools and administrative 
systems, highlights the diverse nature of rule-enforcement that go beyond traditional 
Weberian notions of statehood. Arjona’s framework relates specifically to principal-agent 
problems of legitimacy between states and citizens in areas of rebel governance51 while 
Staniland focuses on state-insurgent interactions. In Libya, state versus non-state actors 
is only one of many conflict dyads, as militia and communal groups have been locked in 
local and regional contests with each other preceding 2014.  
In traditional Weberian statehood, relationships between state and non-state agents are 
organised hierarchically, with the state maintaining the ability to unilaterally enforce rule 
and order. The position of non-state armed groups vis à vis the state creates a landscape 
of hierarchical power that influences the modes and patterns of violence (Raleigh 2012a). 
In ALS, governance can be enforced by non-state agents who have a greater coercive 
capacity than their counterparts. Furthermore, alternative political orderings exist outside 
of hierarchical relations. Non-hierarchical ‘steering’ occurs when no actor possesses the 
coercive capacity to enforce its will on other political actors (Risse 2017: 9). Here, 
Olson’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ induces actors to internalise new rules and norms - not 
through the threat of coercion - but through networks of persuasion and self-regulation 
that impact the cost-benefit analysis of armed groups.  
However, even this private, non-hierarchical rule-making is not always free from the 
influence of public, hierarchical modes that exist underneath. In most instances, even 
when the state is not fully functioning, the total decentralisation of power or complete 
absence of rules is not a feature of the political landscape. This is because either the state 
remains one of several actors in a system of interaction between groups competing for 
power, or non-state agents dictating the rules-of-the-game operate in the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ if they possess enforcement capacity. In these scenarios, political hierarchies 
 
51 Further studies on rebel-citizen interactions include Wood (2012) and Mampilly (2011). 
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can be seen as ‘devolved’ from the centre whereby armed groups engage in the 
“reproduction” of state governance within territorially-bounded units. 
8.3. Insurgent fragmentation and conflict dynamics 
Renewed attention to the practices of power and governance in developing and fragile 
states have reinforced the relationship between political institutions and violent conflict 
at the subnational level (Snyder 2001; Raleigh et al. 2010; Raleigh and De Bruijne 2015). 
Political institutions in Africa are characterised by an uneven projection of state authority, 
reflecting the unequal outreach of the state across its territory (Boone 2003). In most 
instances, the state in Africa possesses a quasi-monopoly on the use of violence, 
exercising it in coordination with, or parallel to, a plethora of non-state actors, 
intermediate elites and local strongmen. Consequently, the spatial distribution of violence 
clusters along distinctive subnational geographies producing substantial differences in the 
nature and use of violence by armed actors. 
However, disaggregating civil wars by their constituent arenas of violence can be guilty 
of fetishizing the local, removing the possibility for trajectories of violence to be directed 
by practices of power above the local level and abrogating any rationale behind coalition 
building. A geographical analysis of violence at the subnational scale reveals patterns of 
conflict that indicate multiple processes of governance and state building that are neither 
independent of nor subsumed by national scale developments. The suggestion that 
localised politics supersedes macro-level tensions in driving conflict patterns sits 
uncomfortably to the realities of contemporary violence in developing and fragile states. 
In these settings, the state remains one of many non-uniform actors vying for political 
control, service provision, bureaucratic administration, and military domination 
(Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008: 9). 
Within the civil war literature, there is a general consensus that the proliferation of armed 
groups increases conflict and the duration of civil wars52. Existing theories of armed 
group fragmentation predominantly explore how rebel groups and self-determination 
movements contest the state (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Pearlman and 
Cunningham 2012; Brenner 2015). However, in recent years across Africa, up to one third 
 
52 Studies of non-state actor strategies are well-developed in exploring the trajectory of civil conflict and 
has been shown to influence the onset (Cunningham 2012); resolution (Driscoll 2012; Staniland 2012), 
modalities and intensities of violence (Boyle 2009; Balcells 2010; Raleigh 2012b) and direction of civil 
wars (Clayton and Thomson 2015). 
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of all armed conflict is attributed to militia groups, a trend that is changing the nature of 
contemporary warfare on the continent (Raleigh 2016). Armed militias perform a range 
of functions and conduct violence on behalf of political elites, at times of heightened 
inter-elite competition for power and resources (Raleigh and Kishi 2018). These findings 
thus challenge the Weberian notion of state sovereignty, whereby the state exercises a 
monopoly on the use of legitimate force. 
Two mechanisms explain the relationship between armed group fragmentation and 
conflict (de)escalation: the role of spoilers and credible commitment problems. Fractured 
opposition movements and a large number of armed groups experience increased 
commitment problems that obstructs de-escalation (Cunningham 2013: 660). As more 
armed groups enter the fold, attempts by spoiler groups to derail the peace process 
increase. Similarly, governments can capitalise on fragmented non-state groups by 
offering selective concessions to moderate groups, isolating them from their radical allies. 
Whilst this is expected to establish better prospects for a peace agreement to be achieved, 
exclusive political settlements rarely address the underlying issues that motivated 
tensions in the first place, increasing the risk that states relapse into violence (Brenner 
2015). 
Findley and Rudloff challenge the destabilising effect of spoiler groups on civil war 
duration (Findley and Rudloff 2012). Combatant fragmentation can rupture the existing 
calculus of factions, establishing a new logic in which a negotiated settlement is a more 
favoured solution to fighting. In this scenario, weaker hard-line elements are sidelined 
from the transitional process when inter-group bargaining between moderate factions is 
more easily negotiated. Despite this, the expectation that armed group fragmentation 
increases the risk of conflict escalation and the continuation of civil wars remains 
influential across conflict studies, governance and political science. 
Insurgent fragmentation and escalation have also been shown to be contingent on 
bargaining processes and the states’ ability to co-opt warlords (Driscoll 2012). According 
to these interpretations, fragmentation represents the process of selective incorporation of 
militia leaders into the state apparatus as the civil war subsides. In this sense, “the state” 
can be treated as a semipermeable membrane for violence entrepreneurs, who weigh their 
life opportunities as social bandits against their life opportunities as agents of an 
internationally recognised sovereign (Driscoll 2012: 12). Rather than commitment 
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problems leading to the extension of fighting, rebel fragmentation was one path towards 
a peace settlement. Fewer studies consider how variation in fragmentation across space 
produces and is produced by the political environment in which it is situated. 
8.4. Contested statehood and violence in the Libyan Civil War, 2014-2017 
The second Libyan Civil War that broke out in May 2014 pitted two rival political 
administrations against one another for control of resources and authority. These are the 
House of Representatives (HoR) based in Beida and the GNC headquartered in Tripoli. 
Each of these parliaments has gained de facto support from splintered armed groups that 
offer security in exchange for concessions. These groups either emerged during or after 
the 2011 revolution and many had their origins in the security apparatus of the transitional 
government following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. 
Competition and polarisation between multiple armed and political groups in the post-
2011 political setting led to rising tensions culminating in a wave of assassinations of 
civil society activists, security officers and political figures in Benghazi from late 2013 
to early 2014. In May 2014, tensions conflagrated as General Khalifa Haftar, who had 
mobilised his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) against the GNC, launched a 
military offensive to clear Benghazi of armed Islamist groups. Against this backdrop, a 
constellation of actors supporting the GNC – including the Libyan Revolutionaries 
Operations Room (LROR) and militias from Misrata – attempted to wrest control of 
Tripoli International Airport by forcing out anti-GNC Zintan militias (Collombier 2016; 
Costantini 2016). While the political crisis between the GNC and HoR escalated in the 
summer of 2014, forcing the HoR to relocate to Tobruk and side with Haftar, local 
tensions between Tuareg and Tebu tribes resurfaced around the town of Ubari in the 
south. UN-backed attempts to restore political unity under the Government of National 
Accord (GNA) resulted in the partial dissolution of the GNC but have not led to a 
comprehensive settlement between the two competing authorities. 
At the same time, explaining the Libyan civil war as a mere dispute between two rival 
governing authorities based in the east and the west, or between secularist and Islamist 
fronts, reduces the nature of a multifaceted conflict to a two-sided confrontation. The 
nature of territorial control shows significant variation between regions in Libya. In the 
north-west, local, ‘turf-war’ territorial challenges are more common than all-out attacks 
to control the capital. In contrast, eastern Libya has witnessed counter-insurgency warfare 
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aimed at fighting predominantly Islamist groups in Benghazi, whilst control of resource 
areas and strategic routes defines violence in the south of the country. Taken together, 
these conflict dynamics and political developments on the ground suggest that a series of 
local political orders have emerged in Libya in which “violence is not simply used to 
mount or repress total military challenges to state power, but instead is a flexible tool in 
pursuit of numerous political, economic, and social goals (Staniland 2012: 255). 
Additionally, by the end of 2013, the failure of demobilisation, disarmament, and 
reintegration (DDR) plans had enabled the proliferation of a number of armed militia 
groups including revolutionary brigades, political militias, criminal gangs and quasi-
legitimate non-state forces that could offer support or resistance to the two different 
governments (Stacher 2015; Collombier 2016). Several factors were conducive to this 
outcome. The fracturing of the government went hand in hand with the disintegration of 
the security sector. The resulting security vacuum led to an explosion of non-state armed 
groups organised along city, tribal and ethnic lines that fought against Gaddafi’s forces 
in 2011 to protect local communities. 
Weak state capacity during the transition consolidated armed group mobilisation, 
reinforcing a hyperlocal security dilemma. Revolutionary groups established ‘Military 
Councils’ as the National Transitional Council (NTC) was unable to move away from 
decentralised military operations, and in some instances these councils – particularly the 
Misrata Military Council – went on to be resistant to the UN-backed Presidential Council 
(PC). The complex web of pro-regime and revolutionary brigades that prevailed in post-
Gaddafi Libya thus prevented a ‘monopoly of force’ from being established and “having 
lost in constitutional politics, jihadists and federalists capitalized on the state’s military 
weakness to violently pursue their agendas.” (DeVore 2014: 464). The absence of central 
authority and governance motivated politically-minded elites and regional power players 
to represent themselves through armed groups pursuing their own local agendas. Rather 
than characterised by a lack of governance, the political landscape in Libya is constrained 
by an “overproduction of governance” whereby the language of politics is violence 
(Costantini 2016).53 
We explain these multiple, distinct patterns of violence within civil conflict by exploring 
the localised political incentives that shape strategies of insurgents, governments and the 
 
53 A critical reading of the failed state discourse is also proposed in Raleigh and Dowd (2013). 
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nature of political contention and violence. We suggest that by studying one element of 
armed group behaviour within different institutional settings – fragmentation – we can 
build a better understanding of the trajectory of violence in civil wars and how this reflects 
Tillean functions of state activity in ALS. In other words, we seek to understand whether 
the presence of more conflict agents contributes to increasing violence, and why these 
actors resort to armed violence to advance their interests. 
To analyse the interaction between actor fragmentation and conflict escalation during the 
Libyan civil war, we use data from ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED records 
information on conflict and protest events across Africa, with data available from 1997 
to the present. Each ACLED event is disaggregated by the location of the event, the date 
it occurred, the name and the type of actor involved, the type of violence and the number 
of fatalities. Non-violent events involving conflict actors are also coded to record strategic 
developments in a country’s conflict environment. 
We surveyed the first thirty-six months of the Libyan civil war, from its outbreak in May 
2014 to April 2017 (see Figure 8.1 below). The primary characteristic of the violence 
recorded in Libya belies most expectations. During this period, ACLED recorded 2,728 
violent events and 8,433 conflict-related fatalities. These high numbers notwithstanding, 
the conflict environment has demonstrated remarkable stability since mid-2014, and in 
particular between June 2015 and March 2017. Despite sporadic peaks coinciding with 
the military campaigns to liberate Sirte and Benghazi from Islamist militants, the total 
number of events has gradually decreased during the period of study from an average of 
98.5 events per month to 55.75 in 2017. Similarly, although two peaks in conflict-related 
fatalities in June and December 2016 are discernible, fatalities have exhibited a downward 
trend since October 2014, in which over 560 fatalities were recorded that month. 
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Figure 8.1: Number of Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities in Libya from May 
2014 to April 2017 
Overall, state-insurgent and intra-insurgent clashes, violence against civilians and remote 
violence activity do not indicate a significant shift in the ‘on the ground’ realities that 
have played out. Battles between armed groups made up half of total violence recorded 
in Libya since May 2014 (see Figure 8.2). Whilst armed confrontations have periodically 
intensified – like in Benghazi in late 2014 or in Sirte in June 2016 - this share has remained 
stable over time. Air strikes, artillery shells and other forms of remote violence constituted 
around one third of total conflict events, although they rarely hit areas that did not witness 
ground battles. Violence against civilians, a signal of intra-militia competition and 
communication of group strength to be co-opted by governments (Raleigh 2012b), began 
to increase after December 2016 but does not seem to represent a radically new approach 
employed by non-state armed groups. 
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Figure 8.2: Percentage of Conflict Events by Type of Violence in Libya from May 
2014 to April 2017 
Analysing attacks by armed group type further supports the theme of stability. Between 
May 2014 and April 2017, ACLED identified 127 distinct non-state actors as active in at 
least one violent or non-violent event, whereas only 115 were responsible for using 
violence in at least one event. Figure 8.3 shows that political militias are the most active 
non-state conflict agent in the country, with their activity constituting more than half of 
the violence perpetrated by armed groups across Libya. The most significant trend is the 
decrease in communal militia activity as militia brigades from Misrata, Zintan and groups 
based around Jebel Nafusa in the north-west have integrated into military coalitions 
affiliated with competing governments. For example, the Misratan militia that 
spearheaded “Operation Sunrise” to wrest control of the central oil terminals from 
Operation Dignity forces in December 2014 and March 2015 later united under the armed 
wing of the GNA to defeat the Islamic State. Similarly, Zintan and Wersheffana militias 
affiliated with the “Tribes Army” based in western Libya operated under the remit of the 
Operation Dignity coalition. 
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Figure 8.3: Percentage of Conflict Events by Actor Type in Libya from May 2014 
to April 2017 
The data display another counter-intuitive trend. The number of conflict agents 
contributing to violence has periodically fluctuated, but has not increased significantly 
since the outbreak of the war. The months in which the number of armed groups was 
highest seems to be characterised by a higher number of attacks, suggesting that splintered 
movements contribute to the perpetuation and escalation of civil wars. However, when 
employing an actor fragmentation index that accounts for the share of violence armed 
groups are responsible for, the relationship disappears (see Figure 8.4). 
148 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Armed Group Fragmentation and Levels of Political Violence in Libya 
from May 2014 to April 2017 
Instead of merely counting the single agents active in a certain month, this indicator 
allows capturing the share of violence each actor is responsible for, as measured by the 
number of politically-violent events they engaged in (Dowd 2015).54 
Rather than implying an absolutist understanding of the conflict process where many 
‘frenzied’ militias concomitantly escalate violence, national-level data do not support the 
claim that the proliferation of non-state armed groups has increased overall levels of 
violence in the Libyan conflict from 2014-2017. From this scale of analysis, the Libyan 
conflict does not conform to the expectation that internal divisions fuel civil conflict 
(Cunningham 2013). By contrast, data indicate that a handful of influential armed actors 
are responsible for driving increases in violence, and these are often those that relinquish 
arms in favour of a prominent position in post-transition polities. In short, violence is 
concentrated in the hands of specific groups of actors who tactically escalate their activity, 
 
54 This index is drawn from Laakso and Taagepera’s electoral study of party systems’ fragmentation (1979), 
and is calculated using the following equation: 𝑁 =
1
∑ (𝐴𝑒)
2
𝑒
 where Ae stands for the number of events for 
which a single non-state actor e is responsible. For example, a fragmentation index of 1 – the lowest in the 
scale – indicates that a single armed group is responsible for all violence in one month. By contrast, higher 
values are evidence of more actors becoming active and contributing to a higher share of violence. In order 
to capture a wider range of non-state actors that have become politically active but have not resorted to 
violence, we decided, contrary to Dowd (2015: 3), to also count political agents responsible for non-violent 
activity, such as disruptions, roadblocks, prisoner exchanges, peaceful transfers of territory or peace talks. 
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suggesting a process of political bargaining that does not occur uniformly across the 
territory. 
Therefore, scaling down our analysis to the subnational level may provide further insights 
on patterns of conflict within Libya. In doing so, we begin to build a more complete 
picture of the structures of contestation, the agents responsible for violence and their 
relationship to other armed groups and to the state, as well as the distinct geographies in 
which civil war violence clusters (see Figure 8.5). Our analysis investigates levels of 
conflict activity and actor fragmentation using ACLED’s first-level administrative 
divisions, which correspond to Libya’s districts (sha’biyat) between 2001 and 2007. We 
grouped different districts showing similar patterns to create three separate conflict 
environments: Tripoli and the West; Benghazi and the East; and Southern Libya55. 
 
Figure 8.5: Number of Conflict Events by Actor Type and Location in Libya from 
May 2014 to April 2017 
 
55 Western Libya includes the capital Tripoli and the districts of Al Jabal al Gharbi, Al Marqab, An Nuqat 
al Khams, Az Zawiah, Ghadamis, Gharyan, Jafara, Misratah, Mizdah, Nalut, Sabratah Surman, Surt, Tajura 
wa an Nawahi al Arba, Tarhunah-Masallatah and Yafran-Jadu. Eastern Libya roughly correspond to the 
historical administration of Cyrenaica, and is composed of the districts of Ajdabiya, Al Butnan, Al Hizam 
al Akhdar, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Marj, Al Qubbah, Al Wahah and Darnah. Southern Libya, which includes 
the historical Fezzan region, extends across the districts of Al Jufrah, Al Kufrah, Ash Shati, Ghat, Murzuq, 
Sabha and Wadi al Hayat. 
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We argue that each of these regions currently constitutes a distinct wartime political order, 
in which the configuration of power provides armed groups with different incentives to 
use violence (Staniland 2012). We expect each of these political orders to be characterised 
by specific conflict patterns and different levels of actor fragmentation. These distinct 
regional conflict environments, however, were not a by-product of the civil war but they 
were reactivated by the civil conflict. Their emergence is anchored in Libya’s tortuous 
state-making process during which the delegation of powers to subnational administrative 
divisions was instrumental in the consolidation of local elites and armed groups (Turki 
and Loschi 2017: 8-10). In Eastern Libya, for instance, widespread opposition to 
Gaddafi’s exclusionary rule was key to rallying support for the revolutionaries in 
Benghazi and across the region, despite its diverse tribal and ethnic composition (Wehrey 
2014). 
8.4.1. Armed group fragmentation in Libya’s wartime political orders 
30 of the 32 districts of Libya have, to different degrees, experienced varying forms and 
levels of political violence and non-violent activity during the period of investigation. 
This non-uniformity in conflict coverage is consistent with developments in spatial 
analyses of civil wars (Raleigh, Witmer and O’Loughlin 2009) and challenges the 
assumption that civil wars take place primarily in peripheral regions far away from the 
country capital (Aas Rustad et al. 2011). Additionally, the forms of political activity are 
not confined to insurgent activity that pits governments against opposition rebels. 
Violence against civilians, rioting behaviour, non-violent militia posturing, tribal 
bargaining and ceasefire agreements also contribute to localised patterns of power 
contestation. 
The graph shown in Figure 8.6 reveals significant variations in the fragmentation of 
armed groups recorded in Eastern, Western and Southern Libya. The regions around the 
capital are more likely to see higher fragmentation than the rest of Libya. The average 
share of political violence attributed to non-state armed groups is 5.5, with regular spikes 
in the months preceding the establishment of the PC led by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli. By 
contrast, average actor fragmentation for the same period was 2.73 in the East and 2.28 
in the South. 
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Figure 8.6: Armed Group Fragmentation by Region in Libya from May 2014 to 
April 2017 
In Western Libya, actor fragmentation is overwhelmingly driven by the emergence of 
armed militias who typically act as local security providers at the city or district level. 
These non-state actors, which include communal and tribal militias as well as a variety of 
military brigades that have mobilised in the years since 2011, have often performed state-
like activities, replacing governmental authorities for providing security and extracting 
taxes.56 Their activity reflects the different outreach, capabilities, and goals of these 
actors. Whereas only some of these groups, such as the Tripoli-aligned militias from 
Zintan and Misrata, or those from Wersheffana and Gharyan, have operated across 
multiple administrative divisions, nearly 80% of the non-state armed groups present in 
the Western region were recorded as being active in one or two second-level 
administrative divisions, pointing to a highly volatile conflict environment (see Figure 
8.7). The presence of these localised militias in Tripoli and its surrounding regions has 
contributed to perceptions of Libya being characterised as a “country of small wars” (al-
Esha 2016). 
 
56 Examples were cited in Jebnoun (2015); Jeursen and van der Borgh (2014); and Raghavan (2016). 
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Figure 8.7: Non-State Armed Groups in Libya’s Regions per Activity Outreach 
from May 2014 to April 2017 
In addition to the militias, the Islamic State (IS) organisation played a major role in Sirte 
and the wider Tripolitania region. Despite being active across the whole of the Libyan 
territory, the local branches of IS were the actor most frequently involved in conflict 
events in Tripolitania. Events involving IS were also the most lethal, as one third of total 
fatalities in the region were recorded in events where their militants participated in the 
fighting. This finding seems to suggest that the other regional conflict actors were not as 
likely as IS to escalate violence, instead adopting a more restrained behaviour that 
followed a local logic. 
By contrast, actor fragmentation has been significantly lower in Eastern Libya. Here, 
conflict dynamics have largely been influenced by the conflict that has pitted General 
Khalifa Haftar’s LNA against Islamist militias in Benghazi and Darnah. Ansar al Sharia, 
the Islamic State and the Benghazi Revolutionaries’ Shura Council make up for more 
than half of all non-state violence in this region between May 2014 and April 2017. 
Haftar’s emergence as the strongman in the East has shaped the local conflict 
environment, cementing local and international alliances and preventing substantial 
challenges to his predominance over the region and the proliferation of armed groups as 
witnessed in North-West Libya (Lewis 2017). 
Compared to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the South has seen fewer conflict events and, 
therefore, fewer conflict actors have been active in the area. Primary perpetrators of 
violence were the local Tebu, Tuareg, Awlad Suleiman and Qadhadhfa militias, which 
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have regularly fought around the southern towns of Ubari and Sabha, along the trans-
Saharan commercial routes. Nevertheless, non-local actors have sporadically contributed 
to non-state violence in southern Libya, including Misratan militias fighting Haftar’s 
forces, Sudanese and Chadian rebel groups and militias and the Islamist Brigades for the 
Defence of Benghazi (Profazio 2017). 
Table 1 (see Appendix) shows that the behaviour of non-state actors also present 
significant variations in the three regions. Intra-militia fighting is the most common form 
of violence in Western Libya, making up more than half of all events recorded by ACLED 
in the region (647 events). Here, security forces interact with militia groups in only 9% 
of cases, an evidence of the security vacuum that has made political and communal 
militias the dominant conflict agents in the region. Fighting between opposing militias 
also constitutes the largest share of the violence in the South, where, however, 
government forces have more frequently engaged in violence with local non-state armed 
groups. These actors, which control profitable sites in Libya’s south, have battled the 
forces of Haftar’s LNA and the GNA in more than 20% of events. By contrast, 
government forces fighting militia and rebel groups were the most common actor dyads 
in the East, pointing to the military and political relevance of Haftar’s allied forces in 
eastern Libya. 
This analysis leaves the question of whether actor fragmentation leads to conflict 
escalation unanswered. We have thus tested our initial hypothesis using a simple linear 
regression model shown in Figure 8.8. The graphs illustrate how varying forms of actor 
fragmentation at the regional level result in different levels of political violence measured 
in the number of both conflict events and reported fatalities. We find that months where 
armed group fragmentation is higher are not correlated with more violence in Western 
and Eastern Libya, while actor fragmentation is correlated with escalating conflict in 
southern Libya only. 
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Figure 8.8: Armed Group Fragmentation Index and Levels of Political Violence by 
Region in Libya from May 2014 to April 2017 
The interaction between armed group fragmentation and conflict escalation displays 
spatial heterogeneity whereby local dynamics contribute to shaping specific subnational 
conflict environments. The next section discusses what factors shape the local conflict 
environments to explain the abovementioned differences in actor fragmentation and 
conflict escalation. Why is actor fragmentation driving escalation in the Fezzan region, 
and not in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania? What explains the comparatively low escalation 
of violence around Tripoli, despite the concomitant presence of multiple agents of 
conflict? How has the presence of General Haftar managed to contain the proliferation of 
armed groups? 
8.5. Understanding Libya’s political orders 
The findings demonstrate geographic variation in insurgent fragmentation in Libya and 
indicate that actor fragmentation by itself does not lead to higher levels of armed conflict. 
As such, fragmentation is not a sufficient predictor of violence patterns. A lack of state 
capacity, disintegration of the security sector and proximity to the capital city are posited 
as motivation for insurgents to escalate violence and contest for state power. By capturing 
the remnant machinery of political authority, non-state groups are able to (re)distribute 
resources, privilege and power to favoured elite groups and constituents. These 
explanations, however, fail to explain the observed variations in patterns of political 
violence at the regional level. To overcome this, we outline the logic of civil war in each 
region that shapes the political opportunities and incentives for armed groups to fragment 
and the nature of violence they employ. 
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While all these features are present within Tripoli – a paralysed unity government 
struggling to establish unity and a quasi-institutionalised military force – this explanation 
is predicated on the mobilisation of a rebel group that actively seeks to reproduce forms 
of established political authority, playing into a Weberian concept of statehood. By 
contrast, we find that the majority of armed groups within this region are political militias 
who compete to become the dominant local security provider at the city or district level. 
The high proliferation and fluidity of militias, including Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, 
Abu Salim Brigade, and Salah al-Burki militia, is tempered by the limited geographic 
scope of their violence, which is predominantly localised to the city of Tripoli and does 
not diffuse or expand beyond the capital. 
Therefore, Tripoli is not a typical insurgent environment insofar as the goal of the conflict 
agents is not maximalist. Violence is overwhelmingly characterised by occasional, short-
lived kidnappings, roadblocks, and tit-for-tat street clashes that did not escalate into all-
out confrontations. Emboldened by earlier successes in influencing the political process 
during 2013, militia groups became aware of their leverage that “paved the way for further 
use of force to manipulate the mechanisms of government for political gain.” (Collombier 
2016: 232-234). The violence these groups undertake does not threaten the takeover of 
the state, although they may continue to undermine its capacity to function by 
exacerbating the intractability of the conflict through “positional bargaining” (Fisher and 
Ury 1983). Indeed, the raison d'être is less about governing or establishing an alternative 
ruling coalition and more focused on maintaining short-term patrimonial relations with 
the PC and shoring up a patchwork of local territorial control to influence the political 
process in Tripoli.  
Several overlapping logics contribute to the local conflict system in Tripoli: the most 
conventional explanation is that violence is a consequence of the immediate response to 
local insecurity in which new and antagonistic rival groups threaten the prominent social, 
economic, and political position these armed brigades have secured for their elite 
sponsors. This dynamic plays out through temporary coalition-building between Tripoli-
based militias to defend the PC against the burgeoning threat of the Khalifa Ghwell’s 
resurrected National Salvation Government (NSG) and the disparate armed groups that 
156 
 
 
back it57. Local security dilemma explanations are unable to explain what motivated the 
emergence and intense fragmentation of the defensive armed groups in the first place. 
A second mechanism builds on the diverse nature, aims and types of militia; some are 
predatory, acting as low-cost, low-risk proxies for dominant and abusive states (Mason 
and Krane 1989) whereas others mobilise to defend and protest local and often minority 
communities (Barter 2013). In Tripoli, neither typology accurately describes on-the-
ground dynamics where governing institutions are for the most part absent and local 
communities frequently protest against destabilising and unlawful militia activity58. 
Instead, a mutual process of signalling and co-optation characterises this cycle of low-
level violence. For example, in July 2017, fighting erupted between rival members of the 
same militia, the Al-Buni brigade, which controls Libya’s Mitiga airport in Tripoli. 
Antagonisms initially developed after a dispute over the distribution of income from 
operating the terminal but rapidly drew the attention of armed brigades stationed nearby. 
It was reported that members of the Special Deterrence Force, a Salafist-leaning anti-
crime force that operates as an independent department directly under the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) and the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, whose official security 
structuring is more obscure, were sent to quell tensions.59 The opportunity this intra-group 
fighting provided to other armed groups to demonstrate their military capability and 
prowess was compounded by the transitional government’s inability to quash powerful 
non-state groups, who instead are intermittently tasked with varying levels of 
responsibility under the rubric of the PC. These include the above security provision at 
major installations such as airports, banks and gas and oil sites, thus producing a ‘market 
for violence’ and heightened inter-factional competition. 
The third logic moves beyond city-based interactions to examine the effect of broader 
national antagonisms. Locally-driven patterns of contestation in the West are 
simultaneously influenced by the Tripoli-based administration’s preoccupation with 
power projection across the Libyan territory in an act of defiance against the eastern 
power base of General Khalifa Haftar. At the beginning of June 2017, the PC announced 
the unilateral decision to establish seven military zones spanning the West, East and 
 
57 Reports of these temporary alliances were published in Fornaji (2017). 
58 Human Rights Watch (2013) reported that militias from Misrata fired upon peaceful demonstrators 
outside the militia base in Gharghour, southern Tripoli on 15 November 2013, leaving 43 people killed. 
Since then, militias and their politician allies have been blamed for cutting fuel and electricity supplies 
inducing power and water crises in the capital. See also Moutaz (2017). 
59 On Tripoli’s militias, see Pack (2017) and Libya Herald (2017). 
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South, in a move widely deemed to be lacking jurisdiction and credible commitment to 
enforce due to the difficulty it faced from multiple militias operating in Tripoli alone. As 
the GNA struggles to form a unified ‘bloc’ to confront the dominance of Haftar, these 
same groups also periodically form and dissolve tacit coalitions to nominally support the 
PC. These ‘signalling’ measures demonstrate to the PC that their co-optation will 
contribute to wider stability, i.e. by absorbing non-state groups into a single-chain of 
military command that will bolster the position of the GNA in its standoff with the rival 
HoR administration and Haftar’s eastern forces. 
In Benghazi and the wider Cyrenaica region, the conflict environment is characterised by 
bipolarity with sustained high levels of violence but lower armed group fragmentation. In 
contrast to the Tripoli administration’s weak capacity to manage internal threats, patterns 
of violence in the east conform to the four processes of war and state-making identified 
by Charles Tilly: war-making, state-making, protection and extraction (Tilly 1985). 
Haftar has positioned his LNA as the dominant force in the region, tentatively containing 
local challenges from powerful tribal groups in the east such as the Magharba tribe and 
absorbing city, tribal and ethnic-based armed groups into a regional military force60. He 
has been adept at forging more stable alliances that avoid the short-term fluctuations that 
frustrate state-building efforts in Tripoli. In developing an armed force, local prerogatives 
have been carefully managed by embedding influential tribal and regional members into 
prominent positions and capitalizing on their wider societal influence. For example, 
Colonel Wanis Boukhamada, a member of the Magharba tribe remains leader of the Al-
Saiqa (Thunderbolt) Special Forces, a strong ally of Haftar in the fight for Benghazi. 
Popular support for the Sa’iqa forces contains the threat of internal social divisions in the 
east and mitigates against a rival armed organisation. Similarly, Saleh al-Ataiwish, a 
prominent Magharba tribal leader, is reported to have played a pivotal role in the LNA’s 
takeover of the ‘Oil Crescent’ region in September 2016 by negotiating with fellow 
tribesmen within the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) to not resist the advance by the 
LNA.61 
 
60 Local challenges in Cyrenaica have not resulted in spill over fighting but careful balancing and mediation 
between eastern tribes remains tense and fragile with defections of support a possibility. See Maghreb 
Confidential (2017). 
61 Reports of PFG’s inaction against the LNA were published by Menastream media agency 
(https://twitter.com/MENASTREAM/status/794534309520670722). 
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The resultant monopolisation of violence in the East has prevented the decentralised 
conflict environment witnessed in Tripoli from taking hold. Asymmetric coercive force 
has deterred the proliferation of multiple local violent challenges by increasing the risk 
of total elimination to challenger groups. As such, fighting has converged around a central 
node with fighting between Haftar’s LNA and Ansar al-Sharia being the primary conflict 
dyad in the East. Alliance building between Islamist militants was a key feature of the 
early stages of conflict as the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) bought 
together a constellation of groups including the February 17th Martyrs Brigade and the 
Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade62 in fighting that devastated Benghazi. This dominant political 
order set the stage for actors to fight for the control of territory rather than to be co-opted 
into patrimonial networks resulting in intense periods of fighting to dislodge militants 
holed up in residential areas of Benghazi. 
Rather than being preoccupied with building an army, Haftar is concentrating on 
consolidating his position. By expanding his military force and territorial reach, at the 
same time as stepping up his campaign for broad civic appeal to win the backing of 
influential tribal entities in the region, violence reflects his attempt to establish national 
legitimacy. Acquiring control of extractive resources is crucial for financing war-making 
practices, although, the logic behind the takeover of oil terminals has been to demonstrate 
authority to international states and Haftar’s responsibility as head of the LNA. When the 
LNA took control of the Oil Crescent in September 2017 and March 2017, his forces 
immediately handed over control to Mustafah Sallah – the head of the National Oil 
Corporation (NOC). This repertoire appears to have influenced the decision of the LNA’s 
opponents, the Brigades for the Defence of Bengahzi (BDB), who adopted the same 
repertoire by immediately handing over oil sites they took control of to the NOC (al-
Jazeera 2016; Lewis 2016).  
Libya’s South is the only region where a strong positive relationship between the 
fragmentation of the conflict environment and the escalation of violence patterns exists. 
Local actors, however, do not seem entirely responsible for this upward shift in violence. 
Although the local Tebu and Tuareg militias, who have rivalled for the control of 
 
62 The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade originated as a battalion of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade and under 
Prime Minister Ali Zeidan were integrated into the Libyan Army. Following their split, rumours of frictions 
between the groups have circulated though no violent confrontations have been observed in the ACLED 
dataset. They have since been reported fighting alongside Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi against the LNA. 
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profitable trade routes particularly since the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime,63 are among 
the main perpetrators of violence in the region, conflict escalation is higher when actors 
from neighbouring regions participate in conflict across the region. This correlation is 
thus explained by the spillover of national dynamics into the South, transforming the 
disputes over local economy into a proxy of the civil war (Murray 2017). 
Militias from Misrata and Benghazi, rebel groups from Chad and Sudan, along with 
communal militias allied with the GNA and the LNA, have all been active in southern 
Libya. These have often acted in conjunction with the armies of the Tripoli- and Darnah-
based governments, suggesting that the control of main towns in the South has become a 
vital economic and political resource for either Libyan administration. Authority over 
Libya’s border flows can not only ensure a regular flow of financial resource, but also 
carry considerable clout with European donors concerned with immigrants (International 
Crisis Group (2017b ). This dimension of the Libyan conflict thus contrasts with popular 
interpretations of modern civil wars represented as essentially criminal, depoliticised, 
private, and predatory (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001). By contrast, the scale of the violence 
is constantly negotiated, and even violence attributed to regional actors respond to 
developments in the national peace process. Reported frustration among Tebu and Awlad 
Suleiman communities over lack of support from Haftar’s LNA have resulted in 
increasing factionalism and divided loyalties, with military officers from the same group 
fighting on opposing sides (United Nations 2017b).  
These conflict patterns suggest that understanding variation in the trajectory of violence 
in the Libyan civil war is not best undertaken through national indicators of escalation, 
fragmentation and diffusion currently employed but a multi-level approach. At first 
glance, this appears to support Staniland’s argument, according to which you cannot 
explain the political state of a civil war by looking at violence only, as it does not 
necessarily represent the exercise of power on the ground (Staniland 2012). Variations in 
violence do not occur at the national level but at the local level. We identified distinct 
conflict environments that demonstrate how different configurations of power incentivise 
the use of violence by armed groups and inform patterns of violence. Taken together, 
 
63 Criminal networks are reported to have flourished in post-revolutionary Libya, sustaining the war efforts 
of several armed groups. See the final reports of the Panel of Experts on Libya submitted to the United 
Nations Security Council in 2016 and 2017 (United Nations 2016b; 2017b). 
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these local conflict arenas contribute to the maintenance of an apparent stability at the 
national level. 
Therefore, the physical patterns of violence respond to but are not entirely subsumed by 
national-level agendas. While politically influential actors and elites organised at the local 
level (Lacher 2016), the city and regional dynamics have been influenced by the 
interaction between local political geography and varying political opportunities at the 
national-level. The fragmentation of Libya’s political space traces its roots in the post-
2011 armed mobilisation, where social ties and strategic considerations reassembled 
alliances and enmities between local communities (Lacher 2020). Militias in Tripoli use 
violence to inform the regional power player – the GNA that their groups have access to 
weapons, logistics, and the ability to coordinate in a way that could threaten the chances 
of local stability or the GNA’s attempts at regional unity. This multifaceted conflict 
environment reflects locally-driven desires for security, survival, and the consolidation 
of a mercantilist relationship with the regional powerhouse, incentivizing the wholesale 
proliferation of multiple armed groups capable of waging warfare within a limited scope 
of action. This confirms that “micro-level tensions were neither purely a consequence of 
macro-level manipulation, nor were they merely criminal or humanitarian problems” 
(Autesserre 2010: 137). It is the establishment of this competitive political order where 
actors fight for extraction/material gain that produces low-level fighting. 
8.6. Conclusion 
This contribution seeks to further understandings on the relationship between actor 
fragmentation and violence escalation in civil war contexts. It investigated the incentives 
and the constraints armed groups face when deciding to use violence in order to advance 
their interests and consolidate their positions in the political hierarchy. By analysing 
armed group fragmentation, this paper has demonstrated that geographic variation in 
patterns of violence are the result of locally-situated political opportunities that are 
produced through interaction between national, regional, and local-level political 
developments.  
These findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far 
beyond the state. Governance relations are not simply the product of non-state actors’ 
reactions to state-led imperatives, but are actively negotiated between politically-relevant 
actors within the state. Across Libya, armed groups encounter different incentives and 
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constraints when deciding to use violence in order to advance their interests and 
consolidate their positions in the political hierarchy. 
Studies of civil war dynamics have made several notable developments in overcoming 
reductionist accounts of the agents, modalities, and motivations for violence.64 While the 
failure of state building initiatives in transitional states has driven the shift away from 
national-level determinants towards the local drivers of political conflict, empirical work 
linking the destruction of a central state to specific processes of violence still has a long 
way to come. As armed group fragmentation remains intimately bound up to explanations 
of conflict escalation and de-escalation, political ecology explanations offer a useful 
toolset with which to interrogate the emergence of local conflict systems.  
Both across and within states affected by civil war, we can identify instances in which 
armed group fragmentation increases and decreases levels of conflict. Rather than being 
bound by path-dependence or “imprinting”, scholars must interrogate the conditions 
under which combatant fragmentation leads to escalation of violence and its spatial 
variation by exploring the political structures of the state within which they operate. 
While characterised as a ‘failed state’ with armed groups acting in a power vacuum 
defined by the absence of stable governance, it is more fruitful to view Libya as a 
‘mediated state’ (Menkhaus 2007) where the state exists as one of several socio-political 
constellations contesting to establish authority (Migdal 2001). As such, a national-level 
framework falls short of understanding the trajectory of civil violence and state-building; 
Libya is not defined by a lack of governance but by violent contestations for power that 
create and are created by uneven governance. 
In addition to non-state armed groups, state agents are also engaged in the process of 
renegotiating the political order. To understand the trajectory of the Libyan state, further 
research is required into the institutionalisation of these non-state armed groups into 
formal state structures, including ministries, military brigades, the outsourcing of state 
functions to non-state armed groups and security enforcement.  
  
 
64 See for example Paul Richards’ response to the “New Barbarism” lens on violent conflict in Sierra Leone 
(Richards 1996). 
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9. Conclusion 
Over the past couple of decades, dramatic changes in state-society relations have 
contributed to reshape the political landscape of several states in Africa and the Middle 
East. Amidst these changing political orders, domestic elites across the region face 
heightened competition that threatens their political survival. The strategic use of political 
violence, often resulting in endemic intrastate conflict or all-out civil wars, is understood 
as the by-product of inter-elite competition for political power and influence. 
Manifestations of this violence – including its geographies, overall levels, actors and 
modes – are therefore assumed to somehow reflect the underlying political motivations 
behind its use. 
Drawing on several cases from across the region, this thesis has sought to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of elites’ role in changing political orders in an effort to explain 
observed patterns of violence and political transformations. Rather than conforming to 
uniform political practices, regimes across the region are organised along distinct political 
orders characterised by heterogenous patterns of elite fragmentation, competition, and 
violence. The research project was motivated by an attempt to explain political 
transformations in transitioning states through the lens of domestic political elites, as 
opposed to alternative approaches privileging regional, sectarian, or purely transactional 
explanations. As such, the overarching research question is how political elites’ survival 
strategies shape conflict environments in changing political orders across the 
contemporary Middle East and Africa regions. Relatedly, where does inter-elite 
bargaining occur? How is political violence linked to elite struggles for domination over 
the political settlement? Which geographies of violence and power are set to emerge amid 
heightened political mobilisation? 
These questions are answered in relation to two main themes. First, what institutional 
strategies political elites across Africa and the Middle East use to protect their position in 
the power hierarchy when they face competition from within or outside the regime. I 
explored this theme with reference to the rise of non-party government ministers 
epitomising consensus-based politics in Tunisia (Chapter 4), the use of cabinet reshuffles 
in the aftermath of political unrest across Africa (Chapter 5), and the reconfiguration of 
power structures following the removals of long-standing state leaders in Algeria, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe (Chapter 6). Second, what local configurations of power are conducive to 
subnational geographies and patterns of intrastate violence. Notably, this theme seeks to 
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understand the extent to which local conflict environments reflect the cohesive or 
fragmented nature of political competition driving violence. This is explored in relation 
to two contemporary civil war contexts, including the relative cohesion of elite networks 
involved in an attempted uprising during Yemen’s civil war (Chapter 7) and the 
emergence of distinct wartime political orders in Libya between 2014 and 2017 (Chapter 
8).  
9.1. Summary of findings 
The thesis comprises five analytical chapters, whose findings are outlined in Chapters 4-
8. In addition to these specific research questions, several cross-cutting contributions 
deserve further consideration.  
9.1.1. The elite-conflict nexus 
In understanding violence as a strategic tool for political competition, its empirical 
manifestations illustrate how such competition occurs. Violence does not occur in 
‘ungoverned spaces’ but rather in political orders characterised by the presence of 
multiple political elites competing with each other over access to power and resources. 
Moving away from the ‘failed state’ framework, the role of elites is explored in relation 
to their contribution to subnational state-making practices and the emergence of local 
alliances and geographies of violence. 
As analysed in Chapter 8, conflict patterns are conditional on the nature of the political 
competition that takes place in distinct political orders. Armed group fragmentation does 
not inevitably lead to higher conflict escalation when violence is used for signalling 
purposes, such as the local elites’ desire to extract political or economic rents from the 
government. This embeddedness reveals how local actors entertain political relations with 
regional and national elites, producing subnational political orders and governance 
spaces. Further, chapter 6 and 7 investigates how cohesive support bases are key to 
weather existential regime crises, allowing incumbents to effectively mobilise allies and 
supporters during coup attempts or anti-regime uprisings. Whilst not a guarantee of 
ultimate success, leaders relying on a fragmented support base face higher mobilisation 
costs which patronage resources (or expectations among local elites that such resources 
may dry up in the near future) are unable to sustain. Under the political marketplace 
framework, the relative cohesion of fragmentation of elite networks intensifies the 
volatile and instrumental nature of alliances. 
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9.1.2. Understanding elite inclusion 
The research project also emphasised the importance of understanding inclusion as a 
multidimensional concept that does not merely relate to institutional representation. 
Indeed, it shows that inclusion in state institutions is a poor indicator of elites’ relative 
power. Inclusion is instead interpreted as the ability of elite groups to maintain access to 
power hierarchies within or outside the state. Examples from across the region show that 
patronage-based practices aimed at co-opting key elites and constituencies through the 
conferral ministerial posts are unable to explain the rise of technocratic-led, consensus-
based politics (Chapter 4); that regimes facing heightened unrest or succession challenges 
may reconfigure the ruling coalition through cabinet reshuffles or alliance upgrades, yet 
leaving the regime’s dominant position unscathed (Chapter 5 and 6); that power-sharing 
institutional arrangements are unlikely to be successful if a section of the elites are able 
to exercise disproportionate power through extra-institutional channels (Chapter 7); and 
that a desire of inclusion in the distribution of political and economic rents may produce 
subnational governance relations sustained by a latent threat of violence and a mercantilist 
relation between local elite groups and the regional power holder (Chapter 8). 
These considerations call for a more nuanced understanding of the relation between 
inclusion and political stability. Focusing exclusively on institutional inclusion may 
indeed create channels for greater elite interaction and familiarisation but carries the risk 
of undermining political participation and create grievances both among the insiders and 
the outsiders, echoing situations of ‘political unsettlements’ and ‘stable instability’ 
(Pospisil and Rocha Menocal 2017). 
9.1.3. Strategies of political survival 
When facing heightened political competition, a variety of political survival strategies are 
available to political elites seeking to maintain their access to power. In the political 
marketplace, elite competition occurs among insiders seeking to negotiate a more 
advantageous position, or with outsiders striving to be included in the existing political 
settlement and benefit from rents distribution. To achieve these goals, political elites are 
shown to make significant or cosmetic concessions in order to appease their rivals, as 
well as to unleash violence when their requests are not accommodated.  
Among the case studies proposed in this research project, I show that technocratic 
governance over the past three decades in Tunisia served to neutralise the emergence of 
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political opponents and tame political competition through consensus-based politics. At 
the same time, accommodation strategies through large-scale ministerial reshuffles (i.e. 
crisis cabinets) are not common across the African continent (Chapter 5), but a wider 
reconfiguration of the ruling coalition along with other political concessions – civilian-
led political transitions (at least nominally in some cases), technocratic governance, 
elections – took place following the elite-led removal of long-standing leaders in Algeria, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe (Chapter 6). In these cases, however, the removal of the leader was 
key to preserve the seizing group’s role uncontested. 
9.1.4. How to study elites 
In recent decades, elite studies have benefitted from the greater availability of datasets 
and empirical approaches, and from efforts towards improving conceptual clarity. 
Throughout the thesis, I used original datasets on elites from across the region applying 
a variety of methods to the study their changing composition and behaviour. A large-n 
dataset was constructed to support an in-depth, country-based study of ministerial elites 
in Chapter 4; quantitative methods were used to draw inferences from correlations 
between violence patterns and elite and armed group fragmentation in Chapter 5 and 8; 
while SNA techniques in Chapter 7 provided a background to study how the relative 
cohesion of subnational elite networks influences violence outcomes. Attention was paid 
to delineate their scope and applicability, and to define what type of political elites were 
analysed and why.  
Taken together, these analyses show that empirical analyses of elite structures across 
Africa and the Middle East – which have long suffered from a dearth of empirical data 
and often relied on anecdotal information – can shed light on the interaction between 
political actors and domestic instability. This includes, among other things, the 
mechanisms regulating political appointments in state institutions, government responses 
and strategies of accommodation, as well as how political power arising from network 
positioning can undermine or consolidate institutional hierarchies. An additional 
dimension concerns the way in which regimes further subnational penetration and 
consolidation through the co-option of local elites, moving away from pure nationally-
situated studies. Importantly, this is explored in Chapters 7 and 8, where the emergence 
of distinct subnational political orders, characterised by limited statehood and local 
practices of governance, is studied in relation to the civil war environments of Libya and 
Yemen. 
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9.2. Implications for future research 
The thesis seeks to contribute to future research in several ways. First, the potential for 
elite studies to be extended to cases beyond those analysed here is one of great interest to 
this author. The lack of systematic data collections on elites has long plagued elite studies 
outside Western Europe: analyses of elite behaviour were more often based on 
assumptions, albeit valid, than on evidence-grounded arguments (Perthes 2004). Today, 
the greater availability of data means that it is possible to draw inferences within and 
across states, providing a more extensive and nuanced understanding of how elites operate 
in a variety of contexts. Elite studies would benefit not only from the widening of its 
scope, but also from a vertical integration of elites at multiple levels of the power 
hierarchy. In particular, incorporating local elites into the analyses is of great relevance 
for understanding how power is negotiated and exercised around specific policy issues. 
This research project has highlighted the changing nature of contemporary political elites 
across Africa and the Middle East. Independent, non-party elites, greater hybridisation 
between formal and informal institutions, and an overall greater ethno-regional 
inclusivity mean that the region’s elite landscape is characterised by an ostensible 
heterogeneity of political actors that has transformed deeply-rooted practices of power. 
Understanding how these domestic dynamics are reproduced, and to what effect, is key 
to identify future patterns of change. Additionally, while not specifically addressed in this 
study, interactions with increasingly transnational political economies and changes in 
international alliances are also of great significance: appropriation of military, 
development and humanitarian aid, integration into international energy and commodities 
markets, and geopolitical shifts are only some of the ways in which domestic political 
elites are being constrained, and likewise manipulating, these dynamics. Future research 
should further investigate the conditions and modes of such interactions. 
Second, for decades, discourses on democracy and democratisation meant that the 
academic literature has emphasised studies of democracy over autocracies. Reflecting a 
widely shared ideological bias, “much of [this literature] is saturated with the dubious 
assumption that democratization is a natural, normal, and even inevitable process that all 
states everywhere would undergo if only certain pesky barriers were removed” (Lynch 
2004: 341). A focus on a regime’s atomic elements – its political elites – instead allows 
studying the factual dynamics of power, beyond the specific regimes in which they are 
situated or supposedly progressive or regressive trajectories of democratisation and 
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autocratisation. In Chapter 6, the thesis has shown that understanding political change as 
a cyclical process could better explain why states have often deviated from these 
teleological movements towards democracy or autocracy. 
Future research should further interrogate whether the dynamics explored in this research 
are indeed a distinctive feature of this region, or rather constitute a recurring element of 
elite behaviour across the globe. Existing scholarship on democratic and authoritarian 
learning (Hall and Ambrosio 2017) has highlighted how regime elites absorb political 
survival practices from others in an effort to weather acute crises. The greater availability 
of both disaggregated conflict and elite data should make it possible to extend the scope 
of the investigations – in this research limited to a specifically defined region – and to 
also make broader generalisations into elite behaviour. 
Third, the relationship between elites and violence has wider implications for state-
building discourses. Although academic and policy audiences have increasingly 
incorporated institution- and state-building priorities in their agendas, the ways in which 
state-building processes can contribute to the greater militarisation of political and social 
orders, along with the entrenchment of violence, are still under-explored. In particular, 
this thesis has argued that, in order to understand these processes, it is crucial to further 
explore how collusive exchanges between state and non-state agents are transforming 
governance institutions in conflict or post-conflict settings. Evidence of this is the 
emergence of areas of limited statehood, in which sovereign authority, state functions and 
law enforcement are exercised beyond the boundaries of the state. Rather than reflecting 
state failure, this is a sign of fragmented conflict environments populated by elites 
competing for power. 
Emphasis on the role and the behaviour of elites is equally significant for peacebuilding 
and conflict management policies in violence-affected societies. Policy responses that fail 
to appreciate the networked and relational dimension of power, are unlikely to create 
lasting conditions for the reduction of violence. In doing so, power-sharing agreements 
often design institutional arrangements that are broadly representative on paper, but in 
fact crystallise unequal relations of power and end up exacerbating mistrust among elites 
and groups. This partially explains the failures of international mediation efforts in Libya 
and Yemen, and the ostensibly intractable character of these conflicts. Without adequate 
attention to the local configurations and practices of power, and to the role that spoilers, 
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mediators and stabilisers can play in these contexts, the result will be highly volatile 
political settlements characterised by the continued deterioration and manipulation of 
governance institutions. 
In sum, this research project has sought to demonstrate the heterogeneity of political 
elites across Africa and the Middle East, and how domestic political violence is 
embedded in local competitions for power. In doing so, it has explored several cross-
cutting themes using a comparative approach, along with a variety of case studies 
arising from the region, singling out their significance, limitations and comparability. 
Future research should continue to further combine comparative work with in-depth 
case studies, bridging the gap between a focus on locally situated contexts and wider 
generalisations across the region and beyond. A more integrated approach that takes 
into consideration both the local, specific conditions of elite behaviour, and the broader 
political patterns and environments in which elites operate, would greatly benefit the 
understanding of the mechanisms of power. 
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11. Appendix 
11.1. Non-party ministers and consensual politics in Tunisia 
Table 1: Ministers without party affiliation 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Number 2 3 4 5 5 3 
Number (%) 6.06% 5.88% 9.09% 11.90% 10.20% 6.38%        
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number 2 2 1 2 1 3 
Number (%) 4.65% 4.55% 2.33% 4.35% 2.17% 7.32%        
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number 3 2 10 12 7 7 
Number (%) 5.56% 4.76% 16.95% 18.18% 13.21% 11.29%        
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number 9 7 10 13 12 17 
Number (%) 16.36% 13.73% 17.24% 22.81% 24.00% 31.48% 
       
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number 56 13 26 29 48 30 
Number (%) 56.57% 30.95% 48.15% 100.00% 69.57% 48.39% 
       
Year 2017      
Number 28      
Number (%) 50.00%      
Notes: the table shows the total number and the share of cabinet ministers without any 
recognised party affiliation. 
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Table 2: Ministerial portfolios by political affiliation under Ben Ali 
Ministerial portfolios Non-affiliated Party members 
Education 8 27 
Industry, Trade and Tourism 7 16 
Communications 6 12 
Foreign Affairs 5 18 
Agriculture 4 15 
Development and Cooperation 4 9 
Culture 2 11 
Environment and Transport 2 22 
Economy and Finance 1 11 
Employment 1 8 
Health and Social Affairs 1 28 
Justice 1 9 
Public Service 1 3 
Women, Family and Youth 1 16 
Human Rights  4 
Interior  15 
National Defence  10 
Religious Affairs  5 
State Property  4 
Other 1 17 
Notes: the table shows the total number and the share of cabinet ministers by their 
respective professional background. (Source: author’s own elaboration). 
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Table 3: Regional origin of ministers and cumulated length of ministerial tenure 
 All ministers Independent ministers 
  
Number 
Share 
(%) 
Months 
in office 
Share of 
months in 
office 
(%) 
Number 
Share 
(%) 
Months 
in office 
Share of 
months in 
office 
(%) 
Grand 
Tunis 
56 27.45% 2595 21.63% 16 41.03% 655 48.77% 
Sousse 25 12.25% 2087 17.39% 6 15.38% 198 14.74% 
Monastir 15 7.35% 1161 9.68% 3 7.69% 136 10.13% 
Nabeul 15 7.35% 845 7.04% 1 2.56% 13 0.97% 
Kairouan 12 5.88% 542 4.52% 2 5.13% 80 5.96% 
Sfax 11 5.39% 859 7.16% 2 5.13% 102 7.59% 
Gabes 8 3.92% 482 4.02%  0% 0 0% 
Gafsa 7 3.43% 242 2.02% 2 5.13% 41 3.05% 
Medenine 7 3.43% 601 5.01%  0% 0 0% 
Mahdia 6 2.94% 197 1.64% 3 7.69% 72 5.36% 
Bizerte 6 2.94% 185 1.54% 1 2.56% 17 1.27% 
Tozeur 4 1.96% 525 4.38%  0% 0 0% 
Beja 3 1.47% 169 1.41%  0% 0 0% 
Jendouba 2 0.98% 129 1.08% 1 2.56% 4 0.30% 
Kasserine 2 0.98% 208 1.73%  0% 0 0% 
Siliana 2 0.98% 145 1.21% 1 2.56% 5 0.37% 
Le Kef 1 0.49% 199 1.66%  0% 0 0% 
Sidi 
Bouzid 
1 0.49% 18 0.15%  0% 0 0% 
Tataouine 1 0.49% 108 0.90%  0% 0 0% 
Kebili 0 0% 0 0%  0% 0 0% 
Zaghouan 0 0% 0 0%  0% 0 0% 
Unknown 21 10.29% 702 5.85% 1 2.56% 20 1.49% 
Total 204 100% 11,999 100% 39 100% 11,999 100% 
Notes: the table reports the total number of ministers and the cumulated length of 
ministerial tenure and their respective share on the total for all Tunisian governorates. 
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Table 4: Ministerial portfolios by political affiliation between 2011 and 2017 
Ministerial portfolios Non-affiliated Party members 
Education 9 5 
Industry, Trade and Tourism 19 13 
Communications 1 2 
Foreign Affairs 9 9 
Agriculture 8 4 
Development and Cooperation 7 5 
Culture 7 0 
Environment and Transport 14 13 
Economy and Finance 10 4 
Employment 4 5 
Health and Social Affairs 10 11 
Justice 6 1 
Public Service 3 2 
Women, Family and Youth 12 8 
Human Rights 3 2 
Interior 9 3 
National Defence 4 1 
Religious Affairs 7 0 
State Property 3 2 
Other 5 7 
Notes: the table shows the total number and the share of cabinet ministers by their 
respective professional background. (Source: author’s own elaboration). 
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Table 5: Regional origin of ministers and cumulated length of ministerial tenure 
(January 2011 – December 2017) 
 All ministers Independent ministers 
  
Number 
Share 
(%) 
Months 
in office 
Share of 
months in 
office 
(%) 
Number 
Share 
(%) 
Months 
in office 
Share of 
months in 
office 
(%) 
Grand 
Tunis 
64 29.41% 854 27.12% 47 33.33% 518 29.77% 
Sousse 16 7.24% 189 6.00% 5 3.55% 59 3.39% 
Monastir 13 5.88% 212 6.73% 10 7.09% 127 7.30% 
Nabeul 15 6.79% 241 7.65% 10 7.09% 129 7.41% 
Kairouan 5 2.26% 90 2.86% 3 2.13% 60 3.45% 
Sfax 18 8.14% 253 8.03% 12 8.51% 119 6.84% 
Gabes 10 4.52% 124 3.94% 7 4.96% 81 4.66% 
Gafsa 7 3.17% 57 1.81% 4 2.84% 27 1.55% 
Medenine 18 8.14% 254 8.07% 9 6.38% 110 6.32% 
Mahdia 8 3.62% 142 4.51% 7 4.96% 115 6.61% 
Bizerte 8 3.62% 164 5.21% 3 2.13% 64 3.68% 
Tozeur 6 2.71% 107 3.40% 3 2.13% 66 3.79% 
Beja 3 1.36% 50 1.59% 1 0.71% 19 1.09% 
Jendouba 4 1.81% 67 2.13% 1 0.71% 8 0.46% 
Kasserine 7 3.17% 95 3.02% 5 3.55% 76 4.37% 
Siliana 2 0.90% 27 0.86% 2 1.42% 13 0.75% 
Le Kef 4 1.81% 80 2.54% 3 2.13% 55 3.16% 
Sidi 
Bouzid 
5 2.26% 57 1.81% 3 2.13% 33 1.90% 
Tataouine 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Internatio
nal 
1 0.45% 10 0.32% 1 0.71% 10 0.57% 
Kebili 1 0.45% 11 0.35% 1 0.71% 11 0.63% 
Zaghouan 1 0.45% 25 0.79% 0 0% 0 0% 
Unknown 4 1.81% 40 1.27% 4 2.84% 40 2.30% 
Total 221 100% 11,999 100% 141 100% 11,999 100% 
Notes: the table reports the total number of ministers and the cumulated length of 
ministerial tenure and their respective share on the total for all Tunisian governorates. 
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Table 6: Professional background of ministers, November 1987 - January 2011 
Professional background 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Number 
(%) 
Non-
affiliated 
Non-
affiliated 
(%) 
Public administration (diplomats, 
magistrates, ministerial officials) 
103 50.74% 17 43.59% 
Teaching, research 49 24.14% 15 38.46% 
Private sector (corporate managers, 
entrepreneurs, bankers) 
9 4.43% 2 5.13% 
Army, police 5 2.46% 0 0.00% 
Other (physicians, engineers, pharmacists) 23 11.33% 5 12.82% 
Unknown 15 7.39% 0 0.00% 
Notes: The table shows the total number and the share of cabinet ministers by their 
respective professional background. (Source: author’s own elaboration). 
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Table 7: Professional background of ministers, January 2011 - December 2017 
Professional background 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Number 
(%) 
Non-
affiliated 
Non-
affiliated 
(%) 
Public administration (diplomats, 
magistrates, ministerial officials) 
77 35.16% 59 42.14% 
Teaching, research 57 26.03% 37 26.43% 
Private sector (corporate managers, 
entrepreneurs, bankers) 
24 10.96% 14 10.10% 
Lawyers 15 6.85% 5 3.57% 
Army, police 2 0.91% 2 1.43% 
Other (physicians, engineers, pharmacists) 42 19.18% 21 15.00% 
Unknown 2 0.91% 2 1.43% 
Notes: The table shows the total number and the share of cabinet ministers by their 
respective professional background. (Source: author’s own elaboration). 
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11.2. Crisis cabinets and the influence of protests on elite volatility in 
Africa 
Table 1: ACLED Variables 
Variable Description 
Demonstrations in 
Previous Six 
Months 
The number of discreet events involving riots or protests in the 
previous six months. 
Percent Change in 
Demonstrations 
The percent increase or decrease between the number of 
demonstrations in the previous six months and those in the prior 
six-month period. 
Demonstrations as a 
Percent of Conflict 
The proportion of total conflict events in the previous six months 
which are demonstrations. 
Number of Clusters 
100km  
This counts the number of distinct clusters of protest. 
Demonstrations within 50km or 100km of each other are counted 
as the same cluster.65 
Herfindahl Index of 
Clusters 
A Herfindahl index which captures the degree of fragmentation 
among the clusters. A high value shows that one cluster is 
responsible for the majority of demonstration events while a low 
value shows an even distribution of demonstrations across clusters. 
 
  
 
65 This is achieved through hierarchical clustering methods with the distance (in kilometres) between events 
used to dictate the cutting threshold. 
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Table 2: ‘Crisis Cabinets’ in Africa, 2007-201866 
 Ministerial 
Turnover 
(%) 
Preceding Crisis 
Burundi (2007) 52.17 
Following the resignation of Vice President Martin 
Nduwimana, Burundian President Pierre 
Nkurunziza creates a ‘government of national 
consensus’ which includes opposition parties. 
Central African 
Republic (2008) 
50.00 
Prime Minister Elie Dote resigns after a threatened 
vote of no confidence following a public sector 
strike over payment arrears. 
Central African 
Republic 
(February 2013) 
82.76 
President Bozizé forms a unity government in an 
attempt to stall the territorial gains of the rebel 
Séléka coalition. 
Central African 
Republic (April 
2013) 
53.85 
Séléka political leader Michel Djotodia becomes 
president after the ouster of Bozizé. 
Central African 
Republic (2014) 
79.31 
Michel Djotodia steps down amid escalating 
sectarian violence. The recently created National 
Transitional Council elect Catherine Samba-Panza 
as the interim president. 
Ethiopia (April 
2018) 
52.50 
Ahmed Abiy is elected leader of the ruling Ethiopia 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
and appointed Prime Minister following the 
resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn amid ongoing 
protests. 
Ethiopia 
(October 2018) 
53.33 
Abiy makes another large cabinet reshuffle in the 
face of continued protest, ethnic violence and a 
potential attempted coup by the military. 
Guinea 2007 88.89 
Protests force President Lansana Conte to name a 
new Prime Minister from a shortlist of candidates 
selected by unions and civil society groups. The 
trade union candidate, Lansana Kouyate, is 
appointed. 
Guinea 2008 60.00 
After the launch of a corruption audit by the 
executive, President Conte fires Prime Minister 
Kouyate. 
Guinea 2009 85.29 
After President Conte’s death, a faction of the 
military led by Captain Dadis Camara launches a 
coup. 
 
66 Only Ethiopia includes 2018 data.  
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Guinea 2010 60.00 
Defence Minister Sekouba Konate becomes interim 
President after Dadis Camara is injured by a former 
aid amid ongoing unrest. 
Malawi 2012 61.11 
President Mutharika dies in office. Vice-President 
Joyce Banda takes over as leader. Banda had been 
expelled from the ruling party after failing to support 
Mutharika’s plan to nominate his brother as 
successor. 
Mali 2012 100.00 
Soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo launch a 
coup after the army is routed by Tuareg rebels in the 
north of the country. 
Nigeria 2010 100.00 
Acting President Goodluck Jonatan removes cabinet 
ministers loyal to the ailing President Musa 
Yar’Adua. 
Tunisia 2011 100.00 
Widespread demonstrations force long-time 
president Ben Ali to flee the country. An interim 
government takes over.  
Tunisia 2014 92.86 
Ennadha government resigns as a part of a political 
agreement with opposition parties to break Tunisia’s 
political deadlock. 
Tunisia 2016 67.74 
Prime Minister Habib Essid is voted out in a 
parliamentary vote of no confidence. 
Zimbabwe 2017 54.55 
President Robert Mugabe is deposed by a coup led 
by the former Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa and his military allies. The coup comes 
after years of tensions within the ruling party over 
who would succeed Mugabe. 
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Table 3: Cabinet Volatility in Crisis Cabinets 
 
Protest-Related 
Crisis Cabinets 
(N = 3) 
Other Crisis 
Cabinets 
(N = 18) 
All 
Reshuffles 
(N = 417) 
Percent Change in Personnel 87.65 69.72 16.21 
Percent Change in Inner Circle 79.76 70.12 19.12 
Change in Representation -3.31 -0.50 0.09 
Change in Inner Circle 
Representation 
6.25 4.19 0.19 
Change in Disproportion -1.22 3.19 0.00 
Change in Inner Circle 
Disproportion 
0.59 0.49 -0.06 
Mean Tenure of Dropped 
Ministers 
61.98 24.87 35.84 
Regime Legislative Seats at 
Previous Election 
75.23 65.31 56.82 
VDEM Score of Democracy 0.18 0.40 0.51 
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Figure 1: Protest against Ministerial Volatility – Autocracy vs Democracy67 
 
 
67 Democratic observations have a VDEM score of 0.5 or over, Autocratic observations have a VDEM 
score of under 0.5. 
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Figure 2: Protest against Ministerial Volatility – Hegemonic vs Competitive Regimes 
68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Hegemonic observations have a regime which occupies more than two thirds of the seats in the lower 
house, while competitive regimes occupy less than two thirds. 
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Table 4: ACPED Variables 
Variable Description 
Percent Change in 
Personnel/Percent 
Change in Inner Circle  
Calculates the number of dropped ministers as a percentage of 
the previous cabinet’s size. Can also be applied to more 
important posts known as the ‘inner circle’. 69  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =  (1 −
P − D
𝑃
) ∗ 100 
P represents previous cabinet/inner circle size, while D 
represents the number of ministers dropped from the 
cabinet/inner circle. 
Change in 
Representation 
Government ‘representation’ is assessed by calculating the 
percent of primary administrative divisions which have a 
representative in cabinet. The index assumes a value between 0 
and 100, where 100 means total representation of all politically 
relevant regional in the population. This variable is applied to 
the whole cabinet and the inner circle. During cabinet 
reshuffles, a change in representation measure is created 
through subtracting current representation against the previous 
cabinet-month’s value. 
Change in 
Disproportion 
The disproportion measure calculates whether representatives 
in a cabinet have a share of the seats that reflects their regional 
population. The measure is an indication of whether power in a 
cabinet is balanced between included groups and adapted from 
studies by Samuels and Snyder (2001).70 
𝐷𝐼𝑆 =  (
1
2
) ∑ ￨𝑥𝑖  − 𝑦𝑖￨
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Sigma indicates the summation over all region i, xi is the 
percentage of all cabinet positions allocated to province i, and 
yi is the percentage of population living in region i. This 
measure is applied only to identity groups occupying at least 
one post within the cabinet. During cabinet reshuffles, a change 
in disproportion measure is created through subtracting current 
disproportion against the previous cabinet-month’s value. 
 
69 All cabinet posts are not of equal importance and existing studies on cabinet composition agree that 
different posts hold different degrees of importance (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015). Consequently, 
posts in the cabinet are further separated into the inner circle posts, representing posts which hold significant 
power over the state apparatus, and outer circle posts which generally deal with service provision and 
cultural issues. 
70 A score of 10 would indicate that 10 percent of cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not 
receive them if posts were distributed purely on population. 
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Mean Tenure of 
Dismissed Ministers 
An average tenure (in number of months) of ministers dropped 
from the cabinet prior to their dismissal. 
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11.3. Taming the snakes. The Houthis, Saleh and the struggle for power in 
Yemen 
Table 1: Number of political elites by institutional affiliation 
Year Cabinet 
Supreme 
Political 
Council 
Military Security Total 
2017 50 14 10 6 80 
2018 48 10 8 7 73 
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Table 2: Number of political elites by institutional affiliation and political party 
Year Cabinet 
Supreme 
Political 
Council 
Military Security Total 
GPC 15 3 0 1 19 
Houthis 23 5 8 5 41 
Others 9 2 0 1 12 
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Table 3: Political elite network's summary metrics in 2017 
Measures Overall network GPC Houthis 
Number of nodes 77 28 35 
Number of links 598 20 335 
Number of isolates 9 5 5 
Density71 0,204 0,053 0,563 
Average degree72 15,532 1,429 19,143 
Average clustering coefficient73 0,813 0,694 0,914 
Average path length74 2,166 1,607 1,261 
 
71 Density measures the proportion of actual ties in a network over the highest number of possible 
connections. In other words, density indicates the probability that a tie exists between any pair of nodes. 
72 The average degree measures the average number of connections each node has. 
73 The clustering coefficient is a measure of the extent to which nodes tend to cluster together. The higher 
the value, the more likely nodes create groups with a high number of ties. 
74 The average path length ratio is the average number of links in the shortest path that are necessary to 
connect a pair of nodes in the network. 
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Table 4: Political elite network's summary metrics in 2018 
Measures Overall network GPC Houthis 
Number of nodes 68 18 37 
Number of links 626 9 382 
Number of isolates 7 6 3 
Density 0,275 0,059 0,574 
Average degree 18,412 1 20,649 
Average clustering coefficient 0,879 0,778 0,909 
Average path length 1,777 1,2 1,513 
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11.4. Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict 
Systems in the Libyan Civil War 
Table 1: Actor dyad by region 
  Western Libya Eastern Libya Southern Libya Total 
  
Event
s 
Share 
(%) 
Event
s 
Share 
(%) 
Event
s 
Share 
(%) 
Event
s 
Share 
(%) 
Militia 52 4.15% 36 3.22% 11 4.89% 99 3.81% 
Militia vs. Militia 647 51.59% 47 4.20% 143 63.56% 837 32.23% 
Militia vs. Private Security Forces 19 1.52% 6 0.54% 4 1.78% 29 1.12% 
Militia vs. State Forces 110 8.77% 610 54.56% 46 20.44% 766 29.50% 
Rebel Groups 25 1.99% 15 1.34% 0 0% 40 1.54% 
Rebel Groups vs. Militia 210 16.75% 297 26.57% 17 7.56% 524 20.18% 
Rebel Groups vs. Private Security 
Forces 
40 3.19% 4 0.36% 1 0.44% 45 1.73% 
Rebel Groups vs. State Forces 151 12.04% 103 9.21% 3 1.33% 257 9.90% 
Grand Total 1'254 100.00% 1'118 100.00% 225 100.00% 2'597 100.00% 
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Table 2: Whole Libya 
  May 2014 June 2014 July 2014 August 2014 
September 
2014 
October 
2014 
Events 64 73 89 81 114 143 
Fatalities 151 73 286 259 465 562 
Actor Count 13 12 10 10 18 23 
Fragmentation 7.70667 4.46897 5.29125 5.15751 11.05200 6.63680 
       
 
November 
2014 
December 
2014 
January 
2015 
February 
2015 
March 2015 April 2015 
Events 137 87 74 73 120 135 
Fatalities 257 266 242 404 207 232 
Actor Count 21 17 10 10 17 18 
Fragmentation 3.94404 5.79570 4.69967 5.71018 4.91124 6.03348 
       
 May 2015 June 2015 July 2015 August 2015 
September 
2015 
October 
2015 
Events 99 70 87 66 59 57 
Fatalities 266 264 274 273 191 85 
Actor Count 19 21 17 16 21 15 
Fragmentation 6.86136 5.82902 5.65399 3.06383 5.76901 8.04103 
       
 
November 
2015 
December 
2015 
January 
2016 
February 
2016 
March 2016 April 2016 
Events 73 50 80 67 59 59 
Fatalities 145 112 179 241 160 189 
Actor Count 15 15 23 11 22 15 
Fragmentation 4.53097 7.26744 8.90161 5.61938 8.91910 4.49284 
       
 May 2016 June 2016 July 2016 August 2016 
September 
2016 
October 
2016 
Events 55 95 55 61 53 47 
Fatalities 146 379 281 269 144 192 
Actor Count 16 13 10 13 10 13 
Fragmentation 4.88219 3.67249 3.90173 4.58816 5.06931 3.76578 
       
 
November 
2016 
December 
2016 
January 
2017 
February 
2017 
March 2017 April 2017 
Events 69 54 47 51 82 43 
Fatalities 283 416 201 92 198 49 
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Actor Count 15 15 14 15 12 14 
Fragmentation 5.45455 7.67041 4.04192 10.68905 5.65166 3.76578 
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Table 3: Tripoli and Western Libya 
  May 2014 June 2014 July 2014 August 2014 
September 
2014 
October 
2014 
Events 17 10 35 46 39 31 
Fatalities 17 1 104 126 318 193 
Actor Count 6 2 6 7 9 6 
Fragmentation 5.42169 1.31579 3.94224 4.23693 6.39183 3.41993 
  
November 
2014 
December 
2014 
January 
2015 
February 
2015 
March 2015 April 2015 
Events 46 55 41 31 66 65 
Fatalities 100 144 141 101 109 109 
Actor Count 16 10 6 6 9 10 
Fragmentation 6.84725 4.80501 5.57017 5.32719 5.04793 6.36068 
  May 2015 June 2015 July 2015 August 2015 
September 
2015 
October 
2015 
Events 35 28 17 25 18 27 
Fatalities 90 33 7 197 33 40 
Actor Count 14 14 9 11 14 10 
Fragmentation 7.75637 5.97931 5.43478 5.44444 8.25714 6.38801 
  
November 
2015 
December 
2015 
January 
2016 
February 
2016 
March 2016 April 2016 
Events 21 19 37 24 34 18 
Fatalities 20 43 124 111 83 28 
Actor Count 8 10 14 6 16 12 
Fragmentation 4.78505 4.51867 6.55527 4.21053 9.65563 7.31429 
  May 2016 June 2016 July 2016 August 2016 
September 
2016 
October 
2016 
Events 31 52 24 38 35 37 
Fatalities 120 255 155 157 90 157 
Actor Count 10 10 5 8 7 8 
Fragmentation 4.52566 3.62862 2.78884 4.36017 4.72289 4.91546 
  
November 
2016 
December 
2016 
January 
2017 
February 
2017 
March 2017 April 2017 
Events 24 32 12 27 44 8 
Fatalities 85 341 114 39 89 20 
Actor Count 7 9 9 12 9 5 
Fragmentation 3.77753 7.81679 5.82759 9.73128 5.35542 5.45161 
 
 
219 
 
 
Table 4: Benghazi and Eastern Libya 
  May 2014 June 2014 July 2014 August 2014 
September 
2014 
October 
2014 
Events 42 58 54 34 65 106 
Fatalities 110 59 182 133 129 352 
Actor Count 6 9 6 6 9 14 
Fragmentation 3.56790 3.73563 2.72544 2.37097 2.97674 3.52574 
  
November 
2014 
December 
2014 
January 
2015 
February 
2015 
March 2015 April 2015 
Events 84 30 29 40 36 66 
Fatalities 143 122 83 302 49 111 
Actor Count 3 4 4 4 6 5 
Fragmentation 1.06608 1.49492 1.39821 2.30233 1.42857 1.59494 
  May 2015 June 2015 July 2015 August 2015 
September 
2015 
October 
2015 
Events 52 38 55 35 39 30 
Fatalities 151 220 182 60 128 45 
Actor Count 6 4 4 2 6 7 
Fragmentation 2.32718 2.88615 2.68528 1.73727 2.64522 3.57143 
  
November 
2015 
December 
2015 
January 
2016 
February 
2016 
March 2016 April 2016 
Events 50 31 38 39 23 39 
Fatalities 110 69 37 97 76 159 
Actor Count 6 5 9 4 4 5 
Fragmentation 2.43682 4.23348 5.51145 3.09715 1.70940 2.14536 
  May 2016 June 2016 July 2016 August 2016 
September 
2016 
October 
2016 
Events 23 43 30 22 16 7 
Fatalities 26 124 124 104 47 35 
Actor Count 4 5 6 4 4 3 
Fragmentation 2.14074 1.77301 3.18421 2.24561 2.39024 2.66667 
  
November 
2016 
December 
2016 
January 
2017 
February 
2017 
March 2017 April 2017 
Events 35 17 31 22 34 10 
Fatalities 170 65 86 49 109 9 
Actor Count 4 3 5 5 4 4 
Fragmentation 1.49492 1.55556 1.71930 2.65138 3.21905 2.90909 
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Table 5: Southern Libya 
  May 2014 June 2014 July 2014 August 2014 
September 
2014 
October 
2014 
Events 5 5 0 1 10 6 
Fatalities 24 13 0 0 18 17 
Actor Count 2 3 0 1 5 5 
Fragmentation 2.00000 2.77778 0.00000 1.00000 3.96703 3.45714 
  
November 
2014 
December 
2014 
January 
2015 
February 
2015 
March 2015 April 2015 
Events 7 2 4 2 18 4 
Fatalities 14 0 18 1 49 12 
Actor Count 5 4 3 1 6 5 
Fragmentation 3.27273 4.00000 2.66667 1.00000 4.24561 3.76923 
  May 2015 June 2015 July 2015 August 2015 
September 
2015 
October 
2015 
Events 12 4 15 6 2 0 
Fatalities 25 11 85 16 30 0 
Actor Count 4 4 5 5 2 0 
Fragmentation 3.07273 3.76923 2.88589 4.45455 2.00000 0.00000 
  
November 
2015 
December 
2015 
January 
2016 
February 
2016 
March 2016 April 2016 
Events 2 0 5 4 2 2 
Fatalities 15  18 33 1 2 
Actor Count 2 1 3 2 4 2 
Fragmentation 2.00000 1.00000 2.45455 2.00000 4.00000 2.00000 
  May 2016 June 2016 July 2016 August 2016 
September 
2016 
October 
2016 
Events 1 0 1 1 2 3 
Fatalities 0 0 2 8 7 0 
Actor Count 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Fragmentation 2.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.00000 3.00000 
  
November 
2016 
December 
2016 
January 
2017 
February 
2017 
March 2017 April 2017 
Events 10 5 4 2 4 25 
Fatalities 28 10 1 4 0 20 
Actor Count 4 5 1 1 2 5 
Fragmentation 2.56000 4.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.80000 1.71930 
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Table 6: Number of first-level administrative divisions in which non-state actors 
were recorded active 
  
Western 
Libya 
Eastern 
Libya 
Southern 
Libya 
Grand 
Total 
Misratah Communal Militia (Libya) 10 
 
5 15 
Islamic State (Cyrenaica Province) 4 8 2 14 
Zintan Ethnic Militia (Libya) 8 3 2 13 
Islamic State (Tripoli) 9 2 
 
11 
Gharyan Communal Militia (Libya) 8 
  
8 
Tabu Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
 
2 6 8 
Ansar al-Sharia 
 
7 
 
7 
Libya Shield Brigade 5 1 1 7 
Militia (Ibrahim Jadran) 2 2 3 7 
Wershefana Communal Militia (Libya) 7 
  
7 
Libyan Rebel Forces 2 4 
 
6 
Operation Libya Dawn 6 
  
6 
Brigades for the Defence of Benghazi 2 2 1 5 
Zawiya Communal Militia (Libya) 5 
  
5 
Al Qaqa Brigade 4 
  
4 
Omar Mukhtar Brigade 
 
3 1 4 
Tuareg Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
  
4 4 
101 Battalion (Tajoura) 3 
  
3 
Awlad Suleiman Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
 
2 3 
Janzur Communal Militia (Libya) 3 
  
3 
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement 
 
1 2 3 
Margahni Clan Militia (Libya) 3 
  
3 
The Steadfastness Front 3 
  
3 
Zuwarah Communal Militia (Libya) 3 
  
3 
Abu Obeida Brigade 2 
  
2 
Al-Barasa Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
 
2 
 
2 
Al-Kanni Brigade 2 
  
2 
Ali Hassan Al-Jabar Brigade 
 
2 
 
2 
AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
 
1 1 2 
BRSC: Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries 1 1 
 
2 
El-Mashashia Ethnic Militia (Libya) 2 
  
2 
Henish Clan Militia (Libya) 2 
  
2 
Janzur Knights Brigade 2 
  
2 
LROR: Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room 2 
  
2 
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Rafallah Sehati Brigade 
 
2 
 
2 
Sabratha Communal Militia (Libya) 2 
  
2 
Tajoura Communal Militia (Libya) 2 
  
2 
Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade 2 
  
2 
Zawiya Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 1 2 
Abu Ghilan Brigade 1 
  
1 
Abu Raawi Brigade 1 
  
1 
Abu Salim Brigade 1 
  
1 
Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Ahmad Al-Sharif Battalion 
  
1 1 
Ajdabiya Border Division 
 
1 
 
1 
Ajdabiya Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council 
 
1 
 
1 
Ajilat Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Al Farouq Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Al Hasawna Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
  
1 1 
Al Qaeda 
 
1 
 
1 
Al-Bla’za Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Al-Buni Brigade 1 
  
1 
Al-Burayqah Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Al-Fateh Al-Jaded Party 
  
1 1 
Al-Keba Brigade 1 
  
1 
Al-Raqaiat Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Ali Ibn Abi Talib Brigade 1 
  
1 
Arab Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Arouba Brigade 1 
  
1 
Artillery and Missles Brigade 1 
  
1 
Awlad Garbou Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Bab al-Tajoura Brigade 1 
  
1 
Basbusa Clan Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Bashir Sadawi Brigade 1 
  
1 
Ben Nayal Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
  
1 1 
Berber Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Brega Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
CCA: Counter Crime Agency 
 
1 
 
1 
El-Farouk Brigade 1 
  
1 
El-Marsa Brigade 1 
  
1 
February 17 Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
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Firjan Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Free Libya Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Furq Al-Sadisa Battalion 1 
  
1 
Furqan Brigade 1 
  
1 
Ihsan Brigade 1 
  
1 
Islamic State (Fezzan Province) and Islamic State (Fezzan) 
  
1 1 
Islamist Militia (Algeria) 1 
  
1 
Jibreel Abaya Militia 1 
  
1 
Khadrawi Clan Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Kiklah Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Libya Misratan Mujahideen 1 
  
1 
Libya National Guard and Libyan National Guards 1 
  
1 
Militia (Pro-Government) 
 
1 
 
1 
Misrata Martyrs Brigade 1 
  
1 
Msallata Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Muslim Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Nahaj Clan Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Najaa Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
National Mobile Force (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Nawasi Brigade 1 
  
1 
Obeidat Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
 
1 
 
1 
Private Security Forces (Italy) 1 
  
1 
Private Security Forces (Sudan) 1 
  
1 
Qadhadhfa Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
  
1 1 
Revolutionaries of the Western Area 1 
  
1 
Sahawat Forces 
 
1 
 
1 
Salah al-Burki Brigade 1 
  
1 
Shaafyin Ethnic Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Sharikan Militia 1 
  
1 
Shield Militia 
 
1 
 
1 
Shura Council of Darnah Mujahidin 
 
1 
 
1 
Shura Council of Islamic Youth 
 
1 
 
1 
Shura Council of the Mujahideen Surman 1 
  
1 
Sixth Security Brigade 1 
  
1 
SLM/A-Minnawi: Sudan 
Liberation 
Movement/Army 
(Minnawi Faction) 
 
1 1 
Special Deterrence Forces 1 
  
1 
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Subol Al-Salam Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Surman Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Tarhouna Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Tariq Ibn Ziyad Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Tawhid al-Salafiya 
 
1 
 
1 
The Rapid Intervention Force 1 
  
1 
Those Who Signed in Blood 1 
  
1 
Tiger Militia 1 
  
1 
Tripoli Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (First Division) 1 
  
1 
Truth Martyrs 1 
  
1 
Zintan Martyrs Brigade 
 
1 
 
1 
Zliten Communal Militia (Libya) 1 
  
1 
Zwai Ethnic Militia (Libya) 
  
1 1 
 
